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PUBLIC SYMBOL IN PRIVATE CONTRACT:  
A CASE STUDY  
ANNA GELPERN  
MITU GULATI∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article revisits a recent shift in standard form sovereign bond 
contracts to promote collective action among creditors. Major press 
outlets welcomed the shift as a milestone in fighting financial crises 
that threatened the global economy. Officials said it was a triumph of 
market forces. We turned to it for insights into contract change and 
crisis management. This article is based on our work in the sovereign 
debt community, including over 100 interviews with investors, 
lawyers, economists, and government officials. Despite the publicity 
surrounding contract reform, in private few participants described the 
substantive change as an effective response to financial crises; many 
said it was simply unimportant. They explained their own participation 
in the shift as a mix of symbolic gesture and political maneuver, 
designed to achieve goals apart from solving the technical problems 
for which the new contract terms offered a fix. Contract terms were 
adopted for what they said, instead of or in addition to what they did. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 1997 a developing country defied convention. It issued New 
York law bonds that let 75 percent of the bondholders change key 
financial terms.1 Until then, standard form New York law contracts 
required unanimous consent. But no one seemed to notice the innovation, 
and just about no one followed suit. 
In February 2003 another developing country issued New York law 
bonds with a 75 percent amendment threshold.2 This time, the world of 
 
 
 1. See Republic of Kazakhstan, Offering Circular, $350 Million, 8.375 Percent Notes Due 2002 
(issued Oct. 1, 1997) (on file with authors). 
 2. See United Mex. States, Pricing Supplement and Prospectus, $1 Billion (Feb. 2003) (on file 
with authors). 
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international finance erupted in applause and criticism. Major press 
outlets, finance ministers, and senior executives publicly pondered the 
shift.3 Other countries adopted similar provisions under the rubric of 
“Collective Action Clauses” or “CACs.” Academic study of sovereign 
debt contracts took on new importance. This article is part of an effort to 
understand what happened and what it means. 
Standard—or “boilerplate”—terms in complex financial contracts 
rarely change.4 The prevalent theoretical explanation of boilerplate 
attributes its existence to learning and network effects and associated 
“switching costs.”5 This body of theory suggests that market participants 
attach value to contract terms either because they have been used in the 
past and are well known (learning effects), or are widely used now and/or 
are expected to be widely used in the future (network effects).6 As a result, 
firms might adopt terms that are suboptimal on their own merits just 
because they are well understood or widely used. Switching may be costly 
for a single firm because it takes time and effort to produce a new term 
that works and to educate the target audience about its meaning. There is 
no guarantee that investors, analysts, and judges will interpret a new term 
in a way that is favorable to its original proponent or, as the example in 
our opening paragraphs illustrates, that others will adopt the term in the 
foreseeable future. 
Boilerplate change is poorly understood because it happens rarely, 
slowly, and quietly. Contract terms do not normally feature on the editorial 
pages of The Wall Street Journal, The Economist, or The Financial Times, 
or in dozens of academic studies across law, economics, and political 
science. Against this background, the dramatic and public shift in 
sovereign bond documentation beginning in 2003 offers a rare perspective 
on the contracting process and boilerplate change. 
The CAC episode is unusual in another respect. World leaders 
generally do not know what boilerplate is, much less advocate for it in 
 
 
 3. See, e.g., Statement of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Apr. 12, 2006), 
http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/news/previous_news/ministerial_meetings_communiques/st
atement_of_g-7_finance_ministers_and_central_bank_governors.html. See also infra Part III. An 
April 25, 2006, Westlaw search in the ALLNEWS database for articles discussing “Collective Action 
Clauses” in the sovereign debt context yielded over 400 hits, including many references to official 
statements. 
 4. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985); Marcel 
Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or “The 
Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997).  
 5. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 4, at 719–30. 
 6. See id. at 719–28.  
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communiqués reserved for big-picture concerns such as global economic 
imbalances. Yet for nearly a decade CACs had a guaranteed spot in 
summit statements alongside financial stability and currency regimes.7 
Moreover, boilerplate theory does not usually contemplate a leading role 
for the public sector in promoting optimal private contract terms.8 But in 
the case of Collective Action Clauses, governments not party to the 
contracts got credit for driving the shift.9 Judging from recent policy 
initiatives, the apparent success of the CAC campaign may have spawned 
a new model of framing economic policy proposals in terms of private 
contract reform. The latest public-sector effort to promote GDP-indexed 
bonds cites the CAC experience as an inspiration, and even adopts some of 
the organizational features of the earlier initiative, such as the expert 
contract drafting group.10 
For all its value as precedent, the public sector’s role in the CAC 
episode remains unexplored. Proponents in the Bush II administration 
called the shift “market-based” even as market commentary attributed it to 
government pressure.11 On the other hand, neither the United States nor 
any other G-7 government appears to have issued direct threats or bribes—
the traditional instruments of “hard power.”12 Financial industry regulators 
refused to mandate CACs or otherwise promote their inclusion; instead, 
pressure came in the form of exhortations by economic policy officials.13 
Did the “soft power”14 of G-7 ideas convince developing countries of the 
inherent virtues of CACs? No emerging market official would tell us that 
 
 
 7. E.g., Press Release, White House, U.S. Actions at the G-8 Summit (June 2, 2003), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030602-10.html; Press Release, Can. Dep’t of 
Fin., G-7 Finance Ministers Adopt Financial Crises Action Plan (Apr. 20, 2002), http://www.fin.gc.ca/ 
news02/02-034e.html; Dehli Communique, G-20 Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank Governors’ 
Meeting (Nov. 23, 2002), http://www.g20.org/documents/communiques/ 2002_india.pdf.  
 8. It does not preclude a role for the public sector either. In their study, Kahan and Klausner 
advocate private standard-setting bodies for contracts on the model of the existing standard-setting 
bodies for industrial products, some of which are state-run. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 4, at 
761–65.  
 9. See infra Part III.A–C.  
 10. See Int’l Monetary Fund, G-24 Seminar on GDP-Indexed Bonds (Apr. 21, 2006), 
http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.asp?eventid=577 (webcast). 
 11. See infra Part III.B.  
 12. One way of exerting economic power is through loan conditionality of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), trade, or other agreement links. See, e.g., Jeffrey Sachs, Conditionality, Debt 
Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Crisis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
2644, 1988), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/W2644. 
 13. See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Restructuring Sovereign Debt, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (2003). 
 14. The term describes “the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to 
adopt your goals. It differs from hard power, the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and 
military might to make others follow your will.” Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft 
Power, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 10, 2003, at 6.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/3
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he participated in the CAC shift because the clauses could alter the course 
of a crisis. Even after moving to CACs, borrowers expressed skepticism 
about the extent of the holdout problem CACs would solve. Alternatively, 
scholars have suggested that G-7 governments engaged in informational 
“cueing” to help overcome network effects, a form of “soft” regulation.15 
Here too, no early mover admitted acting in expectation of a market-wide 
shift; few thought the G-7 capable of delivering such a shift and all 
worried that their country would pay a penalty for innovating. 
A final lingering puzzle of the CAC episode is just how few private or 
public sector participants in it express strong feelings about the clauses as 
such. We spoke with dozens of actors whose websites and speeches 
proclaim the seminal importance of the CAC shift (usually as they claim 
paternity), yet in our interviews a scant few described the change itself as 
important in addressing the problems of sovereign debt restructuring or 
financial crises in the emerging markets. Many were unsure of how the 
new clauses would work in a crisis; most said they were probably good; 
none said they were clearly bad. More participants volunteered strong 
feelings about the process that led to the shift—praising cooperation, 
grumbling about wasted time and official meddling. Was this another 
instance of wasted lawyering or runaway process?16 
If true in part, this description is incomplete and not entirely fair. Most 
participants suggested that their efforts on CACs had less to do with the 
clauses’ literal purpose (facilitating future contract modification) than with 
their relative utility in advancing other goals, such as demonstrating 
commitment to a new crisis management strategy, currying political favor, 
or establishing reputations in the market. Some were successful in 
achieving these goals; others failed. Their collaboration produced a 
revealing study in the uses of contract form and ways of governance. 
We depart from earlier quantitative and analytical studies of sovereign 
debt contracts17 in favor of an interview-based approach. We have 
collected over 100 accounts of the CAC shift from market participants, 
 
 
 15. Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the 
International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 691, 735 (2004) (“cueing” may include a signal that the term will 
be widely used). 
 16. See ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT 171–78 (2000) (women’s issues 
“networkers” working for the sake of the Network and its paraphernalia, with the effect of shutting out 
politics and the women in whose name the networking takes place); Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (contracts play a 
marginal role in the business relationships of Wisconsin manufacturers). 
 17. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An 
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929 (2004). 
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officials, and others who took part in it, and have supplemented these with 
our own observations from the daily work of law firms and government 
offices, conferences and negotiations, press accounts, official documents, 
and of course the debt contracts themselves.18 
Below we first review the sovereign debt context in the early 2000s, 
the contract provisions at the center of the study, and the process that led 
to the shift in 2003. Second, we recount alternative explanations for the 
shift that have been published to date. We then describe the findings from 
our interviews and conclude with implications for contract change, the 
uses of contract, and governance. 
II. THE SETTING 
A. Emerging Market Sovereign Debt: Actors and Contracts 
Our focus is on the external bonds of emerging market governments, 
which traditionally has meant money borrowed from foreign residents in 
foreign currency under foreign law—for example, Mexico’s dollar-
denominated, New York–law bonds marketed to U.S. residents.19 
Although such bonds dominated foreign sovereign borrowing in the 
nineteenth century and into the 1930s, Depression-era defaults shut down 
the market for over sixty years.20 Sovereign borrowing came back in the 
1970s in the form of bank loans. A wave of loan defaults in the 1980s 
triggered a new debt crisis, which stunted growth for a decade and 
threatened the health of major international banks. In the early 1990s, 
 
 
 18. Our approach to and use of interviews is similar to that in John M. Conley & Cynthia A. 
Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 6–12 (2005) (describing “business ethnography”), and that 
of Dezalay and Garth (describing “reflexive sociology”). See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO 
TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 9 (2002). Earlier work using similar methods includes 
Macaulay, supra note 16 and ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES, 291–92 (1991) (describing interview-based research in a small community). 
 19. The distinction is important because during the period we study, governments began to shift 
away from such borrowing into local currency, often governed by domestic law. BIS Quarterly 
Review at 45–63 (Sep. 2003), available at www.bis.org and INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES, ch. 3 (Apr. 2006) [hereinafter 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT]. As countries remove restrictions on capital flows, the link 
among currency, governing law, and residence of the holder has weakened. While economists usually 
focus on currency and residence of the holder, for purposes of this project we are only concerned with 
governing law. See Anna Gelpern & Brad Setser, Domestic and External Debt: The Doomed Quest for 
Equal Treatment, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 795, 795–96 (2004), for a discussion of the definitions of 
domestic and external debt used by lawyers and economists. 
 20.  For a summary, see Rory Macmillan, Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-out System, 16 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 57, 80–84 (1995).  
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banks agreed to exchange bad loans for Brady Bonds, named after the U.S. 
Treasury Secretary who helped broker the solution.21 Trading in the Brady 
Bonds paved the way for new issues. The emerging market bond market 
was born. 
The Economist defines emerging markets as developing countries, 
explained in turn as “[a] euphemism for the world’s poor countries.”22 The 
term is also used occasionally to describe all countries with annual per 
capita income of below $10,725, classified as low- and middle-income by 
the World Bank.23 This excludes high-income or “mature market” issuers 
such as the United States and the other G-7 economies with well-
established domestic financial systems, steady access to domestic and 
international investors, and the capacity to issue debt in their own 
currencies.24 We prefer a narrower definition that reflects the fact that only 
a minority of all low- and middle-income countries have market access on 
any meaningful scale. J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index 
Global (EMBIG) includes U.S.-dollar-denominated debt instruments of 
governments and state-owned entities in thirty-three countries, for which 
dealers quote prices daily.25 Market participants frequently use this 
index as a proxy to describe emerging market external debt as an asset 
class. In the summer of 2003, as the market was shifting to CACs, EMBIG 
market capitalization was $224 billion.26 Mexico, Brazil, Russia, and 
 
 
 21. For a summary, see NANCY BIRDSALL & JOHN WILLIAMSON, DELIVERING ON DEBT RELIEF: 
FROM IMF GOLD TO A NEW AID ARCHITECTURE 14–15 (2002).  
 22. Economist.com, Economics A–Z, http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/ 
alphabetic.cfm?LETTER=E (follow “Emerging Markets” hyperlink; then follow “Developing 
Countries” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). See generally Ashoka Mody, What Is an Emerging 
Market?, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 641 (2004) (providing a systematic overview of the defining 
characteristics of emerging markets). 
 23. The World Bank, Country Classification (2007) www.worldbank.org/datastatistics (follow 
“Country Classification” hyperlink) (“Economies are divided according to 2005 GNI per capita, 
calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $875 or less; lower 
middle income, $876 – $3,465; upper middle income, $3,466 – $10,725; and high income, $10,726 or 
more.”) 
 24. Id. 
 25. Gloria M. Kim, J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., EMBI Global and EMBI Global Diversified: 
Rules and Methodology (Dec. 2004) (on file with authors). In mid-2003, the largest countries in the 
EMBIG were Brazil, Mexico, and Russia. Jonathan Bayliss, J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., Emerging 
Markets as an Asset Class (Sep. 2003) (on file with authors). Other countries frequently included are 
Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
El Salvador, Hungary, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the 
Philippines, Poland, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, and Vietnam. The older EMBI+ index includes fewer countries, has higher liquidity 
requirements than EMBI Global, and excludes certain debt of parastatals and local governments. 
EMBI Global Diversified includes the same countries as EMBIG, but caps the weighting of the largest 
issuers within the index. Kim, supra. 
 26. Bayliss, supra note 25. 
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Turkey comprised over half this total (Argentina had been a big presence 
until its $100 billion default in 2001); a dozen countries accounted for 
nearly 90 percent. Over one-third of the debt in the index was investment 
grade.27 Total external debt outstanding issued by EMBIG countries, 
including instruments denominated in euro and others not included in the 
index was closer to $300 billion.28 For comparison, foreign-currency debt 
issued by mature markets governments (such as New Zealand’s yen-
denominated securities) was more than double the emerging market 
total.29 However, mature market governments are often able to sell local-
currency debt to foreign investors: at the end of January 2007, foreign 
residents held over $2 trillion in dollar-denominated U.S. Treasury 
securities.30 Emerging market debt is actively traded: a leading industry 
association reported annual trading volume at over $5.5 trillion in 2005, 
slightly below the historic high of $6 trillion reached in 1997.31 
The number of people involved in emerging market sovereign debt is 
small, partly due to the small number of large-volume issuers. Compared 
to thirty-three countries in the EMBIG, over 2,500 companies are listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange alone.32 Raising money abroad is most 
often the responsibility of a country’s finance ministry, occasionally of the 
central bank. Recently, stand-alone debt management offices have gained 
popularity. The core government team for a new issue is usually about half 
a dozen people. 
When an emerging market government decides to issue debt abroad, it 
hires an international investment bank to “manage” the offering: to design 
and market the instruments, and, for underwritten deals, to commit to buy 
the debt. These “sell-side” institutions compete for mandates from 
governments; often two or more institutions are appointed “co-lead 
managers” for an issue. Sell-side bankers refer to the issuing governments 
as their clients; their fees are a portion of the issue proceeds. About half a 
dozen investment banks dominate the scene, with another handful 
managing an occasional issue for a marginal sovereign. Sell-side banks 
 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Authors’ estimate based on BIS Quarterly Review, supra note 19, at 27 and Joint BIS-IMF-
OECD-WB External Debt Database, http://devdata.worldbank.org/sdmx/jedh/jedh_ dbase.html. 
 30. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY AND FED. RESERVE BD., MAJOR FOREIGN HOLDERS OF 
TREASURY SECURITIES (Mar. 15, 2006), http://www.treas.gov/tic/mfh.txt. 
 31. Soon after reaching the 1997 high, the volume fell sharply with the wave of international 
financial crises. The new total represents a strong recovery. EMTA, EM Background: History and 
Development, http://www.emta.org/emarkets/ (last visited Jun. 19, 2007). 
 32. NYSE Group, Inc., Listed Companies, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/1170350259411. 
html (Dec. 31, 2006). 
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have research departments that report regularly on the emerging markets. 
In theory, research and investment banking are separated by “Chinese 
walls.”33 When sell-side research analysts speak of clients, they refer to 
the investors, also known as the “buy-side.” 
There is no authoritative source of information on investors in 
emerging markets sovereign debt. Sell-side research departments 
occasionally survey their clients, and governments occasionally try to get a 
fix on their creditor base, but neither effort produces a comprehensive 
picture.34 Less concentrated than the sell-side, the buy-side universe is still 
small: at the time of our study, a few dozen funds held most of the external 
debt issued by most emerging market governments, except where 
domestic, expatriate, or retail (real people investing directly) investors 
were a significant presence. The funds are a mix of “dedicated” and 
“cross-over” institutions, active trading accounts, and “buy-and-hold” 
investors. Dedicated investors, such as a Latin America or Southeast Asia 
Fund, commit to put all or some of their money in risky emerging market 
assets.35 Cross-over investors are generally more risk-averse, and are often 
regulated entities such as pension funds and insurance companies that may 
invest a portion of their portfolio in the emerging markets to boost returns 
when yields are low on mature market assets.36 Riskier debt attracts active 
traders that look for a quick profit in arbitraging price and interest rate 
differences worldwide.37 Hedge funds are often associated with such 
 
 
 33. For a skeptical account of the separation between research and investment banking in 
emerging markets finance, see PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT): 
WALL STREET, THE IMF, AND THE BANKRUPTING OF ARGENTINA 61–71 (2005). 
 34. See GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 95; Jennie Byun & William 
Oswald, J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., Emerging Markets External Debt as an Asset Class (Apr. 26, 
2006), at 34–35 (on file with authors). 
 35. The IMF estimated that between 30 and 40 percent of the funds invested in the emerging 
markets in 2001 came from dedicated investors. INT’L MONETARY FUND, INVOLVING THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR IN THE RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL CRISES: RESTRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGN 
BONDS 16 n.14 (Jan. 24, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/series/03/ips.pdf. 
Cross-over investors were becoming more significant in 2003. BIS Quarterly Review, supra note 19 at 
47. Investors usually measure their performance relative to an index such as EMBI+ or EMBIG. Id. at 
47–48 and INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MARKET 
DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES 36 n.4 (Dec. 2002) available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ 
ft/gfsr/2002/04/pdf/chp3.pdf. See BLUSTEIN, supra note 33, at 70–73, on the paradoxes of index 
investing. 
 36. BIS Quarterly Review, supra note 19. Until recently, returns on emerging and mature 
markets assets rarely correlated. See GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 92. 
 37. Active traders and speculative investors can be especially important in the run-up to, or after, 
the default. They buy distressed debt at a discount and they often agree to harsh restructuring terms 
because they hope to reap large profits relative to the low purchase price. Commentators often conflate 
distressed debt buyers and holdout litigants, even though the two business models are different. See 
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investment strategies. Some buy-side outfits have their own research 
departments. Domestic residents and institutions in the issuing countries 
are an increasingly important investor category in some cases, as are retail 
investors, especially for governments raising money in Europe and 
Japan.38 
For most of the period we studied, seven trade associations catered to 
the investor community. Three focused on the emerging markets; the other 
four dealt overwhelmingly with mature markets securities.39 All but one 
trade group claimed to represent both the buy-side and the sell-side; the 
Emerging Markets Creditors Association (EMCA) was established 
specifically to represent the buy-side.40 
Lawyers in this practice mirror the market’s concentration.41 Half a 
dozen U.S. law firms, all but one headquartered in New York, document 
nearly all New York–law sovereign issues. A handful of London-based 
firms dominate the English-law sovereign market. Few of these firms have 
more than one or two partners specializing in sovereign debt.42 The senior 
lawyers in this cohort tend to be veterans of the 1980s loan crisis; the 
younger ones spent their early days documenting new bond issues in the 
1990s. 
Sovereign bond documentation usually consists of a disclosure 
statement distributed to investors (and, in the case of a registered public 
offering, filed with securities regulators), a distribution agreement between 
the issuer and the managers, and a series of agreements, including the debt 
instrument itself, that govern the relationship between the sovereign debtor 
and its bondholders. Innovations such as shelf registration and medium-
 
 
Anna Gelpern, After Argentina 7–8 (Inst. for Int’l Econ., Policy Brief No. PB05-02, 2005), available 
at www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb05-2.pdf.  
 38. On the rise of domestic investors, see BIS Quarterly Review supra note 19, at 45. German 
and Italian retail investors held a significant portion of Argentina’s debt at the time of its default in 
2001. Gelpern, supra note 37, at 3.  
 39. The three focusing on emerging markets were the Emerging Markets Creditors Association 
(EMCA) (www.emcreditors.com), EMTA (formerly the Emerging Markets Traders Association) 
(www.emta.org), and the Institute of International Finance (IIF) (www.iif.com). The four dealing 
primarily with mature market securities were the Securities Industry Association (SIA), the Bond 
Market Association (BMA), the International Primary Market Association (IPMA) and the 
International Securities Market Association (ISMA). SIA and BMA have since merged to become The 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) (www.sifma.org); IPMA and ISMA 
became the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) (www.icma-group.org). 
 40. See Emerging Markets Creditors Association, http://www.emcreditors.com.   
 41. Compare Dezalay and Garth’s description of the small and tightly linked international 
arbitration community, YVES DEZALEY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 10 
(1996). 
 42. Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton is an exception. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 17, at 950. 
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term note programs enable governments to establish a document umbrella 
that applies to multiple issues and thereby to streamline documentation for 
any single borrowing. The key contracts are a product of issuer-manager 
negotiations with their respective lawyers. Buy-side investors generally do 
not see the disclosure statement until the marketing phase, with little room 
for detailed negotiation.43 As a result, it is up to the managers and their 
lawyers to negotiate a document package they can sell. Structuring, 
negotiating, and selling a sovereign issue can take anywhere from a few 
days to several months; complex restructurings take longer. 
Unlike other financial contracts, the sovereign lot has had trouble 
establishing its free market credentials.44 When one of the parties is a 
government, power politics inevitably sway the invisible hand. A 
sovereign debt crisis is often a political crisis with strategic implications 
beyond financial stability. From this perspective, it is unsurprising that 
governments occasionally take interest in one another’s debt contracts.45 
Lenders’ governments have a long history of directing and enforcing 
private loans for political gain.46 On the other hand, borrowing 
governments enjoy special immunities,47 and so might choose to walk 
away from foreign debts when it suits domestic political purposes. They 
have few credible ways to commit to pay or restructure, and no sovereign 
bankruptcy regime to fill the gap. The resulting debt contracts are 
inevitably incomplete.48 
 
 
 43. Not one investor reported reading the underlying contracts. 
 44. For a summary of economic literature on sovereign debt, see FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & 
JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 31–54 (2006). 
On why sovereigns repay their debts, see Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is to 
Forgive to Forget?, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 43, 46–47 (1989) (discussing the enforcement model); Harold 
L. Cole et al., Default, Settlement, and Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of 
Sovereign Debt, 36 INT’L ECON. REV. 365, 367–68 (1995) (discussing the reputational model); 
Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 289, 289–90 (1981) (similar discussion).  
 45. See Miles Kahler, Politics and International Debt: Explaining the Crisis, in Miles Kahler, 
ed., THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT, at 16–22 (1986). For a more recent overview of official 
actors involved in sovereign debt restructuring, see LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: 
THE CASE FOR AD HOC MACHINERY 24–45 (2003); Lee C. Buchheit, The Role of the Official Sector in 
Sovereign Debt Workouts, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 333 (2005). 
46. See Louis A. Pérez, Jr. & Deborah M. Weissman, Public Power and Private Purpose: 
Odious Debt and the Political Economy of Hegemony, N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. (forthcoming 
2007) (manuscript at 7–23) for a historical overview of government-sponsored private lending to Latin 
American sovereigns. 
47. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992); Georges R. Delaume, The 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Public Debt Litigation: Some Fifteen Years Later, 88 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 257 (1994). 
48. See Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, Sovereign Debt Structuring and Restructuring: An 
Incomplete Contracts Approach (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
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Before the trend toward restricting sovereign immunities took hold in 
the second half of the twentieth century,49 foreign ministries were often 
the only channel for bondholders seeking redress.50 But rich country 
governments did not always side with their constituents—bondholder 
concerns have had to compete with other parts of the foreign policy 
agenda. Politics continued after the courts opened in the 1950s. The U.S. 
and other G-7 governments were implicated in managing the 1980s Latin 
American debt crisis both because of the region’s strategic significance 
and because sovereign defaults threatened to bring down major U.S. 
banks.51 The next generation of crises started with Mexico’s near-default 
in 1994-1995, averted with the help of a $50 billion U.S.-led rescue 
package.52 The crises culminated with Argentina’s bond default in 2001, 
where foreign policy concerns were no less salient, even in the absence of 
bilateral financing.53 
The wave of calamity that started with Mexico’s “Tequila Crisis” in 
1994 focused public attention on sovereign bond contracts.54 It also 
prompted countless academic and policy projects to identify and reassess 
contract terms that could impact crisis management.55 Amendment 
procedures quickly emerged as central among these terms. 
 
 
 49. See supra note 47. 
 50. See, e.g., Macmillan, supra note 20, at 80–84. 
 51. See Ross P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Debt Trading 
from 1989 to 1993, 21 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 1802, 1802–15 (1998).  
 52. See MEXICO 1994: ANATOMY OF AN EMERGING MARKET CRASH (Moises Naim & Sebastian 
Edwards eds., 1997). 
 53. See Eric Helleiner, The Strange Story of Bush and the Argentine Debt Crisis, 26 THIRD 
WORLD Q. 951, 965 (2005). 
 54. While many of the crises (including Mexico’s) did not involve foreign sovereign bonds, these 
were seen as a key source of vulnerability. See Edwin M. Truman, Debt Restructuring: Evolution or 
Revolution?, 2002 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 341 (2002); NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD 
SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, ch. 8 
(2004). 
 55. See, e.g., Liz Dixon & David Wall, Collective Action Problems and Collective Action 
Clauses, FIN. STABILITY REV. 142 (2000); Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, Do Collective Action 
Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New Evidence from Emerging Markets, 6 INT’L FIN. 415 (2003); Mark 
Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, The Use of Collective Action Clauses in New York Law Bonds of 
Sovereign Borrowers, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 815 (2004); Torbjörn Becker et al., Bond Restructuring and 
Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly? (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 
WP/01/92, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp0192.pdf; Barry 
Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7458, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sob3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=630737. 
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B. Meet the Clauses 
Contract terms are rarely named for social science theories. Collective 
Action Clauses are the exception. Collective action problems in economics 
and political science describe the circumstances where individuals acting 
rationally to maximize self-interest produce an outcome detrimental to 
their interests as a group.56 Free-riding and the prisoner’s dilemma are 
variants of the problem. Collective Action Clauses in sovereign debt 
contracts are provisions that address collective action problems that might 
arise among creditors, such as the incentives to rush for the exits (sell the 
debt), to rush to the courthouse, or to hold out and free-ride on a 
restructuring agreement.57 Creditor coordination failures delay debt 
restructuring, ultimately reducing recovery for creditors as a group. All 
other things being equal, large groups lacking social cohesion are more 
prone to collective action problems. Hence the move from regulated bank 
syndicates to more dispersed bondholder constituencies was expected to 
cause disruption in sovereign debt management.58 
Bankruptcy regimes address creditor collective action problems for 
corporate, individual, and municipal debtors—but not sovereigns. By the 
mid-1990s, a chorus of lawyers, officials, and academic economists 
anticipated a sovereign bond crisis and predicted chaos. Academics and 
economists in the “official sector” (here, the IMF and its dominant 
shareholders) framed the policy challenge in collective action terms.59 The 
presumption that any attempt at bond restructuring would lead to systemic 
disruption was so strong in 1994 that few were willing to risk amending 
Mexico’s domestic-law dollar-indexed tesobonos—the instruments at the 
center of the crisis—even if technically it could have been done by fiat.60 
 
 
 56. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971). 
 57. See Eichengreen, supra note 13, at 81–82; see also THOMAS JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND 
LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 11–14 (1986). 
 58. The description is stylized. Some syndicates include hundreds of banks, while some bond 
issues are closely held. 
 59. See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN, ET AL., CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR 
SOVEREIGN DEBTORS (1995) (a volume commissioned by the Bank of England as part of its work on 
the Rey Report); GROUP OF TEN, THE RESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN LIQUIDITY CRISES: A REPORT TO 
THE MINISTERS AND GOVERNORS PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE DEPUTIES (1996) 
[hereinafter REY REPORT], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.pdf.  
 60. An op-ed in The Financial Times reflected the prevailing sentiment: “As the Mexican crisis 
showed, the world financial system desperately needs a mechanism to draw bondholders together to 
renegotiate foreign government debt.” Rory Macmillan, Personal View: New Lease of Life for 
Bondholder Councils, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 15, 1995, at 11. In fact, the Mexican crisis showed 
little, since the rescue package preempted bondholder mischief by paying them off. See infra note 198 
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Mexico’s ties to the United States and other factors instead weighed in 
favor of a rescue loan. 
Working groups of officials from systemically important economies 
assembled in the aftermath of crises in Mexico and throughout Asia 
considered and rejected sovereign bankruptcy as a political non-starter. 
Reports released in 1996 and 1998 advocated widespread adoption of 
contract terms—some old, some new—to improve creditor coordination 
and bind disruptive minorities.61 In practice, these recommendations 
targeted New York–law bonds, which dominated the sovereign debt 
market.62 Issuers and investors dismissed the prospect of coordination 
failures and rejected official intrusion in their contracts.63 Contract reform 
initiative stayed with the academy and the official sector.64 By 1998, the 
phrase “Collective Action Clauses” had come to describe the universe of 
terms they advocated.65 
Lawyers seem like bit players in this story so far. But neither the 
officials nor the academics who advocated CACs had intuited the content 
of the clauses on their own. Trade journals and manuscripts circulating 
among practitioners by the mid-1990s identified four kinds of terms.66 
Most prominent were modification provisions that would allow a qualified 
majority of creditors (usually 75 percent in principal amount) to change 
payment terms over minority objections. These had been common in 
English- and Japanese-law bonds but were rare in New York– and 
German-law bonds. Second, a related set of terms would restrict an 
individual creditor’s capacity to demand full principal repayment 
(accelerate) or to sue the debtor. Clauses that require creditors to share 
 
 
and accompanying text. 
 61. See REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISES (1998) 
[hereinafter G-22 REPORT], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/othp01d.pdf; REY REPORT, supra 
note 59. 
 62. New York–law bonds accounted for about 80 percent of all emerging market debt securities 
outstanding in 2002. See INT’L MONETARY FUND (Dec. 2002), supra note 35, at 44. 
 63. See infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 64. Clauses had a handful of early prominent supporters in the market; these were the exception. 
See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit, The Collective Representation Clause, 17 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 9 (Sep. 1998); 
Ed Bartholomew, Ernest Stern & Angela Liuzzi, Two-step Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Market-
based Approach in a World without International Bankruptcy Law (2002), http://www.iiiglobal.org/ 
topics.soveriegn/Two_Step_Sovereign_Bartholomew.pdf.  
 65. The term “collective action clauses” appears to have been used for the first time in the G-22 
REPORT. See supra note 61.  
 66. For a summary of the provisions that had attracted official attention in the late 1990s, see Lee 
C. Buchheit, Sovereign Debtors and Their Bondholders, UNITAR Training Programmes on Foreign 
Economic Relations Document No. 1, at 19–22 (2000), available at http://www.unitar.org/fer/ 
sovereign.pdf and Anna Gelpern, For Richer, For Poorer: Sovereign Debt Contracts in Crisis, 1 J. 
INT’L BANKING REG. 20, at 27–29 (Jan. 2000). 
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litigation proceeds with their comrades had been used in syndicated loans 
and were being proposed for bonds to dampen incentives to sue. Third, 
collective representation or engagement clauses would help organize 
bondholders and channel their activities through a trustee or a creditor 
committee. Deputizing the trustee to accelerate, sue, and share the 
proceeds combines the representative function with the brake on 
individual enforcement described earlier. Finally, initiation clauses would 
help the debtor initiate a restructuring, and might sanction a payment 
suspension and a “cooling off” period.67 
Mexico’s SEC-registered twelve-year global note issue launched in 
February 2003 tipped the markets in the direction of CACs. Mexico’s 
sole—momentous—innovation was in the modification provisions. 
Departing from the unanimity convention under New York law, the notes 
allowed amendment of financial terms by holders of 75 percent of 
outstanding principal. In a concession to creditors, Mexico raised the 
threshold for amending most other terms from 50 percent to 66 2/3 
percent; several non-financial terms, including priority ranking and waiver 
of immunity, now required 75 percent.68 Higher thresholds for non-
financial terms make it harder for creditors participating in a debt 
exchange to amend securities held by non-participating creditors so as to 
make them effectively worthless (a practice known as exit consents).69  
Trade association data suggest that since Mexico, more than two dozen 
countries—including Brazil, South Korea, Turkey, and South Africa—
have issued bonds with majority modification provisions under New 
York–law contracts, most using the 75 percent threshold for financial and 
key non-financial terms (“reserve matters”).70 A handful of countries have 
gone beyond majority amendment and adopted other innovations, but most 
of these have not caught on. 
When we speak of the “CAC shift,” we refer principally to the shift 
from unanimous to majority modification provisions in New York law 
bonds, which is virtually complete for new issues. By February 2006, the 
 
 
 67. Elements of earlier proposals came together as the initiation clause in John Taylor’s April 
2002 speech. See infra note 130.    
 68. For one of the many official sector announcements of Mexico’s 2003 shift, see International 
Monetary Fund, IMF Continues Discussion on Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bond Contracts 
(Apr. 18, 2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2003/pn0353.htm.  
 69. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 59, 83–84 (2000). 
 70. EMTA, Sovereign Bond Documentation Charts, http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/emsovbond 
doccharts.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). Several countries started with 85 percent and switched to 
75 percent in subsequent issues. See id. 
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stock of bonds with CACs had grown to 60 percent of the total 
outstanding—up from 40 percent in three years.71 
As noted at the start, CACs were introduced twice over the past decade. 
Mexico’s 2003 issue has attracted virtually all the commentary. But six 
years earlier, a group of less prominent issuers—including Bulgaria, 
Kazakhstan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Qatar—used majority modification 
clauses in their New York–law bonds issued in the European market and 
exempt from SEC registration. These had little market impact, and 
attracted no official or academic attention until after Mexico in 2003. We 
focus on the shift that began in 2003, but discuss the earlier episode 
because the contrast is illuminating. 
III. OFFICIAL STORIES AND PUBLISHED EXPLANATIONS 
The Mexico-led shift inspired a host of news releases, public 
statements, articles in the popular and trade press, and renewed academic 
activity on the subject of CACs. Most authors tried to explain why Mexico 
and others changed their contract forms. We found nine explanations, each 
stressing a different causal factor. In addition, we include an account of the 
“lost issues” six years before Mexico’s. These public accounts served as 
background for our interviews.  
A. Fear of SDRM 
In this account, CACs prevail because they are the lesser of two evils. 
In 2001, the IMF proposed the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
(SDRM) as a quasi-statutory, treaty-based regime to deal with creditor 
coordination problems. Borrowers and private creditors rejected SDRM as 
an IMF power grab designed to encourage defaults and reduce demand for 
official money.72 Before SDRM, neither sovereigns nor their creditors had 
 
 
 71. INT’L MONETARY FUND, REPORT OF THE MANAGING DIRECTOR TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE ON THE IMF’S POLICY AGENDA 8 n.9 (Apr. 20, 2006), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/042006.pdf. The total includes all 
international bonds, not just ones governed by New York law. Most of the outstanding bonds without 
CACs were issued before 2003. 
 72. See Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 299 (2005). The Economist explained the CAC shift this way in May 2003: “Why have 
borrowers changed their minds? One reason is fear. Once the SDRM was mooted—a far worse idea 
than collective-action clauses in borrowers’ eyes—the thought that it might be put into effect focused 
minds on the search for a market-based alternative.” Dealing With Default, ECONOMIST, May 8, 2003, 
at 63.  
 Paul Blustein’s book on Argentina’s crisis concludes: 
The triumph of CACs over the SDRM offered some depressing insights into the difficulty of 
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shown enthusiasm for CACs.73 With SDRM on the horizon, CACs began 
to look attractive.74 Mexico and others then adopted CACs for fear that 
SDRM would prevail without an alternative method of dealing with 
sovereign insolvency.75 A nuanced version of this story had Mexico 
adopting CACs to stop the talk of SDRM, which was harming the asset 
class regardless of the initiative’s ultimate prospects.76 
B. U.S. Pressure 
Beginning in the fall of 2002 Bush Treasury officials appeared to make 
CACs a centerpiece of their strategy to eliminate public sector bailouts. 
Financial press reported that Treasury arm-twisting caused Mexico and 
others to try CACs.77 Others suggested that the shift came of a Treasury-
sponsored change in U.S. law.78 The leading advocate of CACs in the U.S. 
government characterized the efforts as diplomacy and persuasion.79 Some 
in the market pointed to Mexico’s special relationship with the United 
States, and cited rumors of a quid pro quo.80 
 
 
making headway on international financial reforms. The idea of introducing the clauses had 
been proposed years earlier and had stalled amid opposition from Wall Street; only when the 
more radical SDRM reared its head did private financiers come around to backing CACs as 
the lesser evil.  
BLUSTEIN, supra note 33, at 230. See also A Better Way to Go Bust, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 2003, at 
64; Melvyn Westlake, Battle of the Heavyweights, EMERGING MARKETS, Sept. 27, 2002, at 16.  
 73. See Hagan, supra note 72, at 319–20. 
 74. “Developing countries are issuing new bonds that should make it easier to clear up or head 
off defaults.” Dealing with Default, supra note 72, at 63. See also DEUTSCHE BANK EMERGING 
MARKETS DAILY 8 (Feb. 26, 2003) (on file with authors).  
 75. See Hagan, supra note 72, at 320 (citing Adam Lerrick & Allan H. Meltzer, Sovereign 
Default: The Private Sector Can Resolve Bankruptcy Without a Formal Court, Q. INT’L ECON. REP., 
Apr. 2002, at 2: “With bailouts ruled out, the private sector is confronted with a choice: accept 
regulation or find its own solution to make restructuring work.”); see also Barry Eichengreen et al., 
Crisis Resolution: Next Steps (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/03/196, 2003) (noting that 
the IIF’s embrace of Collective Action Clauses would never have happened in the absence of the 
SDRM initiative), available at http:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03196.pdf. 
 76. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 54, at 313. 
 77. See Dealing With Default, supra note 72, at 63 (“American pressure also played a part: the 
Treasury made no secret of its preference for the new clauses.”). For more recent accounts, see 
BLUSTEIN, supra note 33, at 230 (“Eventually, with U.S. clout working its usual magic, CACs won 
endorsement from the G-7 and the IMF’s policy-setting committee of member-country finance 
ministers, and several emerging market countries began issuing bonds with the clauses in 2003.”); and 
David Skeel, Why Contracts are Saving Sovereign Bankruptcy, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 2006, at 24–
32 (“With some serious arm-twisting by the US Treasury, Mexico broke the logjam in 2003 . . . .”). 
 78. See Alan Beattie, ‘Vulture Funds’ Circle but Debtors Remain a Moving Target, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Feb. 19, 2007, at 15. 
 79. JOHN B. TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCIAL WARRIORS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCE IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD (2007), at 124–25. 
 80. See Felix Salmon, Blazing a Trail Down Mexico Way, EUROMONEY, Apr. 2003, at 124; see 
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C. G-10 Expert Drafting Group 
A working group of officials, convened by the G-10 governments,81 
commissioned “eminent lawyers” from key jurisdictions to draft model 
CACs. The group included partners from leading law firms representing 
both sovereigns and investment bankers, and had the imprimatur of the 
official sector.82 One explanation of the group’s role suggests that it served 
as a coordinating mechanism to overcome network effects, especially the 
fear that no one would follow the first mover in adopting CACs.83 
D. Law Firms 
Like the last explanation, this one credits the CAC shift to the party 
that helped overcome network effects. Choi and Gulati suggested that 
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, with its large stable of sovereign 
clients, had disproportionate influence in inducing the CAC shift.84 For 
Choi and Gulati, the CAC shift had roots in Ecuador’s aggressive new use 
 
 
also John Authers, Mexico Sends Signal with Bond Clauses, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 26, 2003, at 31 
(“‘Mexico is building up a war-chest of favours to the US Treasury, which it’s going to claim . . . in 
the future,’ said Walter Molano . . . . ‘This deal is going to be an orchestrated success, because there’s 
an enormous amount of political reputation riding on this, specifically for the US Treasury.’”); 
Fernando J. Losada, Mexico: Going Nowhere Fast, ABN-AMRO EMERGING MARKETS FORTNIGHTLY, 
Mar. 5, 2003, at 31 (“The authorities in Mexico were apparently persuaded by the US Treasury and 
some leading Wall Street bankers to attempt to issue such a bond.”); Matthieu Wirz, Mexico 
Introduces CACs to Rocky Reception, INT’L FIN. REV., Mar. 1, 2003, at 71 (“Bankers and investors 
point to the heavy hand of the US Treasury and recognition of the inevitability of CAC 
implementation to explain the decision.”). 
 81. The Group of Ten (G-10) comprises eleven economies with significant financial sectors 
(Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States), coordinated at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel. 
Central Banks play a bigger role in the G-10 than in other similar fora, such as the G-7. See Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, Bank for International Settlements, http://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed22.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). 
 82. See Part IV.C infra. 
 83. See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Role of Groups in Norm Transformation: A Dramatic Sketch, in 
Three Parts, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231, 240–41, 245–46 (2005) (on the G-10 experts and other groups, 
some formed in response to the specter of SDRM); Choi & Gulati, supra note 17, at 970; see also 
Elmar B. Koch, Collective Action Clauses: The Way Forward, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 665 (2004) (noting 
the report of G-10 working group provided the necessary guidelines or framework for the market to 
formulate their clauses). Also noting the role of the G-10 drafting committee as a key element in the 
progress towards CACs, see JOHN DRAGE & CATHERINE HOVAGUIMIAN, BANK OF ENG., COLLECTIVE 
ACTION CLAUSES: AN ANALYSIS OF PROVISIONS INCLUDED IN RECENT SOVEREIGN BOND ISSUES 2–3 
(2004), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2000/fsr17art9.pdf; and Pierre 
Francois-Weber, Sovereign Debt (re)Structuring: Where Do We Stand? FIN. STABILITY REV. (Banque 
DeFrance), Nov. 2005, at 105 (noting that the “spread of collective action clauses (CAC) follow[ed] 
the Quarles Report by the Group of 10”), available at http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/ 
telechar/rsf/2005/etud5_1105.pdf. 
 84. See Choi & Gulati, Innovation, supra note 17, at 975–76.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/3
p 1627 Gelpern Gulati book pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] PUBLIC SYMBOL IN PRIVATE CONTRACT 1645 
 
 
 
 
of exit consents (advised by Cleary Gottlieb), which created uncertainty 
about the value of unanimity and opened a window for further 
innovation.85 Cleary Gottlieb’s own brochure takes credit for leading the 
CAC shift, among other innovations in the sovereign debt market.86 The 
story is consistent with Kahan and Klausner’s prediction that large volume 
intermediaries drive boilerplate change. Here the elite law firm caused the 
shift, motivated not only by the value of the new term to its clients, but 
also by the reputational value of being a market leader.87 
The Choi-Gulati study ran into criticism from sovereign debt lawyers, 
who said it had missed the plot by giving all early-moving issuers equal 
weight and ignoring the special role Latin American issuers play in the 
New York market.88 Had the authors understood this dynamic, they would 
have given more credit to two other law firms: Sullivan & Cromwell and 
Arnold & Porter.89 
E. Lee Buchheit 
One lawyer has been publicly associated with the CAC saga more than 
any other. He was among the first to urge the adoption of new contract 
terms to overcome collective action problems, and among the first to 
propose specific contract language in a popular trade journal. He was one 
of three New York lawyers on the G-10 drafting group and a senior 
 
 
 85. Id. at 934, 936, 944–47. 
 86. See Cleary Gottlieb Firm Brochure Overleaf, http://cgsh.com/files/tbl_s5102SiteFileUpload/ 
File5788/4/Cleary_Gottlieb_Firm_Brochure.pdf (“2003: The firm helps pioneer the use of collective 
action clauses (CACs) in sovereign debt offerings.”) (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). 
 87. An April 30, 2006, visit to the Cleary Gottlieb website produced several references to the 
firm’s role in helping Mexico develop these clauses for the market. See, e.g., News Release, Cleary 
Gottlieb, Mexican Bond Issuance (Apr. 11, 2003) (on file with authors). See infra note 282 for results 
from a later visit. 
 88. See the responses of Sergio Galvis and Lee Buchheit to Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, The 
Evolution of Boilerplate Contracts: Evidence from the Sovereign Debt Market 45 (Buchheit), 49 
(Galvis) (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, No. 05-17; Georgetown Univ. 
Law Ctr. Bus., Econ. and Regulatory Policy, No. 800264, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=800264#PaperDownload (free login and download required).  
 89. Sullivan & Cromwell’s website features their role in the CAC shift: 
We played an integral part in the debate about the development of collective action clauses, 
which represent a market-based response to the hold-out problem that arises when debt 
becomes distressed. Collective action clauses were first used by United Mexican States in its 
successful February 2003 bond offering, where we represented the underwriters. 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, First Use of Collective Action Clauses (2003), http://www.sullcrom.com/ 
practice/servicedetail.aspx?firmService=21&pdText=PDInfoText3& pdname=LR021969) (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2007). The Arnold & Porter analogue is at Arnold & Porter LLP, Firm Advises Brazil on 
Innovative $1 Billion Global Bond Issue (May 2003), http://www.arnoldporter.com/case.cfm? 
publication_ID=743. 
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partner at Cleary Gottlieb, the firm that represented both Mexico and 
Uruguay. An article in Latin Finance put all this together to credit 
Buchheit with CAC paternity.90 
F. Big Institutional Investors 
A front-page article in The Wall Street Journal claimed that big 
institutional investors—in particular, Mohamed El-Erian at Pimco—
induced the shift to CACs.91 Their willingness to buy a large share of 
Mexico’s first CAC issue and the advance assurance that they gave 
Mexico to that effect made the deal possible. 
G. Trade Associations 
This explanation credits the release of model “marketable” clauses by a 
group of seven leading creditors’ associations92 with catalyzing the CAC 
shift. The so-called Gang of Seven clauses included an amendment 
threshold between 85 and 90 percent, an engagement clause, and other 
provisions that addressed creditor concerns with debtor misbehavior. 
Euromoney reasoned that the release of creditor consensus clauses 
signaled market acceptance of CACs in principle, and made their adoption 
in some form a foregone conclusion.93 
H. Preemption 
This explanation goes specifically to Mexico’s motives.94 Gelpern 
wrote that Mexico may have acted out of concern that less creditworthy 
countries under G-7 pressure would adopt creditor-sponsored CACs, and 
pay a premium to do so.95 This would have created adverse precedent for 
 
 
 90. In an article on twenty innovators who had helped transform the Latin American financial 
markets, LatinFinance listed Mexico’s adoption of CACs among Buchheit’s accomplishments. 
Breaking the Mold, LATINFINANCE, Dec. 2005, at 23–24.  
 91. Craig Karmin, Power Player: A Fund Chief Flexes Muscles When Countries Need a Loan, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2004, at A1. Cf. Felix Salmon, The Emerging Markets Heavyweight, 
EUROMONEY, Sept. 2003, at 44 (describing El-Erian’s influence in the emerging markets securities 
world).  
 92. See supra note 39 for the list of associations. 
 93. See Salmon, supra note 80, at 125–28. 
 94. See Dealing With Default, supra note 72, at 63 (“[S]elf-interest led Mexico to go first. It 
hoped that by starting the ball rolling it would brand collective-action clauses as a sign of good credit, 
rather than of weakness.”); see also Gelpern, supra note 37, at 6; Salmon, supra note 80, at 128. 
 95. Anna Gelpern, How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign Debt, INT’L FIN. L. REV., May 
2003, at 20–21. Mexican officials “denied any link between the US and Mexico’s use of CACs, but 
frankly admitted the advantage of setting a standard” before the clauses became more widely used. 
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Mexico to overcome. In a pre-emptive strike, Mexico adopted a 75 percent 
modification threshold and rejected most of the other proposed 
innovations. 
I. Argentina 
For nearly three years after its bond default, Argentina refused to enter 
into meaningful negotiations with its creditors or the IMF.96 Many echoed 
the commentator who said that creditors’ frustration with Argentina’s 
actions and with their own powerlessness “led the private international 
financial community to become much more willing to endorse some 
official reforms to make sovereign debt rescheduling more orderly, most 
notably through the use of . . . (CACs) in new international bond issues.”97  
J. The Lost CACs and Inadvertence 
We have found only one story about the use of CACs in New York–
law bonds before Mexico. Gugiatti and Richards studied these early issues 
to identify the effect of CACs on bond prices. They report that not only 
did the market pay little attention to the use of CACs by Bulgaria, 
Kazakhstan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Quatar in their New York–law bonds, 
but that the borrowers themselves seemed unaware, or at least indifferent, 
to the shift.98 The study notes that each of these early issuances was 
documented by the London office of a New York law firm.99 The authors 
suggest that the innovation was “somewhat inadvertent”—a combination 
of the lawyers’ comfort with New York law and their lack of familiarity 
 
 
Wirz, supra note 80, at 71.  
 96. See Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of 
Argentina’s Default, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 311 (2005); Helleiner, supra note 53. 
 97. Helleiner, supra note 53, at 965. Cf. Ernesto Zedillo, Argentina or the “Principles”? 
FORBES, May 23, 2005, www.forbes.com/global/2005/0523/012_print.html (“Argentina’s financial 
collapse was the impetus for serious discussions on how to improve the system.”); Lee C. Buchheit, 
Supermajority Control Wins Out, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 2007, at 2 (“[T]he fresh memory of a major 
sovereign debt restructuring dragging on year after exasperating year may have convinced some 
holders that speed in the workout process—even at the cost of some intercreditor bruising—was worth 
it.”).  
 98. See Gugiatti & Richards, supra note 55; See also Anthony Richards & Mark Gugiatti, Do 
Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New Evidence from Emerging Markets, 6 INT’L FIN. 
415, 421 & n.12 (2003) (reporting indifference to CACs among legal advisers in these deals). Robert 
Gray, a senior official with ICMA, confirms the Richards and Gugiatti observations and further 
suggests that their finding of lawyer indifference to the early changes also extended to the issuers, 
underwriters, and investors involved in those initial deals. See Robert Gray, Collective Action Clauses: 
Theory and Practice, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 693, 703 (2004).  
 99.  Gugiatti & Richards, supra note 55, at 815. 
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with Euromarket boilerplate.100 The firms were doing New York–law 
deals, but cut and pasted contract terms from an English-law form.101 
IV. THE INTERVIEWS 
This section sets out accounts collected from over 100 participants in 
the CAC shift. Our contacts spoke to us in the expectation of confidential 
treatment; thus, we have coded the interviews to preserve anonymity. We 
proceed roughly in the order of the explanations set out above, which 
together form the public story of the shift.  
In gathering information for this article, we tried to be comprehensive 
first, by seeking out everyone directly involved in the CAC shift (about 
200 people), and second, by soliciting different perspective on the same 
events—for example, interviewing issuers, underwriters, investors, and 
lawyers on both sides in the early CAC deals. Based on the interviews and 
our experience with this community, we believe that we contacted over 
half of all direct participants in the shift. We obtained multiple accounts of 
every incident we describe, have shared drafts of this article with many of 
our interviewees, and have reflected their comments. This approach also 
addressed fading memories and hindsight bias, though both remain 
important concerns. We eschewed statistical survey tactics in favor of 
free-form interviews that allowed our contacts to frame their accounts in 
their own terms102 and produced nuance lacking in prior studies, including 
our own.103  
 
 
 100. Id. at 826.  
 101. Id.  
 102. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 41, at 17, on the value of encouraging interviewees to 
present their own picture of the relevant legal field: “[I]t serves to identify what they seek to appear to 
be and what they reject, thereby serving to define the principles of opposition that structure the field 
and shape change over time.” 
 103. The use of free-form interviews and withholding attribution in the text leaves us open to 
criticism because, among other reasons, such a study may be difficult to replicate. See generally Lee 
Epstein & Gary King, Exchange: Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: The Rules 
of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 38–45 (2002). Our response is twofold: First, we spoke with a large 
portion—potentially over half—of all participants in a small universe. Even with a smaller sample, a 
later study should be able to replicate our findings. Second, we simply saw no other way to learn and 
tell what we thought was an important story. E.g. Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, 
and Improving the Navigation of The Yellow Submarine, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1161, 1185 & n.99 (2006); 
cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 18. 
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A. SDRM: The Phantom Menace 
The majority of our contacts connected the CAC shift with SDRM. 
Only three said that the CAC shift might have happened without the threat 
of SDRM; we return to their views later in the article. Most market 
participants offered one of two versions of the explanation. In the first 
version, the official sector wanted to foist a statutory regime on the 
market, but backed down in the face of market resistance, settling for 
CACs as “second best.” According to one investor, “There were enough 
parties of interest in the world of finance [opposing SDRM] that political 
forces in Washington stood down. The White House listened to this, [and 
thought] ‘maybe we were making too many enemies, . . . we need a 
second best.’ CACs were that second best.”104 
In the second market view, more common among those familiar with 
public sector efforts to promote CACs in the 1990s, officials announced 
SDRM out of frustration with the market’s failure to adopt CACs or any 
other fix to the collective action problem that governments foresaw and 
markets dismissed.105 SDRM was the nuclear fix, a way to ensure that the 
“[p]rivate sector would pay attention finally to what government 
thinks.”106 
Our interviews and correspondence confirm that industry 
representatives had tried more than once to trade their acceptance of CACs 
for the official sector’s commitment to “drop” SDRM,107 which implies 
that they had thought such a bargain to be within the power of their 
official interlocutors. A dozen or so contacts described a particularly 
contentious gathering of investors and emerging market and G-7 officials 
hosted by the U.S. Treasury in late September 2002 on the margins of the 
World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings. The parties reportedly tried to reach 
consensus on CACs, but failed to do so because the United States would 
 
 
 104. Telephone Interview (July 1, 2006) [hereinafter Interview 070206] (the transcripts of all 
interviews are on file with the authors). 
 105. See Hagan, supra note 72, at 302. 
 106. Interview (Nov. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Interview 111705]. 
 107. See, e.g., Letter to Paul H. O’Neill from the heads of EMTA, IIF, IPMA, BMA, SIA, ISMA, 
and EMCA (Dec. 6, 2002) (on file with authors): 
We believe that a market-based approach to strengthening crisis management holds the only 
promise for success. Consequently, we have taken the lead in developing marketable 
collective action clauses (CACs) that could command the support of both investors and 
issuers. Regrettably, that effort was set back by the “two-track” approach reinforced in 
September, an approach which was seen by a number of investors as well as issuers as 
signaling that a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) could override what is 
achieved through CACs. 
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not take SDRM off the table.108 One participant described the meeting as a 
“debacle”; at one point Mexico’s Finance Minister Francisco Gil Diaz 
“got up and said, ‘Forget it, we are never doing CACs!’”—a gesture the 
Minister reprised at international gatherings in the run up to February 
2003.109 
Did the G-7 and the IMF truly aim for a statutory regime, settling for 
CACs as the face-saving fallback? Or was SDRM a ploy to induce a 
market fix to collective action problems after nearly a decade of market 
resistance to official pleas? And were the G-7 deliberately driving a hard 
bargain, holding SDRM over the markets to secure unconditional 
surrender on CACs? Interviews with officials suggest a different story, and 
raise the possibility that SDRM itself came of a loss of control by the 
United States and coordination failure among the G-7. 
Most accounts of the IMF’s initiative110 start with Argentina. In August 
2001, that country secured its last IMF loan before defaulting on nearly 
$100 billion in foreign bonds.111 The Bush Treasury, eager to distance 
itself from Clinton-era bailouts,112 was searching for a way to inject 
market discipline in the Argentine package. Inspired by the financial 
engineering of the Brady Plan and by faith in market ingenuity, the 
Treasury team pressed the IMF to set aside $3 billion out of $23 billion for 
a “market-based,” “voluntary” restructuring operation.113 It soon became 
 
 
 108. See, e.g., Interview (Sept. 27, 2005, and Mar. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Interview 092705]; 
Interview (Oct. 6, 2005, and Dec. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Interview 100605]; TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 
122–24; Paul H. O’Neill, U.S. Treasury Sec’y, Keynote Address to the Institute of International 
Finance (Sept. 28, 2002), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/po3077.htm (where 
O’Neill refers to the meeting several days earlier but commits to pursue both CACs and SDRM). 
 109. Interview 100605, supra note 108. 
 110. The intellectual history of sovereign bankruptcy precedes SDRM, tracing at least as far back 
as Adam Smith. See Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Early Ideas on Sovereign Bankruptcy: A 
Survey 3 n.5 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper, No. WP/02/57, 2002), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=879533.  
 111. MICHAEL MUSSA, ARGENTINA AND THE FUND: FROM TRIUMPH TO TRAGEDY (2002) 
(criticizing IMF disbursements in the run up to default); BLUSTEIN, supra note 33, at 135–57, TAYLOR, 
supra note 79, at 86–88.   
 112. See, e.g., John B. Taylor, Loan Rangers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2006, at A12 (defining his 
legacy as putting a brake on the IMF bailouts of the 1990s); Press Release, John B. Taylor, Office of 
Pub. Affairs, U.S. Treasury, The Bush Administration’s Reform Agenda At the Bretton Woods 
Institutions: A Progress Report and Next Steps, Testimony Before the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate (May 19, 2004), available at http://www.treasury. 
gov/press/releases/ js1662.htm (describing post-Mexico packages of the 1990s as an example of short-
term tactics that risked distorting market incentives) [hereinafter Taylor Progress Report]. 
 113. Interview (Dec. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Interview 121405B]; BLUSTEIN, supra note 33, at 
152–53; TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 87–88; International Monetary Fund, Transcript of a Press 
Briefing by Thomas Dawson, Director, External Relations Department (Aug. 30, 2001), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2001/tr010830.htm (last visited Jun. 27, 2007). 
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clear that restructuring $100 billion with $3 billion would take more magic 
than engineering.114 But some of the early design meetings introduced 
Paul O’Neill, the eccentric first Treasury Secretary of the second Bush 
administration, to negative pledge constraints in sovereign debt 
contracts.115 O’Neill did not take well the prospect that a contract clause 
might interfere with debt restructuring for an insolvent sovereign, and on 
September 20, 2001, he publicly called for a sovereign bankruptcy 
mechanism.116 
Days earlier, O’Neill had hosted a private breakfast for Horst Koehler, 
the managing director of the IMF, and Anne Krueger, his newly-appointed 
first deputy.117 Several senior staff were in attendance. One participant 
told us that at breakfast, O’Neill “waxed poetically” about international 
bankruptcy.118 Another reported O’Neill saying something like, “We need 
an international bankruptcy court . . . and do it by December.”119 The IMF 
had explored sovereign bankruptcy several times in the preceding decade, 
each time without an action mandate from its major shareholders. For the 
IMF officials at the Treasury breakfast, O’Neill’s call signaled an 
institutional boost. Elated, “Horst and Anne sort of floated out of the 
place.”120 
In contrast, O’Neill’s deputies took his words as rhetorical gloss. The 
Secretary had identified a problem—inflexible debt contracts—and 
 
 
 114. Eichengreen implies that collective action problems were responsible for the failure to deploy 
the $3 billion in a preemptive restructuring. Eichengreen, supra note 13, at 82. The officials and 
investment bankers who participated in the discussions on possible financial structures said that the $3 
billion mandate did not reflect financial realities; none reported coordination problems. See, e.g., supra 
note 113, and Interview (Jan. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Interview 013106]. In retrospect, Taylor describes 
the value of $3 billion as “strongly signaling that this was in fact the final augmentation.” TAYLOR, 
supra note 79, at 88.  
 115. A standard negative pledge clause restricts the borrower’s capacity to pledge collateral to 
secure future debts. Most private lenders to sovereigns, as well as the World Bank, require negative 
pledge commitments. 
 116. “We need an agreement on an international bankruptcy law, so that we can work with 
governments that in effect need to go through a Chapter 11 reorganization instead of socializing the 
cost of bad decisions.” The Condition of the Financial Markets and Regulatory Responses Following 
the September 11 Terrorist Attacks: Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, 107th Cong. 33 (2001) (statement of Paul O’Neill, Secretary, United States Department of the 
Treasury). 
 117. O’Neill mentions the meeting in his September 20, 2001 testimony. He dates it the preceding 
Monday, which was September 17. Id. The IMF’s first deputy is traditionally nominated by the United 
States. Krueger, a prominent economist, was a Bush White House choice. For the announcement of her 
appointment, see Stanford Report, Economics Professor Anne Krueger Named to Key Job at IMF 
(June 8, 2001), http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2001/june13/krueger-613.html. 
 118. Interview (Dec. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Interview 121605]. 
 119. Interview 121405B, supra note 113. 
 120. Id. 
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commissioned a solution. Statutory sovereign bankruptcy was a solution, 
but one that was costly (at a minimum, requiring Congressional approval) 
and, more importantly, too dirigiste for most of the Bush team’s free-
market sensibilities. One team member, a lawyer, suggested that 
bankruptcy functions could be synthetically replicated in a contract. 
Conversations with staff and outside experts (mostly academic 
economists) unearthed the earlier CAC initiatives, going back to 1995. 
Officials became convinced that “[n]ot only was it possible, it was smarter 
to do it [contractually].”121 But by then, the IMF machine was in full gear 
designing the statutory framework. 
Some Treasury participants in the September breakfast say they saw 
right away that Krueger’s understanding of O’Neill’s marching orders 
differed from their own. But Treasury officials, still completing transition 
to the new administration, thought they had time to bring Fund 
management “back on the reservation.”122 They miscalculated. Krueger 
gave her first speech launching SDRM in November 2001.123 IMF had 
sent an advance copy to the Treasury but heard nothing back.124 Krueger 
may have assumed she had what “clearance” she needed; Treasury 
officials assumed more substantive consultations would ensue: after all, 
she was proposing to amend the IMF Articles of Agreement (Charter) and 
the United States held the blocking vote. 
Market reaction to Krueger’s speech was scathing. One New York 
lawyer recalled that the speech “scared the Bejesus out of” some business 
contacts, saying, “It’s VIII(ii)(b) again, but much, much worse!”—
referring to an earlier official attempt to sanction nonpayment under 
Article VIII(ii)(b) of the IMF Charter.125 A buy-side money manager 
summarized market concerns as twofold: discomfort with, first, 
“institutionalizing a process by which your contracts would be trumped,” 
and, second, having that process run by an institution like the IMF, 
controlled by the G-7, and exposed to their shifting policy priorities.126 
 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Architecture for 2002: New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Speech at the National 
Economists’ Club Annual Members’ Dinner (Nov 26, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/speeches/2001/112601.htm. 
 124. Interview 121405B, supra note 113.  
 125. Interview (Dec. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Interview 121305B]. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, 
Discretion, and Authority in International Financial Reform, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 613, 674 (2001). 
 126. Interview 070206, supra note 104. Many in the market never bought into the IMF’s efforts to 
distance itself from the actual management of the restructuring process—no technical changes could 
convince the skeptics that SDRM was anything other than a power grab by the IMF.  
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Many others suspected Fund motives and accused it of a conflict of 
interests: the IMF is often the largest creditor of a sovereign in distress. 
Once the idea was out, it proved hard to squash. O’Neill had no 
problem with CACs, but refused to allow his deputies to end the statutory 
experiment. A celebrated industry captain before his Treasury stint, he 
fancied the idea of different groups competing to design solutions to his 
problem.127 Competition began to resemble confrontation the following 
spring when Krueger and John Taylor, Treasury Under Secretary for 
International Affairs, both spoke at a conference on sovereign debt 
restructuring at the Institute for International Economics, a Washington 
think tank.128 Krueger delivered a modified version of the first SDRM 
proposal, scaling down the IMF’s role.129 Taylor endorsed CACs in a 
speech that was read as dismissing SDRM as a matter for academic 
speculation.130 Those involved in preparing the text say that Taylor never 
intended to slight Krueger, a former Stanford colleague, and certainly did 
not mean “academic” in a pejorative sense. The following account is 
typical: 
He was asked to speak at a conference, he had views to share. Fairly 
sure he was not doing it to be Machiavellian. He was being an 
academic. She thought that the U.S. was supporting her. There was 
pressure after for John not to be in Anne’s face . . . . she was 
“slightly” upset.131 
 
 
 127. Interview 121405B, supra note 113. In the fall of 2002, O’Neill publicly called for a 
competition of ideas: 
Simply put, our goal is to change the way that debt is restructured, not to tie ourselves to one 
approach or another. If there were a third approach to consider, we would welcome that 
opportunity as well. Don’t throw stones at our best efforts to fix this system—throw ideas. 
The competition of ideas will ensure that we develop the most sensible system to bring 
predictability to sovereign debt restructuring. We will explore every option, every means to 
our goal, assess its flaws and strengths, and modify it accordingly. 
O’Neill, supra note 108. 
 128. The institute has since been renamed Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics 
(http://www.petersoninstitute.org). 
 129. Anne O. Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, New Approaches to 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking, Speech at the Conference on “Sovereign 
Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards,” Institute for International Economics (Apr. 1, 2002), available 
at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=454. See also Paul Blustein, IMF 
Scales Down ‘Bankruptcy’ Plan, The WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2002, at E1. 
 130. John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y of Treasury for Int’l Affairs, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A 
US Perspective, Speech at the Conference on “Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards,” 
Institute for International Economics (Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/ 
papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=455. For press reactions, see infra notes 133 and 134. 
 131. Interview (Dec. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Interview 121305]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1627 Gelpern Gulati book pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1654 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1627 
 
 
 
 
Taylor considered Krueger a friend; he also knew that she was revising 
the original design—perhaps he had expected their approaches to 
converge.132 In retrospect, it is hard to see how a U.S. proposal with no 
role for the Fund could escape being perceived as threatening. In any 
event, the press reported the speeches as open conflict between the IMF 
and its largest shareholder.133 The signal this sent may have trumped the 
substance of either initiative. Dispatched to control the damage, Taylor’s 
new deputy, Randal Quarles, told the press that the United States was for a 
two-track approach, where the Fund and the G-7 would explore both 
CACs and SDRM.134 
Krueger had some support inside the Bush White House. The nature 
and depth of this support is unclear. Taylor recounts in his book being 
called to the White House to manage the press flap.135 Krueger was 
friendly with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (Krueger, Rice, 
and Taylor all had taught at Stanford in the same period). When Krueger 
and Rice occasionally dined together, Krueger would mention the SDRM, 
and Rice would respond with encouragement.136 But senior White House 
staff apparently considered and rejected the idea of elevating either SDRM 
or CACs beyond the Treasury.137 A Treasury official characterized White 
House interest as “discomfort with the press playing up the conflict 
between Treasury and IMF . . . . It was an arcane issue at the White 
House . . . .”138  
National Economic Adviser Larry Lindsey and Council of Economic 
Advisers Chairman Glenn Hubbard were among the few White House 
officials to weigh in on the debate, generally in line with the contractual 
approach.139 Hubbard even gave a keynote speech at an IMF conference 
 
 
 132. Telephone Interview (June 15, 2006) [hereinafter Interview 061506]; TAYLOR, supra note 79 
at 117. 
 133. See, e.g., Alan Beattie & Raymond Colitt, US Scorns IMF Plan for Bankrupt Governments: 
Proposals to Help Countries in Crisis Sort Out Their Debts without Fear of Litigation Have Met a 
Cool Response, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 6, 2002, at 7; Paul Blustein, IMF Crisis Plan Torpedoed: 
Treasury Official Rejects Proposal a Day After It Is Advanced, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2002, at E1; 
Sovereign Bankruptcies, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 2002, at 98. TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 116–17, 
summarizes the press reactions. 
 134. See, e.g., Paul Blustein, IMF Reform Plan Makes Comeback: U.S. Eases Stand on 
‘Bankruptcy’ Idea, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2002, at E4; O’Neill Says US View on IMF Debt 
Restructuring Plan Misinterpreted, AFX EUROPEAN FOCUS, Apr. 9, 2002. 
 135. TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 118. 
 136. See Interview (Mar. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Interview 032306]; Interview 121405B, supra 
note 113. Some Administration insiders suggested to us that Rice was merely being polite without 
delving into the initiative’s substance. 
 137. Interview (Dec. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Interview 122005]. 
 138. Interview 061506, supra note 132. 
 139. See id.; TAYLOR, supra note 79 at 119; R. Glenn Hubbard, Chairman, Council of Econ. 
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on SDRM, held on January 22, 2003. He proposed a mix of contractual 
innovation and a voluntary dispute resolution mechanism that echoed 
some features of the SDRM, combined with restructuring incentives and 
tighter conditions on IMF lending.140 Even though in substance Hubbard’s 
idea was much closer to Taylor’s than to Krueger’s, his rhetoric was 
telling—he called CACs a “Treasury proposal,” as if to distance the rest of 
the administration from the controversy.141 Some Treasury officials saw 
Hubbard’s “third way” as a worrisome diversion.142 But for IMF staff the 
speech sounded the death knell for SDRM—they had assumed that the 
White House was with Krueger.143 Hours later, things got surreal as 
Quarles delivered another ritual endorsement of the two tracks, promoting 
the clauses but encouraging the IMF to keep refining their SDRM 
proposal.144 That afternoon, an IMF staffer complained privately to one of 
us that he wished the United States would just end the charade and put his 
colleagues out of their misery. 
Active controversy around SDRM and CACs lasted for about a year 
and a half after Krueger’s first speech. Some senior U.S. and IMF officials 
suggested quietly it was a no-win battle, and tried to distance themselves 
from both sides to the extent possible.145 Their reasons were some 
combination of believing that neither initiative was likely to succeed, and 
that CACs were inadequate, while SDRM was ill thought-out. Some said 
 
 
Advisors, Enhancing Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Remarks at the Conference on the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism, International Monetary Fund (Jan. 22, 2003), available at http://www0.gsb. 
columbia.edu/faculty/ghubbard/speeches/1.22.03.pdf [hereinafter Hubbard, Jan. 22, 2003, Remarks]. 
Hubbard delivered nearly identical remarks several months earlier at the American Enterprise Institute. 
See R. Glenn Hubbard, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisors, Enhancing Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute Conference on the IMF’s Sovereign Debt 
Proposal (Oct. 7, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/EnhancingSovereignDebt 
RestructuringAEIOct72002.pdf.  
 140. Hubbard, Jan. 22, 2003, Remarks, supra note 139. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Interview 061506, supra note 132. 
 143. Hubbard’s audience was likely unprepared to parse yet another proposal; the big question on 
everyone’s mind was whether the White House was with the SDRM or against it. There is some 
evidence that Hubbard did indeed intend his speech as a signal against the SDRM. One guest at a 
conference luncheon recalls Hubbard asking privately, “Was I clear enough?,” a question that 
confirmed the impression around the table that the speech sought to end the IMF experiment. 
Interview (May 25, 2006) [hereinafter Interview 052506]. On the other hand, it is not clear that White 
House officials cared much one way or another about the substance; they just wanted the controversy 
to end. A prominent academic heading an advisory body, Hubbard may have been testing out yet 
another theoretical construct that could simultaneously help solve the restructuring problem and end 
the Treasury-IMF contest. 
 144. For a discussion of the impact of Quarles’s remarks on the lawyers in the audience, see infra 
Part IV.G. 
 145. See Interview (Dec. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Interview 121205B]; Interview 122005, supra 
note 137. 
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that at the Fund, Krueger “owned” the initiative so completely that it left 
little room for others of her stature.146 “It was going to be her legacy,” and 
was her battle to fight.147 On the other hand, our contacts often pointed to 
a small cohort of “true believers” in SDRM, comprised of Krueger and 
several senior IMF staff, sustained in their design work by encouragement 
from O’Neill, the desire to boost the role of the IMF, at least acquiescence 
from the White House, and, importantly, by support from European 
capitals. 
By the end of the 1990s, European officials had come to lead the 
opposition to outsize IMF packages. Germany’s insistence on hard lending 
limits typified this view, as did a joint paper by the Bank of England and 
the Bank of Canada, advocating debt standstills and lending limits.148 
Unlike the newly minted Bush appointees, many European representatives 
in the CAC-SDRM debate were veterans of the “private sector 
involvement” wars of the late 1990s.149 Wary of discretion, which had let 
the United States steamroll over their objections, and weary of the old 
CAC initiatives that looked in retrospect like a fig leaf for U.S.-led 
bailouts, the Europeans wanted firm crisis-management rules.150 SDRM 
was their chance, thanks to the space created by O’Neill.151 Europe’s over-
representation on the IMF Board made its support impossible to ignore, 
 
 
 146. Interview 052506, supra note 143. A long-time observer of sovereign debt restructuring 
interpreted Krueger’s ownership as the first sign of doom: “When this came out [as] the Anne Krueger 
proposal—not IMF, not Koehler—[it was the] first clue to me that it was dead on arrival.” Interview 
(June 6, 2006) [hereinafter Interview 060606]. 
 147. Interview 052506, supra note 143. 
 148. See PAUL BLUSTEIN, THE CHASTENING: INSIDE THE CRISIS THAT ROCKED THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND HUMBLED THE IMF 170–74 (2001); TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 107; Andy 
Haldane & Mark Kruger, The Resolution of International Financial Crises: Private Finance and Public 
Funds (Nov. 2001) (unpublished paper of the Bank of England and Bank of Canada), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/financialstability/boeandboc.pdf. This staff paper 
came with the explicit endorsement of the heads of their respective central banks. See id. at 2. As the 
authors note, the paper circulated widely in the official finance circles before being publicly released. 
Id. at 1. 
 149. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 54, at 2–3, 6 & n.7. See Telephone Interview (Feb. 17, 2006) 
[hereinafter Interview 021706]. Blustein describes private sector involvement, a term that emerged 
from the 1990s crises and the official policy response, as “a code phrase for inducing banks and 
investors to accept part of the burden for resolving a crisis by reducing or stretching out their claims.” 
BLUSTEIN, supra note 148, at 174. The term was also known by its acronym, “PSI.” 
 150. See generally Tarullo, supra note 125. Tarullo contrasts the European position with the 
strongest proposal for a rule based system by Meltzer and others; he does not dwell on the 
disagreements between the Clinton Administration and its European allies. Id. at 641. European 
officials were not against CACs (in fact, most came across to us as both supportive and optimistic 
about their value), but were merely skeptical of their capacity to reduce bailouts. See, e.g., Telephone 
Interview (Sept. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Interview 091106]. 
 151. See Brad Setser, The Political Economy of SDRM (Jan. 8, 2005) (unpublished draft, on file 
with authors). 
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even if the United States alone could have blocked the supermajority vote 
to amend the Charter.152  
With the United States tied to the parallel tracks for as long as O’Neill 
was in office, the most vocal resistance to SDRM in the IMF Board came 
from large emerging market issuers, notably Mexico and Brazil.153 One 
official called the SDRM the “wrong idea at the wrong time,” noting flatly 
that if it had prevailed, his country would have lost all market access.154 In 
private, borrowers also worried about losing access to IMF funds; some 
raised the IMF’s conflict of interest.155 In public, they framed their 
resistance in the language of large-volume market issuers, as in this 
example: “From the point of view of [this issuer], all discussions of 
default, possibility of making default easier, were not genial. . . . Our 
scenario is not default.”156 
Mexico’s CAC issue came two months after O’Neill’s stormy 
departure from office in December 2002.157 It is hard to speculate whether 
either event alone was sufficient to shelve SDRM. The IMF conference 
where Hubbard and Quarles appeared to speak at cross-purposes came 
between O’Neill’s resignation and the appointment of his successor, John 
Snow, and may have been a symptom of the interregnum. (Mexico’s 
spokesman at the conference reiterated his country’s opposition to both 
tracks, suggesting that finance leaders should better focus on building 
hospitals, not morgues.) Our interviews tie O’Neill’s departure, SDRM, 
and Mexico’s issue together. This statement by a U.S. official is unusual 
 
 
 152. See, e.g., Edwin M. Truman, Rearranging IMF Chairs and Shares: The Sine Qua Non of 
IMF Reform, in REFORMING THE IMF FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 203 (Edwin M. Truman ed., 2006) 
(proposing a consolidated European seat); see also Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, IMF Governance and the 
Political Economy of a Consolidated European Seat, in REFORMING THE IMF FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 
supra at 233–55 (explaining the paradox of Europe’s nominal over-representation against the lack of 
coordination among European chairs in the IMF); Ngaire Woods, Unelected Government: Making the 
IMF and the World Bank More Accountable, 21 BROOKINGS REV. 9 (2003), available at http://www. 
brookings.edu/press/review/spring2003/woods.htm (criticizing constituency representation). 
 153. Interview (Dec. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Interview 121205]; Interview (June 16, 2006) 
[hereinafter Interview 061606]; E-mail to G. Mitu Gulati (July 24, 2006) [hereinafter Interview 
072406]. Because Mexico was part of the Spanish constituency, it could only voice its objections 
intermittently, when it sat in the constituency chair. See Interview 121305B, supra note 125; . 
 154. Telephone Interview (Aug. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Interview 080406]. 
 155. See Interview 121205, supra note 145. 
 156. Interview 061606, supra note 153. Interview 121205, supra note 145, illustrates a similar 
sentiment: both CACs and SDRM raised concerns with signaling default; to some, SDRM raised them 
more starkly. 
 157. On O’Neill’s resignation, see RON SUSKIND, THE PRICE OF LOYALTY: GEORGE W. BUSH, 
THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE EDUCATION OF PAUL O’NEILL (2004); and also Interview 121605, supra 
note 118. 
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for bringing broader geo-strategic issues to bear on the CAC-SDRM 
debate: 
Of course, now we had an alternative. We could see the alternative 
happening, it is easier to say we do not have to talk about [SDRM] 
anymore. Maybe it is easier for the U.S. not to support SDRM. 
Period. Certainly O’Neill had to be gone . . . . With O’Neill’s 
departure, . . . [the U.S.] could say to the MD, the U.S. will never 
support this, and you need our vote. At about the same time, there 
was a big blowup at the UN about Iraq—after that, it became clear 
the UN process was failing, falling apart . . . . With those U.S.-
European battles, it made no sense to have battles [at the IMF] for 
no good reason. When Koehler said the U.S. is against, it’s over 
. . . . Koehler was never a true believer . . . .158 
O’Neill’s initial set-up of a competition between IMF staff and his own 
framed the episode. Taylor put it diplomatically, “The existence of an 
alternative proposal advocated by the IMF (and in particular by my 
colleague Anne Krueger) also had bearing on our financial diplomacy 
plan.”159 Another U.S. official recalled O’Neill saying, “If SDRM solves 
it, good; if your way solves it, good. Read my lips—I want the problem 
solved. Don’t swat Anne down. I’m behind Anne and you will get in 
line.”160 Admitting that O’Neill’s directive put his deputies in an awkward 
position, the same official said, “In the end, I think it was a good thing 
from the point of view of process that we didn’t swat down the 
SDRM . . . . [W]ith O’Neill out of the building, the heart of Treasury 
support [was gone]. Mexico moved; others moved . . . . We said all along, 
‘may the best process win,’ and it did.”161 But another official said that 
keeping SDRM alive may have done more harm than good:  
Some people feel [that SDRM was a] forcing factor. I am not sure. 
Private sector was so alarmed, it ran the risk of scaring [them] away 
from the whole deal. Did not make much difference. The underlying 
story is O’Neill versus Snow. O’Neill wanted to have it [SDRM] 
 
 
 158. Interview 121305B, supra note 125. “MD” stands for Managing Director. See also, e.g., 
Interview 121605, supra note 118, Interview 121305, supra note 131. 
 159. John B. Taylor, Essential Reform of the International Financial System: Collective Action 
Clauses, http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/Essential%20Reform%20of%20the%20International%20 
Financial%20System,%20CACs.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). 
 160. Interview 121405B, supra note 113.  
 161. Id. 
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out there. Snow was very comfortable about [ending] SDRM. The 
whole thing changed.162 
The irony of the episode is that SDRM’s ultimate chances of being 
implemented had always been slim to none. The IMF Charter is an 
international treaty; amending the Charter requires an affirmative vote of 
85 percent of its Board. At about 17 percent, the United States alone could 
block the initiative, playing the holdout. Amendment also requires 
approval by member states, which for the United States would implicate 
the U.S. Congress.163 The leading policy officials in the Bush 
administration came to office skeptical of the role of the international 
financial institutions and the way in which the Clinton administration had 
used them to battle international crises. Before his appointment, Taylor 
had even suggested abolishing the IMF (he later distanced himself from 
the statement).164 The idea that this administration would spend political 
capital to expand IMF power at the expense of private contracts, and that 
Congress would blithely go along, verges on inconceivable.165 One 
European official involved in early CAC efforts offered a broader view: 
I always thought SDRM was dead in the water, because countries 
just do not cede sovereignty. The Rey Report said as much. It was a 
waste of the Fund’s time, [of] anyone’s time. It was not a credible 
alternative.166 
Other contacts, including emerging market officials who worked hard to 
defeat the proposal, said they had always assumed SDRM would die—
eventually.167 As some of the accounts below suggest, eventually may not 
have been soon enough. 
In sum, if the SDRM initiative had a role in the CAC shift—and our 
interviews suggest that it did—then this may be the ultimate story of 
inadvertence. A brand new, enterprising U.S. Treasury Secretary, unaware 
of the old CAC initiatives, got peeved at the negative pledge clause in 
 
 
 162. Interview 061506, supra note 132. 
 163. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 
2 U.N.T.S. 39, as amended through June 28, 1990, Article XVIII, available at www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/aa.aa.pdf; Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 22 U.S.C. § 286c (2000). 
 164. See Uncommon Knowledge: Adios IMF? International Monetary Fund (Hoover Institution 
video filmed Dec. 15, 1998), available at http://www.uncommonknowledge.org/99winter/320.html.  
 165. See, e.g., Interview 060606, supra note 146. 
 166. Interview 021706, supra note 149. 
 167. See, e.g., Interview 121205, supra note 145; Interview 060606, supra note 146. The incentive 
to claim foresight ex-post is obvious. But we heard similar sentiment from scores of officials, 
investors, and observers long before SDRM was shelved. 
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Argentina’s bonds, and unleashed a statutory alternative that made CACs 
seem handsome by comparison. O’Neill’s intervention empowered IMF 
management (led by another new Bush appointee) and long-time European 
advocates of rule-based crisis resolution, but also energized his own 
deputies to work hard to preempt them. The White House allowed the 
space for competition by deeming the controversy too technical and 
insignificant to intervene. The entire kerfuffle lasted long enough either to 
convince the markets of the merits of the contractual solution, or to create 
enough uncertainty about the outcome to make it worth debtors’ and 
creditors’ while to preempt the debate. The political transition in the 
United States and the Argentine crisis, bound up in this story, are the 
salient distinguishing features between the successful shift in 2003 and the 
failed campaign for CACs in the late 1990s. 
B. Invisible Hands 
Bush administration officials came up with CACs in the fall of 2001, 
knowing little or nothing about the prior life of the initiative. One official 
implicated in the clauses’ comeback described a tinge of awkwardness 
when learning he had reinvented the CAC wheel: “It’s round, it rolls, look 
what I’ve discovered!”168 A staffer privy to both iterations of the CAC 
campaign was more charitable: “There was a lot of pressure for a radical 
alternative, and to his credit, John [Taylor] did not yield to the pressure, 
but dusted off the CACs.”169 The subtlety was lost on some market 
observers: 
I did not pay much attention to the early rounds; it did not make 
sense to. We thought it would go away. And for a period it seemed 
they [CACs] vanished . . . and then they reemerged. I try to stay 
away from Washington; I am not a lobbyist. Here, Washington 
lobbied us, invaded . . . . I thought they were on a tear to fix . . . but 
fix the wrong thing. Boy, they sure got CACs. Now you can bind 25 
percent.170 
In this and other accounts, market-based change came courtesy of 
successive Washington invasions. This explanation raises more questions. 
If U.S. pressure catalyzed the CAC shift in 2003, what were the 
 
 
 168. Interview 121405B, supra note 113. 
 169. Interview 121305, supra note 131. 
 170. Interview 111705, supra note 106. 
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ingredients of the winning strategy? Why did U.S. advocacy fail in the 
1990s? Did the early efforts contribute to its eventual success? 
Even though it involved only domestic-law bonds, Mexico’s 1994 
crisis solidified public consensus that the era of bond crises had arrived, 
and would be worse than the 1980s loan crisis.171 Experts pointed out that 
foreign bank loan restructuring took a decade, and both the instruments 
and the creditors were fewer and more flexible in the 1980s.172 By the 
mid-1990s, emerging market sovereign bonds had acquired a reputation as 
a sacred asset class, partly because they seemed technically difficult to 
restructure, but also partly because of their association with the moral 
commitment the official sector had made in sponsoring the Brady Plan.173 
The Bradies were meant to be inflexible so as to instill fear of default into 
the hearts of wayward debtors. One provision in the bonds turned out in 
retrospect to be near-comical bluster—a promise that they would never be 
restructured. Starting in 1995, academic and trade journals began 
publishing lawyers’ bond restructuring proposals; even more ideas 
circulated informally.174 
On the official side, concern about bond restructuring went hand-in-
hand with concern about mega-bailouts: many in the finance circles fumed 
at the $50 billion Mexico package.175 Central banks took the lead in 
preventing a recurrence. A series of central bank deputies’ meetings 
beginning in February 1995 produced a G-10 working party under the 
leadership of Jean-Jacques Rey, the Belgian central bank deputy chosen, in 
 
 
 171. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
 172. The Brady bonds, which were the predominant model for emerging market sovereign bond 
contracts, had not been designed as “market instruments but rather [as] crisis instruments created 
specifically by the creditor banks as a prerequisite for agreeing to significant debt and debt service 
reduction.” James Hurlock & Troy Alexander, The Fire Next Time: The Dangers in the Next Debt 
Crisis, 15 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 14 (1996). 
 173. See REY REPORT, supra note 59; Vincent Truglia et al., Sovereign Risk: Bank Deposits vs. 
Bonds, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERV. SPECIAL COMMENT, Oct. 1995 (surveying recent history of 
selective sovereign default and implications for different instruments); Azmat Zuberi & David 
Roberts, Preferred Creditors and the Sovereign Ceiling, DUFF & PHELPS CREDIT RATING CO., Mar. 
19, 1996. 
 174. See, e.g., Hurlock & Alexander, supra note 172; Symposium, The New Latin American Debt 
Regime, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 5 (1995); J.B. Hurlock, Sovereign Bankruptcies: Countries Cannot 
Always Pay (1995) (unpublished manuscript, White & Case, cited in Barry Eichengreen & Richard 
Portes, Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors in Eichengreen et al., supra note 
59 at 65); James B. Hurlock, A Chapter 9 Process for the Global Financial System? (May 17, 1995) 
(unpublished manuscript, White & Case, on file with authors) [hereinafter, Hurlock, Chapter 9]. 
According to Hurlock, “Several tactics were tried during the [1980s] Debt Crisis to curb the power of 
the unanimity provisions. The first, and most obvious, was to amend the provisions over time as debt 
fatigue began to overcome the restructuring participants . . .” Id. at 12. 
 175. BLUSTEIN, supra note 148, at 172.  
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the words of one participant, “because he was neutral—not American but 
not crazy Bundesbank—no bailouts.”176 The Rey group’s mandate was “a 
reaction to what [the United States] did, [the thinking being that] there has 
got to be a better way of handling sovereign liquidity crises.”177 The fruits 
of the group’s work, known informally as the Rey Report, came out in 
May 1996. It considered and rejected statutory sovereign bankruptcy as 
neither feasible nor appropriate and proposed a “market-led process to 
develop for inclusion in sovereign debt instruments contractual provisions 
that facilitate consultation and cooperation” between debtors and creditors, 
as well as among creditors.178 This specifically included majority 
modification to improve restructuring predictability.179  
It is not clear how the contract proposal made its way into the report. 
Some later commentators credit a volume edited by economists Barry 
Eichengreen and Richard Portes, commissioned by the British Treasury 
and the Bank of England in connection with their work in the Rey 
group.180 But some of the authors and working party members describe the 
bond clause proposals as “already out there” and part of the crisis 
management discussion.181 Veterans of the 1980s crisis who participated 
in the Rey effort said that the lengthy, costly and traumatic restructuring 
delays they attributed to high-majority and unanimity requirements in loan 
contracts played a role in framing their concerns.182 Some private 
practitioners had expressed similar worries several years before the 1994 
Tequila Crisis.183 
In market surveys commissioned for the Rey Report, investors 
dismissed the contract proposal: 
 Market participants opposed any attempt to change the present 
structure of bond contracts. The general view among the 
respondents was that bonds represent a simple promise by the 
borrower to pay, and their attractiveness as an investment vehicle 
 
 
 176. Interview (Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Interview 100705]. 
 177. Id. 
 178. REY REPORT, supra note 59, at 1.  
 179. Id. at 16–17. 
 180. EICHENGREEN ET AL., supra note 59. 
 181. See Interview 100705, supra note 176; Interview 021706, supra note 149; Interview (Jan. 3, 
2006) [hereinafter Interview 010306]; Interview (Aug. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Interview 081706]. 
 182. E.g., Interview 092705, supra note 108. Buchheit and Hurlock each reported collective action 
problems in earlier loan restructurings, and blamed holdouts for the lengthy and costly workouts. Lee 
C. Buchheit, Making Amends for Amendments, 10 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 11 (1991); Hurlock, Chapter 9, 
supra note 174 at 2, 12 (citing Poland’s experience and proposals to reduce amendment thresholds).  
 183. Buchheit, supra note 182. 
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reflects their character as easily transferable, unencumbered, and 
difficult-to-restructure securities.184 
To be fair, investors also dismissed sovereign bankruptcy and 
bondholder committees—they pretty much wanted to be left alone. We 
were privy to similar outreach efforts several years later, which elicited 
roughly the same market response. 
Nevertheless the clause proposal, initially mocked as “a tinny 
deliverable,”185 survived for almost five years. After the Rey Report, 
clauses reappeared in a report on crisis resolution by the G-22186 in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, and as part of the International 
Financial Architecture Initiative in 1999. One staffer suggested this 
resilience was due to a combination of intellectual appeal and bureaucratic 
convenience: 
 [CACs offered a] very elegant, simple theoretical framing. It 
worked in the economics world. Collective action problems are a 
well-accepted category that a legal problem falls into—a well-
accepted model of market failures . . . . Government is only 
involved if there is a market failure. It is easy to show market 
failure here. . . .Very powerful framing overlapped with the concern 
in the legal world whether document standards in New York law 
Brady bonds made sense—set up in a way [where] exit [equals] no 
more restructuring—that made it harder down the line. This simple 
accepted model of potential problem that worked both in legal and 
economic world—there was an element of truth to the arguments—
got elevated and expanded into a notion that because CACs are not 
there, there is no market solution, [and] the only option is a bailout. 
Somehow it went from “absence of CACs makes restructuring 
harder than it should be” to “there will always be bailouts.” 
. . . .  
 
 
 184. REY REPORT, supra note 59, at 31. 
 185. Interview 092705, supra note 108. 
 186. The group included the G-7 and Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, and Thailand. 
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 . . . Jeff Sachs was pushing international bankruptcy,187 [and it] 
seemed too far. Traded securities . . . difficult to restructure [means 
a] bailout next time—the Mexico problem—not tenable. As [is] 
always the case, you put the unattractive options as the first bullet 
and the third, everyone picks the option in the middle. The option in 
the middle was to do something that makes tradable bonds easier to 
restructure.188 
The intellectual appeal story is plausible because of the large number 
of academic economists involved in CAC policies over time. Lawrence 
Summers and John Taylor are the best-known of the lot, but the economics 
PhDs involved at the highest levels numbered in the dozens. It helps 
explain the search for market failures and the willingness to commission 
academic studies in support of the effort. 
The bureaucratic story requires elaboration. The officials who 
discussed the topic with us made clear that their advocacy of CACs related 
to a bigger policy objective. If Mexico-style bailouts were no more, bond 
restructuring was inevitable. In the late 1990s, CACs became part of the 
effort to signal that the official sector would not stand in the way of 
sovereign bond restructuring, and in some cases may even demand it. The 
implications of that judgment translated into two big policy shifts in the 
late 1990s under the rubric of “private sector involvement in crisis 
management,” or “PSI”.189 First, the Paris Club of government-to-
government creditors would condition its relief on the debtor’s 
commitment to seek private bond restructuring terms comparable to the 
official concessions.190 Second, the IMF would extend to bonds its 
willingness to finance countries while they are in default on private 
loans.191 Several participants said that at the time, CACs ended up on the 
 
 
 187. See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Do We Need an International Lender of the Last Resort, Frank D. 
Graham Lecture, Princeton University (Apr. 20, 1995), available at http://www.earthinstitute. 
columbia.edu/about/director/pubs/intllr.pdf. For a more recent iteration, see Jeffrey D. Sachs, The 
Roadblock to a Sovereign Bankruptcy Law, 23 CATO J. 73 (2003), available at http://www.cato.org/ 
pubs/journal/cj23n1/cj23n1-8.pdf. 
 188. Interview (Nov. 22, 2005). This statement sets out for CACs the classic ingredients for 
dissemination of policy ideas. See generally PETER A. HALL, ED., THE POLITICAL POWER OF 
ECONOMIC IDEAS: KEYNESIANISM ACROSS NATIONS (1989). 
 189. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 190. See Jeffrey Keegan, Growing Chorus of Regulators Want Sovereign Bondholders to Share 
the Pain, INV. DEALER’S DIG., May 3, 1999, at 16; Kristin Lindow et al., Pakistan’s Paris Club 
Agreement Implies New Official Strategy Regarding Seniority of Sovereign Eurobonds, MOODY’S 
INVESTORS SERV. GLOBAL CREDIT RES., Mar. 1999, at 3. Bank loans had been subject to 
“comparability” since the 1970s. 
 191. Before 1989, the IMF refused to finance countries in arrears to private creditors. This 
empowered the creditors to hold up both their own as well as the IMF’s financing. As bank 
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laundry list of things to be “for” in operationalizing PSI.192 Despite three 
years of market resistance beginning with the Rey Report investor surveys, 
the clauses still had an inoffensive, vaguely market-friendly ring to the 
official ear. 
But in the late 1990s, CACs remained an adjunct initiative. A former 
Clinton White House official suggested that Treasury Secretaries Robert 
Rubin and Lawrence Summers never seemed eager to push hard on the 
CAC front.193 Staffers observed that Rubin and Summers had expressed 
their respective reservations differently:  
 Larry was worried that it would make us look feckless. We 
publicized it a certain amount, but how they structure contracts is 
not our business. If this is our primary recommendation and they do 
not do anything about it, we look feckless. 
 Rubin was happy to have us talk about it, but would not have 
supported drafting model clauses. [He said] “These guys have a 
problem coming down the pike. [They will have to] restructure 
bonds—if they can’t do it, this is when it will happen. This will not 
be solved until they believe it is a problem, and when they do, then 
they will solve it better than we ever had.”194 
The delicate state of the global economy weighed heavily against 
regulation or even heavy pressure on market participants: “Although we 
believed that CACs would not in any basic sense change the situation, 
[they were a] highly charged symbolic political thing since the Rey 
Report.”195 Moving precipitously might “screw up fragile equilibrium.”196 
Mulling CACs’ eventual success, another participant in the Clinton-era 
debates admitted being torn between feeling “sheepish—they made it 
happen when we could have done it in 1999–2000—and what I used to 
 
 
restructurings progressed, the Fund changed its policy to allow lending where the country was still in 
default on its loans, provided the country was complying with its policy program. With qualifications, 
the policy expanded to cover default on bonded debt in the late 1990s. INT’L MONETARY FUND, FUND 
POLICY ON LENDING INTO ARREARS TO PRIVATE CREDITORS: FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF THE 
GOOD FAITH CRITERION 3–9 (July 30, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ 
privcred/073002.pdf. 
 192. Interview (Sept. 9 and 13, 2005) [hereinafter Interview 091305]. See also Interview 092705, 
supra note 108. 
 193. Interview 010306, supra note 181. 
 194. Interview 091305, supra note 192. 
 195. Interview 010306, supra note 181.  
 196. Id. For a sense of the international economic environment and public perceptions of the role 
of the U.S. economic policy team, see Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Three Marketeers, TIME, Feb. 15, 
1999, at 34, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,990206,00.html.  
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think then, which is that . . . in the hierarchy of priorities . . . it was not 
number one, number two, or number three.”197  
The overall tone of the PSI effort of the 1990s was more burden-
sharing than privatization. CACs were part—even if the mildest part—of a 
policy package that signaled “we want banks to take a hit.”198 The official 
sector was not about to get out of the crisis management business; rather, 
private creditors that got a subsidy post-Mexico would now be asked to 
pay their way. In the late 1990s, the official sector was united around bond 
comparability and lending into arrears on bonded debt. These were 
measures that governments could and did implement on their own, with 
minimal cooperation from the private sector. Once they did, officials could 
wait and see how bond restructurings might pan out. Within two years, 
Pakistan, Ukraine, and Ecuador had secured high participation rates in 
distressed bond exchanges without significant litigation.199 Ecuador was 
especially influential because it restructured New York–law Brady bonds 
without CACs, thanks in part to another market-generated contractual 
innovation—exit consents.200 
The context had changed by the time CACs reemerged in 2002, several 
years after the Paris Club and IMF policies had been implemented. IMF 
packages were getting even larger under the new U.S. administration, 
which had made opposition to bailouts a plank of its foreign economic 
policy.201 The new U.S. leadership framed this opposition as leaving the 
market to its own devices—getting the public sector out of crisis 
management, rather than making the private sector pay.202 In contrast, for 
many European officials SDRM seemed like a natural next step in 
escalating the PSI debate. 
The free-market contingent at the U.S. Treasury needed an alternative 
that promised to reduce bailouts, empower market forces, and look 
credible enough to preempt SDRM. CACs—long rejected by Wall 
Street—were arguably the worst candidate. On the other hand, once 
 
 
 197. Interview (October 21, 2005). 
 198. Interview 010306, supra note 181. 
 199. See, e.g., Interview 091106, supra note 150, suggesting that the Paris Club was reasonably 
satisfied with the market’s “practical, technical” response to bond comparability. 
 200. See Lee C. Buchheit, How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap, 19 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 17 
(2000); Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 69, at 83–84.  
 201. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 54, at 8–9; Tarullo, supra note 125, at 650–51, 660.  
 202. Taylor contrasted the Bush Administration’s approach to that of their predecessors: “They 
tended to be government-focused rather than market-focused, emphasizing large loans by the official 
sector and later government-induced bail-ins by the private sector.” Taylor Progress Report, supra note 
112. Whether this market focus went beyond rhetoric and the extent to which it made for sound policy 
is much debated. See, e.g., ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 54, at 8–9, 368–69. 
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SDRM was out of the box the time constraint was real, especially if one 
believed as some did that the debate itself was harmful to the markets. No 
other palatable alternative had materialized. Republican officials may have 
found philosophical appeal in a fix that literally “came from the markets” 
in the form of standard English-law contracts, and bonus bureaucratic 
appeal in a fix that looked familiar and essentially harmless to the finance 
officials in the major industrial countries, and even to some emerging 
markets countries that had to buy into CACs to make the shift happen. 
Within two years, CACs went from being a symbol of “bail-ins” to being a 
symbol of market-friendly reasonableness.203 
Taylor noted the early history of CACs in his public statements and 
private outreach.204 Several officials specifically credited the education 
efforts of the 1990s with the initiative’s quick progress in the 2000s, 
speculating that if CACs had first sprung up on the eve of Argentina’s 
default, they would have taken another decade to adopt.205 Most of our 
interviews with investors and emerging markets officials suggest little 
knowledge of the history. Some of this may be due to personnel changes. 
One buy-side executive prominent in the 2003 shift speculated that he was 
too junior to have been included in the CAC conversations of the 1990s.206 
(A Washington team met with the head of his operation in 1999.) Another 
investor privy to both iterations of the initiative described a subliminal 
learning process: “People were worn out, but also knew that the public 
sector lived for that stuff and would never wear out.”207 In retrospect, early 
advocacy increased the volume and sharpened the focus of CAC 
information in the public domain; the drumbeat also raised awareness of 
bond contracts among some creditors and helped frame the mandate for 
groups like EMCA, discussed below. 
For European officials, the life of CACs between 1995 and 2003 
looked more like a continuous effort,208 even if it proceeded in fits and 
starts and in distinct phases:  
As for the two iterations, there are clear distinctions. I do not think 
they are completely and absolutely distinct—they [led] into one 
another. Excuse the analogy, it is like the process of labor—one 
 
 
 203. Interview 010306, supra note 181. 
 204. Taylor, supra note 159. 
 205. See, e.g., Interview 092705, supra note 108. 
 206. Telephone Interview (Mar. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Interview 030306]. 
 207. Interview 070206, supra note 104. 
 208. See Interview 021706, supra note 149; Interview 091106, supra note 150; Telephone 
Interview (July 10, 2006) [hereinafter Interview 071006]. 
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contraction leading into another. But they were significantly 
different.  
. . . . 
 People who think of success or failure in the international 
domain bring up the idea of a hegemon. The fact that the U.S. was 
behind this was necessary but wasn’t sufficient. The U.S. was 
certainly behind the first phase as well.209 
This official divided the policy push into three phases—the 1995–96 
Rey Report, which was essentially a G-10-only exercise, outreach 
notwithstanding; the 1998 G-22 report on crisis resolution, authored by a 
group of officials from major industrial and emerging market economies 
in equal numbers; and the “Taylor-Quarles” phase, which mobilized an 
even broader range of actors, including lawyers and diverse members of 
the investor community.210 Another European described a more diffuse 
process: 
I do not particularly subscribe to [the] ‘individuals make a 
difference’ school of thought. If the Rey Report had not been 
written, if Eichengreen-Portes hadn’t produced the report, if O’Neill 
hadn’t encouraged Krueger to give her SDRM speech, . . . the 
Quarles working group, Taylor’s advocacy, Buchheit’s advocacy 
(and these people were important advocates) . . . would have taken 
place in a vacuum.211 
On balance, even if market outreach had limited visible effect, it seems 
fair to trace the education and buy-in process among officials to 1995, and 
for a small but important subset, even further back to the restructurings of 
the late 1980s. There is some irony to the fact that CACs’ most important 
and powerful proponents in the official sector—deputy-level Bush 
Treasury officials—were also the last to arrive on the scene. It helped that 
their career staff were familiar with the clauses, and that their principal 
international interlocutors knew about them and were open to them. The 
accretion of press and academic studies that made CACs look harmless at 
worst, and often helpful, boosted the officials’ rhetorical arsenal and 
increased their comfort with advocating new terms.212 
 
 
 209. Interview 021706, supra note 149. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Interview 071006, supra note 208. 
 212. See Interview 100705, supra note 176; Interview 061506, supra note 132. 
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The way in which the new team pursued CACs is instructive. As Under 
Secretary for International Affairs, John Taylor was head of Treasury’s 
international division; Quarles was his deputy. They oversaw an 
organization of roughly 150 staff, organized into functional and 
geographic offices.213 Functional offices are responsible for policies that 
span geographic regions, such as international debt, development, trade, 
investment, terrorist finance, and U.S. participation in multilateral 
institutions. “Country” offices are responsible for policy with respect to 
specific countries and regions, and generally maintain staff-level 
communications with other finance ministries and central banks. The 
functional office responsible for U.S. policy in the IMF and the G-7 
process had the “lead” in staffing the CAC initiative, with input from in-
house lawyers and the office of the U.S. representative at the IMF.214  
Between Krueger’s first speech in November 2001 and the summer of 
2002, the lead office collected research on the clauses and consulted with 
academics, some emerging market issuers, and selected market 
participants (mostly trade groups and researchers at large investment 
banks). Early efforts focused on including CAC advocacy in important 
policy signaling documents, such as G-7 communiqués, speeches and 
other public statements by senior U.S. officials, meetings with foreign 
counterparts, and market outreach.215 This was similar to the late 1990s 
tactics. 
In April 2002, the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors 
adopted an “Action Plan” to strengthen crisis prevention and resolution.216 
G-7 ministers’ meetings usually yield statements and communiqués, 
broader-brush documents meant to signal economic trends and policy 
intentions. An Action Plan signaled urgency and specificity—an emphasis 
on results reflecting the public style of the new U.S. team. “Contingency 
clauses” were the first item in the plan, followed by limits on IMF lending, 
greater transparency in official decision-making, and further work on 
SDRM (which “would take time”).217 The one-page plan described the 
clauses in detail, tracking Taylor’s speech a few weeks earlier. CACs had 
 
 
 213. U.S. Treasury, Organization Chart (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.treas.gov/organization/org-
chart-122005.pdf. 
 214. E.g., Interview 100605, supra note 108; Interview 061506, supra note 132.  
 215. Id. 
 216. Press Release, G-7 Fin. Ministers and Cent. Bank Governors, Action Plan (Apr. 20, 2002), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/po3015.htm. See BLUSTEIN, supra note 148, at 34–
36, for a discussion on the role of the G-7 finance ministers’ meetings and G-7 deputies’ channels in 
international economic policy. 
 217. Press Release, supra note 216.  
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appeared in G-7 statements in the 1990s, but their prominence in this 
“action” document meant a promotion. 
One official described the plan as a U.S.-British compromise to diffuse 
European support for SDRM and present a united G-7 front for CACs. 
Shortly after giving the speech that launched the CAC campaign, Taylor 
traveled to Russia. On the way back, he stopped for a G-7 meeting in 
London. There, Taylor and his UK counterpart Gus O’Donnell agreed to 
frame CACs as a predicate for limiting IMF lending in crisis—a policy 
long advocated by the Europeans.218 For the Clinton Treasury, CACs were 
marginal and strict limits were unacceptable (and in any event not 
credible); for their successors, both CACs and limits sent a message 
against bailouts. Concerned that the other G-7 members would see any 
U.S-British deal as suspect, Taylor and O’Donnell asked the Canadian 
deputy Jonathan Fried to present what became the Action Plan.219 
Everyone reports that Treasury’s CAC strategy shifted either in the 
summer of 2002 or following the disastrous meeting with issuers and 
investors in September.220 Staff in “country” offices were charged with 
learning the issuance pipeline for their region in the last quarter of 2002 
and early 2003, working with in-house lawyers and using informal market 
contacts. The lead functional office put together a composite log and 
coordinated an intensified outreach plan with calls from Taylor, Quarles, 
and other officials to finance ministers, deputies, and debt managers in the 
issuing countries. With issuers’ permission, U.S. officials and staff also 
contacted the lawyers and investment bankers involved. 
Our official sector contacts stressed that there was no “arm-twisting”: 
no threats were made, and no rewards were promised. Taylor and others 
have described “an exercise in persuasion;”221 the briefings and reports we 
have seen do nothing to refute this characterization. It is difficult to 
 
 
 218. TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 119–20. The Clinton Treasury had a powerful ally in U.S. Federal 
Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan. Greenspan, Rubin, and Summers were loath to tie their own 
hands, and in any event had viewed hard IMF lending limits as not credible. Taylor suggested that 
CACs gave lending limits credibility in Greenspan’s eyes. TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 120. Others who 
knew Greenspan speculated that he went along with the deal because the new limits were still plenty 
flexible, while the clauses did no harm. Interview 100705, supra note 176. 
 219. TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 120. Canada chaired the G-7 process that year. The Canadian 
Finance Ministry welcomed the new approach as reflecting ideas Canada had been pressing for years 
to reform international financial architecture. A chronology accompanying the Canadian press release 
dates the architecture reform effort to the start of Mexico’s Tequila Crisis in December 1994, and 
features Canada’s advocacy of CACs and its own CAC issue in 2000. Press Release, G-7 Fin. 
Ministers, Can. Dep’t of Fin., Adopt Financial Crises Action Plan (Apr. 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/news02/02-034e.html. 
 220. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 221. Taylor, supra note 159. 
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ascertain how the conversations were perceived on the other end. While 
none of our investor and emerging markets contacts would admit to having 
their own arms twisted, many seemed certain that twisting was going on 
elsewhere. U.S. officials and staff involved in the calls describe the 
response as mixed: some ministers knew nothing of the clauses; others 
said they had heard issuing with CACs would be costly. Everyone was 
polite, but no one volunteered. Smaller, shakier issuers said they could not 
afford to jeopardize their market access; others said they had no plans to 
default, did not need new clauses, and would not risk paying a penalty for 
no good reason.222 The outreach log from January 2003 records “broadly 
supportive” and “maybe next time” sentiment across the board. Issuers 
pointed to the bankers, bankers pointed to the issuers, everyone pointed to 
the investors. One U.S. official painted this picture: 
Don’t think any of them saw it as in their own interest. Lawyers—
why should they change? They have a template, they are making 
good money. Countries risk the yield going up. Imagine a finance 
minister [who is] responsible for spreads going higher. Investment 
community saw it as taking power away from them.223 
Against this background, broadening investor outreach was a key 
aspect of the new strategy. As noted, in the first half of 2002 officials were 
in frequent contact with trade associations and sell-side research analysts. 
The buy-side was usually represented in these discussions by members of 
EMCA, a group that emerged out of Ecuador’s Brady default in 1999.224 
EMCA had been vocal in opposing any contract change that would 
diminish investor protections.225 By the end of 2002, U.S. officials 
engaged with a broader cross-section of the buy-side, including large 
investors who reached out to the Treasury and tried to distance themselves 
from EMCA positions.226 On the sell-side, the team shifted focus from 
research to bankers “actually doing deals”: 
[A]fter we really got down into the dirt [in late 2002], making calls 
to the debt managers in the countries and to the real live investment 
 
 
 222. See Interview 061506, supra note 132; Interview 121305, supra note 131. 
 223. Interview 061506, supra note 132. 
 224. We discuss EMCA’s role in detail in Part IV.E below. Background on EMCA is available at 
http://www.emcreditors.com/about.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). 
 225. For the EMCA’s response to Mexico’s February 2003 issuance with CACs, see Press 
Release, Emerging Mkts. Creditors Ass’n (Feb. 26, 2003), available at http://www.emcreditors.com/ 
pdf/EMCA_Press%20Release_2_26_03.pdf. 
 226. See Interview 100605, supra note 108; Interview 030306, supra note 206. 
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bankers actually doing the deals, these people knew very little about 
the whole CAC debate. It was quite astonishing. The people doing 
the deals hadn’t been going to the conferences, could have cared 
less, hadn’t heard much from the conference goers, and didn’t know 
much at all. They just knew how to generate fees. So, the private 
sector talking heads weren’t worth much.227 
By late 2002, outreach to issuers suggested that no single country was 
willing to go first. As an alternative, the U.S. Treasury and its allies in the 
investor community tried to get a group of highly rated issuers, potentially 
including Mexico, Korea, Poland, and South Africa, to announce together 
their intention to issue with CACs. The announcement would not be linked 
to any particular issue that might fail. To set the stage, they planned a 
meeting with the target issuers in late February, a week or so before John 
Snow’s first G-7 Finance Ministerial. The objective was to have large 
investors reassure the countries that they were willing to buy their debt 
with CACs and did not expect to charge a penalty. 
At the last minute Mexico canceled. It later turned out that Mexican 
officials were meeting with their bankers and lawyers to plan for the 
country’s first CAC issue. By many accounts, U.S. officials found out 
about the issue shortly before the launch. According to Mexican officials, 
the Finance Minister broke the news casually at the end of a lunch with the 
new Treasury Secretary.228 One senior U.S. official describes intense 
coordination leading up to the launch, where Treasury pledged and 
delivered a public statement of support and procured similar backing from 
the G-7; others suggest this was a compressed process following Mexico’s 
surprise revelation—the difference may be a matter of emphasis.229 Within 
days of Mexico’s announcement, at Snow’s first G-7 meeting, the United 
States signaled the end of the two tracks. SDRM was officially shelved in 
April.230 
 
 
 227. Interview 121605, supra note 118. 
 228. Interview 121205, supra note 145. 
 229. Interview 061606, supra note 153; Interview 121605, supra note 118. While the precise form 
and timing of the issue appear to have been a surprise, Taylor’s book and file memos indicate that 
Mexican officials told their U.S. counterparts that they were ready to move in principle as early as 
January. TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 127–28; see also Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. 
Treasury, U.S. Treasury Statement Regarding Decision by Mexico to Issue Bonds with Collective 
Action Clauses (Feb. 24, 2003), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/20032241817 
1120575.htm. 
 230. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, G-7 Action Plan Implementation, April 2003 (Apr. 12, 
2003), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/200341213252315778.htm. 
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Just as SDRM was identified with Anne Krueger, in 2002-2003 many 
saw CACs as John Taylor’s initiative. Observers familiar with early CAC 
efforts said Taylor’s voluntary contractual initiative was doomed on 
arrival. Comments from the audience at his April 2002 speech predicted 
nothing would happen without a government mandate; hallway chatter 
bordered on disparaging—but Taylor seemed undaunted.231 In less than a 
year, he proved them all wrong. For a non-lawyer, Taylor had an 
impressive grasp of how key clauses worked; he missed no opportunity to 
raise CACs in speeches and testimony, and asked for frequent progress 
reports on the initiative. He was invested in the targeted, intensive 
outreach. Contacts at all levels described encounters where Taylor—a 
mild-mannered man—showed visible frustration with the slow progress to 
CACs, most notably in late 2002. One person remembered getting a call 
about CACs while Christmas shopping at Target, in which Taylor said, 
“Nothing is happening, we need to do something!”232 Another only 
tangentially involved with CACs recalled Taylor’s reaction to a CAC-less 
bond issued without Treasury’s knowledge—“There is no excuse, we 
should be calling everyone!”233 
Some suggest CACs made sense as a defensive move on Taylor’s part: 
”[T]he principal aim was to stop SDRM and his mad boss.”234 Yet among 
all U.S. participants in the CAC episode, only academic economists (of 
which he is one) expressed Taylor’s level of enthusiasm for the clauses’ 
substantive value and their potential importance in crisis. Taylor’s website 
puts CACs among his most important accomplishments at the Treasury, 
under the headline, “Essential Reform of the International Financial 
System: Collective Action Clauses,” and alongside Iraq’s reconstruction, 
terrorist financing, and China’s exchange rate.235 In speeches, he has 
credited the success of the CAC effort partly to the post-9/11 spirit of 
international cooperation. We have no way of knowing whether this 
conviction was genuine; if it were, we can only speculate on the reasons. 
But we cannot help wondering whether a cooler, more pragmatic approach 
to CAC advocacy in 2002 might have failed as its predecessors did in the 
late 1990s: “History needs a midwife in this situation. John was the 
midwife.”236 
 
 
 231. Interview 010306, supra note 181. 
 232. Interview 121605, supra note 118.  
 233. Interview (Dec. 14, 2005) [Interview 121405]. 
 234. Interview 010306, supra note 181. See also TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 116. 
 235. John B. Taylor, Policies in International Finance 2001–2005, http://www.stanford.edu/ 
%7Ejohntayl/PoliciesInternationalFinance.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).  
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C. Ritual Experts 
Several published accounts of the CAC shift focus on the role of 
experts, especially of lawyers and economists, in educating the 
officialdom and the markets. Interviews suggest that shift participants used 
expertise in unexpected ways. 
We have noted the impetus economic theory gave to the clause 
initiative by framing the bondholder collective action problem and the 
holdout dilemma.237 Two other instances of expert deployment stand out 
in the CAC campaign. The first is the eminent lawyers’ team 
commissioned to draft model clauses under the auspices of a G-10 
working group chaired by Quarles. The second is the econometric studies 
that asked whether investors demanded a higher price for bonds with 
CACs than for those without. 
In June 2002, shortly after the release of the G-7 Action Plan, the G-10 
established a working group of officials to infuse more content in the CAC 
exhortations.238 Quarles was in the chair.239 We have no evidence that the 
group was intended as a “counter-design” project to balance the IMF’s 
work on SDRM; however, in retrospect it appears to have played some 
such function. The group’s product, released in three months, contained 
two parts: an official report recommending clauses for inclusion 
principally in New York law bonds, and a set of model clauses drafted by 
an advisory group of “eminent lawyers” who represented sovereign 
debtors and creditors in jurisdictions where most external sovereign debt is 
issued (England, Germany, Japan and New York).240 The effect was to 
produce a tangible alternative to SDRM and the industry clauses released 
four months later, an alternative that had “intellectual heft”241 and 
appeared to come pre-endorsed by major countries and law firms in the 
sovereign market. 
Quarles’s role in the enterprise was critical. Before joining the Bush II 
administration, he was a partner at Davis, Polk & Wardwell in New 
York;242 he had also held a domestic finance appointment in the Bush I 
Treasury.243 In his new government stint he soon gained a reputation as an 
 
 
 237. See supra notes 61, 205, 212. 
 238. GROUP OF TEN, REPORT OF THE G-10 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES (Sept. 
26, 2002), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf. 
 239. Id. at 8.  
 240. Id. at 1–2. 
 241. Interview 121605, supra note 118. 
 242. To our knowledge, his practice did not include sovereign debt. 
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engaged listener, a quick thinker, and a dynamic interlocutor even among 
those who disagreed with him. One sell-side banker who met Quarles 
several times described him as “one that looked like a dyed-in-the-wool 
Republican,” and in the same breath recalled being “pleasantly surprised” 
with his willingness to listen and delve into substance.244 
Some said the drafting effort was Quarles’s idea; others saw his 
leadership as a U.S. effort to control G-10 mission creep. Belgian officials 
were especially keen to use the CAC campaign to bolster the role of the G-
10, a forum where Belgium and other “small Europeans” not part of the G-
7 play an important role. Even some European participants in the working 
group described it in part as a Belgian play for relevance.245 We heard this 
sentiment from a senior U.S. official: 
I was so glad that Randy chaired it. . . . After the G-7 supported 
[clauses], the G-10 decided this would be something to do. It is a 
group always looking for something to do.246 
Taylor was not at the meeting that sanctioned the working group, and 
though he went along with it, he was never comfortable with officials 
prescribing contract text to the market.247 He had a point: even as the 
group’s report put distance between its own recommendations and the 
eminent lawyers’ model clauses, and even as insiders all attested to 
Quarles’s scrupulous enforcement of that distance in the process, virtually 
all our market contacts perceived the model as the official position on the 
merits. This was especially significant with respect to the 75 percent 
amendment threshold for “reserve matters” (key financial and legal terms): 
“Randy was not shy about 75 percent. The report said certain countries, 
certain profiles, certain problems . . . [but] 75 percent is the mandated 
number.”248 
Other G-10 recommendations for New York law bonds included 
trustees or permanent bondholder representatives, elected bondholder 
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 248. Interview 111705, supra note 106. The G-10 Report specifically cautioned against thresholds 
above 75 percent. GROUP OF TEN, supra note 238, at 5. The fact that official pronouncements on IMF 
lending to Argentina hinged on participation levels in the bond exchange, and that Argentina’s 
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representatives to negotiate a restructuring, brakes on acceleration and 
litigation, and additional disclosure by the issuer.249 
The extent to which the G-10 effort helped convince some of the early 
movers is a matter of debate. One “eminent lawyer” who was also 
involved in an early CAC issue suggested that “[t]he G-10 report gave 
enough legitimacy to the use of the clause” for issuers to experiment.250 A 
U.S. official said that the G-10 template added to Mexico’s comfort.251 
But some Mexican officials expressed concern at the proliferation of 
drafting and discussion fora: “Discussions at IIF, G-10, U.S. 
government—process not leading anywhere. It was seen as [re]opening 
every single item in the contract.”252 Soon U.S. officials found themselves 
reassuring issuers that the G-10 would not make a fuss if they went ahead 
with clauses different from the template.253  
By late 2002 to early 2003, some in the United States began to worry 
that G-10 had started a runaway process, with other groups threatening to 
form on the heels of the Quarles-led effort.254 European support for a code 
of conduct for sovereign debt management255 and renewed efforts to 
include CACs in the debt issued by EU member states were threatening to 
dilute the focus on a core set of clauses and a core group of issuers.256 
Mexico soon made the concerns moot. At the IMF conference on 
SDRM in January 2003, even as Mexican officials delivered the 
customary public nays, they let their U.S. counterparts know that they had 
commissioned a set of clauses from Cleary Gottlieb, and were willing to 
use them if the conditions were right.257 Price penalty remained the biggest 
concern. 
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 255. BANQUE DE FR. STAFF, TOWARDS A CODE OF GOOD CONDUCT ON SOVEREIGN DEBT RE-
NEGOTIATION (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.fesur.org.uy/publicaciones/Trichet-proposal.rtf. 
This proposal was incorporated in the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring 
in Emerging Markets. The Principles were released jointly by the IIF, IPMA, and several key 
emerging markets issuers in the fall of 2004. See Press Release, Sovereign Issuers of Int’l bonds, the 
Inst. of Int’l Fin., and the Int’l Primary Mkt. Assoc., Key Principles Agreed To Strengthen Emerging 
Markets Finance (Nov. 22, 2004), available at http://www.icma-group.org/media/news1/Archive 
IPMA press releases.Par.0007.ParDownLoadFile.tmp/221104%20Principles% 20Pressrrelease.PDF. 
 256. We discuss the impact of G-7 and other mature markets issuers including CACs in their debt 
in Part IV.C and Part IV.G below. 
 257. Interview 100605, supra note 108. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/3
p 1627 Gelpern Gulati book pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] PUBLIC SYMBOL IN PRIVATE CONTRACT 1677 
 
 
 
 
The question of whether investors would charge more for CACs had 
haunted the clause enterprise from the start. It had several iterations. The 
first often came out in “market outreach”: when told about CACs, 
investors who had not heard of them said flatly that “orderly” restructuring 
meant easier restructuring, and that they wanted more money for any 
clause that made debt easier to restructure. This was true even for 
investors who held billions of dollars in English-law CAC bonds. A 
charitable interpretation of this reaction has CACs as a signal. A country 
switching to CACs (unlike the country that has them as a matter of course 
in its English-law contracts) revealed that it was thinking about default. 
This meant that it was more likely to default, and possibly—depending on 
how the clauses actually worked in crisis (which no one knew or wanted to 
spend time figuring out)—suggested lower recovery in a restructuring.258 
Some investors described the buy-side response as reflexive: 
CACs’ utility is next to nothing. Guys do not read prospecti—is that 
the proper plural?—until next to default. Guys like me will ask for 
five extra basis points even if it is not worth it, something to hang 
our hat on.259 
Economists in the academy and in the government might have had a 
reflexive reaction of a different sort. If indeed there was a bondholder 
collective action problem, and if CACs helped solve it, then somehow it 
must surface in the bond price. One possible effect might even be 
beneficial to the issuer—if CACs reduced deadweight loss to the 
bondholders from a prolonged, messy restructuring, then an average 
bondholder that wanted to get a deal done quickly might forego a few 
basis points for the sake of a smoother process. On the other hand, to the 
extent the country had to convince fewer creditors to accept its 
restructuring proposal, it might offer a worse deal to the marginal 
bondholder260 —a price penalty would be in order. 
One senior government economist described a search for pricing 
studies at the time of the Rey Report in 1995–1996; to his surprise, the 
search came up dry.261 In the next few years, a number of studies 
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appeared, many associated with the official sector (the Bank of England, 
the IMF, the Reserve Bank of Australia).262 The studies disagreed 
vigorously on methodology; debates continue to this day. Moreover, 
market assessment of CACs—and their pricing—may well change if and 
when they are used to restructure debt on a significant scale. But even the 
most pessimistic among the early studies predicted only a minimal price 
penalty, and only for some sovereigns. A study by Eichengreen and Mody 
suggested that while borrowing costs might rise slightly for poor credits, 
they could go down for highly rated countries that used CACs because 
markets did not expect them to engage in opportunistic defaults and would 
value the flexibility that CACs could offer.263 The implicit message was 
that the CAC initiative would best be led by a country with a high credit 
rating. Early in 2003, Mexico fit the bill. 
Several of our official sector contacts—all economists—said that the 
pricing studies increased their comfort level with promoting CACs.264 But 
none recalled differences among the studies; the shared view that any 
penalty would be small was enough. One U.S. official not normally prone 
to post-modern musings implied that the studies’ value was in large part 
rhetorical: “We always cited Barry [Eichengreen]’s work. Of course, 
econometrics can never prove beyond shadow of a doubt . . . . I used it in 
advocacy [to] neutralize the bad stuff [they were] hearing. . . . If I were [an 
emerging market debt manager], I would still be awfully worried.”265 
The “bad stuff” came mostly from investors, often mediated through 
investment bankers. Many investors were also trained as economists. 
Some buy-side players dismissed the pricing studies: 
Academic studies on pricing were useless as they always are. 
[They] grossly misunderstand how investors behave, investor 
sophistication. The data sets they use would make [a quantitative 
analyst] cringe.266 
Investment bankers were more muted, but kept coming back to 
marketing concerns: 
 
 
 262. See supra note 55 (citing studies by Eichengreen & Mody, Becker, Richards & Thaicharoen, 
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They [emerging market clients] were petrified. Very hard to 
imagine how [CACs would result in] terms that were better for 
them, and very easy to imagine how [it could be] worse. The 
official sector was winking and nodding that they would indemnify, 
but it is not clear how they could have done it.267  
Even as U.S. officials consistently reported that their Mexican 
counterparts worried about the price penalty above all, a senior Mexican 
debt manager recalled that his team paid little attention to the academic 
pricing studies.268 This did not mean that issuers did not care about 
pricing, simply that their thinking about price was influenced by factors 
other than academic studies. 
A sell-side banker explained that by 2003 investors analyzed Mexico 
much as they did a high-grade U.S. corporate issuer, focusing on 
discounted cashflows rather than the probability of default.269 
Nevertheless, Mexican officials and their bankers worked hard to make 
any potential price effects untestable. On the one hand, the first CAC bond 
had to be far enough away from the most liquid issues on Mexico’s yield 
curve, so that it could not be compared directly. On the other hand, it 
could not be so far off as to risk being illiquid, with CACs getting the 
blame. The result was a success by all accounts. The most critical analyst 
report suggested less than a twenty-five basis point penalty.270 Others 
came in lower; Mexico and its advisers maintain it paid none.271 Months 
after the first issue, traders in the secondary market no longer asked 
whether the bonds they got had CACs; bankers filling their orders no 
longer volunteered.272 
In sum, the experts’ role in the CAC campaign was hardly 
straightforward. In the case of the G-10 working group and its “eminent 
lawyers,” the principal benefit of the technical work was not optimal 
contract language, but a process that created the appearance of consensus 
and legitimacy for some set of CACs. The G-10 report also created a straw 
man, a presumption, and a yardstick by which subsequent model and 
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actual clauses could be measured. This role is distinct from the one Ahdieh 
described when he credited the G-10 with helping overcome network 
effects: no issuer or investor told us that the model clauses signaled a 
market-wide shift following the model.273 On the other hand, by opening 
half a dozen contract terms to negotiation, the G-10 process may have 
increased uncertainty and created the impetus for Mexico to preempt 
further experimentation. Like the model clauses, the academic pricing 
studies responded to demand from the official sector. They added to the 
comfort level among CAC advocates, and may have helped deflect 
demands for a CAC subsidy. But for much of the CAC campaign, the 
studies fed into a rhetorical loop, a ritual retort to ritual investor threats 
about a default scenario that for issuers and investors alike remained 
imponderable and unpondered. 
D. Product Design 
Our contacts consistently said that the lawyers did not push Mexico to 
adopt CACs in February 2003. Neither Cleary Gottlieb (representing 
Mexico) nor Sullivan & Cromwell (representing the lead managers) took a 
firm position on the merits before Mexico made up its mind. What role did 
the lawyers play in this shift? We asked this question of every contact that 
had knowledge of the transaction—lawyers, bankers, investors, and 
officials. Most said that Mexico’s lawyers were wary of changing the 
standard documentation. Mexican finance officials took the early legal 
memos to suggest that “with all the legal architecture, CACs did not add 
much or take away much. No value added.”274 The decision to shift was 
made at the Mexican Finance Ministry, with the approval of the Minister 
himself.275 Consultations with Cleary Gottlieb were important, but not 
decisive. Once Mexican officials made the decision, they approached 
Cleary Gottlieb, J.P. Morgan, and Goldman Sachs to execute it.276 Sullivan 
& Cromwell collaborated in the draft. 
Our impressions contradict both the Choi-Gulati studies and the 
original Kahan-Klausner framing that focused on high-volume 
intermediaries. Underlying both sets of studies is an image of lawyers and 
bankers who design a solution to multiple clients’ problem, with the 
 
 
 273. See Ahdieh, supra note 83. We exclude statements from lawyers and officials who 
participated in the G-10 effort. 
 274.  Interview 121205, supra note 145. 
 275. Id.  
 276. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/3
p 1627 Gelpern Gulati book pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] PUBLIC SYMBOL IN PRIVATE CONTRACT 1681 
 
 
 
 
incentive to diffuse their invention in the market. But accounts of the 
process leading up to Mexico’s issue suggest that virtually no one 
involved saw the holdout problem as either problematic for Mexico or in 
need of an imminent fix. With or without CACs, “deals got done” is the 
phrase we heard often from the lawyers. The problem on which lawyers 
and clients appeared to agree was a proliferation of official initiatives. 
That required a different solution. This observation from a banker 
involved in the deal is typical: 
In [the lawyer’s] mind, CACs were in because my client wants it, 
Treasury wants it. If [they are] truly effective fifteen years from 
now, my client does not care because they do not plan to default.277 
While they did not drive the decision to shift, the lawyers helped 
determine the precise form of the new clauses and how the shift was 
executed. Lawyers and clients described the process in similar terms. First, 
Mexican officials commissioned an analytical memo that fed into the 
decision. Some months later, the clients decided to move, called the 
lawyers down to Mexico City, and asked them to draft the contracts. The 
deep relationship between Mexican finance officials and their lawyers, 
going back to the early 1980s, helped expand the lawyers’ role. 
The form of Mexico’s CACs was born of a team effort. The fact that 
most deal protagonists knew one another from prior transactions 
(unsurprising given the small community) surely helped. Clients and 
lawyers alike sought to keep innovation to a minimum for fear that the 
market’s tolerance for change was limited. The end result was a version of 
the G-10 majority amendment provisions using the 75 percent threshold, 
modified to be more consistent with standard form documentation for U.S. 
issuances. Mexico passed on the other G-10 recommendations, such as a 
trustee. A lawyer involved in the deal observed that an 85–90 percent 
amendment threshold would have made investment bankers’ lives easier 
but would have set disastrous precedent for Mexico.278 Lawyers said they 
knew the English-law convention (75 percent of a quorum) and had done 
corporate restructurings using English-law amendment provisions. We got 
the strong sense that going above 75 percent of outstanding principal in 
New York–law bonds would have been a sign of weakness for a 
sovereign, at least for a strong credit like Mexico—it enhanced neither the 
issuer’s nor the lawyer’s reputation. Mexico’s position was that 
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amendment thresholds were irrelevant to its credit analysis. Moving away 
from the G-10 and closer to the industry-backed levels would have 
contradicted this view and betrayed concern with market reception of the 
issue. Market chatter in response to Brazil’s use of 85 percent two months 
later confirms this.279 Looking back, the investment bankers involved in 
Mexico’s first issue did not complain to us about 75 percent.280 On the 
other hand, one banker recalled inserting a provision that made certain 
kinds of exit consents more difficult to obtain; after Mexico’s contracts 
became market standard, he expressed regret at not pressing for a wider 
range of similar protections.281 
Lawyers also argued against elaborate investor consultations before 
bringing the first issue to market. They and others worried that instead of 
allaying investor jitters about CACs, the meetings would dilute the 
contract language against Mexico’s interests: 
When the U.S. government was talking to everyone . . . arranging 
meetings between the country and buy-side, we said, “Nonsense!” 
. . . Immediately after launching the deal, discussions with [buy-side 
were] tense: “We want this, we want that . . . .” They were offended 
they didn’t get to design the product. In the end, they bought the 
deal.282 
Less than two months after the Mexican prototype hit the markets, 
Brazil and Uruguay were offering new variations on CACs. Brazil’s 
clauses were more conservative, limited to majority amendment and 
raising the voting threshold to 85 percent from Mexico’s 75 percent. 
Uruguay’s clauses were more aggressive. They included the 75 percent 
amendment threshold plus aggregated voting across bond issues, made 
easier because Uruguay exchanged its entire debt stock. Uruguay used a 
trust instead of a fiscal agency, which brought collective representation 
 
 
 279. See infra note 352 and accompanying text. 
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(last visited Jun. 27, 2007) yields press releases for 2005 CAC offerings by South Korea and the 
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and litigation-retardant benefits. It added other bondholder protections at 
the investors’ request. 
Some contacts suggested that this diversity reflected competition 
among law firms and lawyers eager to define the new standard and boost 
their own reputation. Arnold & Porter represented Brazil, Cleary Gottlieb 
represented Uruguay, Sullivan & Cromwell represented Brazil’s 
investment banks, and Shearman & Sterling represented the bankers for 
Uruguay. All four firms are major players in the sovereign market. 
Those involved in the deals did not report a story of competition either 
among the individual lawyers or their firms. Lawyers in the same firm did 
not always agree on the form that CACs should take. Mexico and Uruguay 
both used Cleary Gottlieb, but adopted different modification provisions. 
Both Brazil and Mexico had Sullivan & Cromwell representing the lead 
managers, but used different voting thresholds for their early CACs. 
The differences over what form CACs should take appear to have 
broken down between those lawyers who described CACs primarily as a 
response to official pressure, and those who looked to CACs to solve the 
holdout problem. This is not to say the first group did not understand 
CACs, but that they conceived of their own mandate differently. Lawyers 
advising early CAC movers often saw themselves as part of a team that 
engineered a deal with high participation and no price penalty, which in 
turn would help establish the viability of CACs as a concept, subject to 
later technical revision (one lawyer even told the press that his client 
might revise its CACs as market standards evolve).283 The clauses had to 
work and be a net improvement for their clients, but above all they had to 
sell and sell quickly—hence this group was inclined to minimalism. One 
lawyer summed up the sentiment this way: “We all think having CACs 
will be better than not . . . . Not only are they a good idea, but not 
particularly intellectually challenging.”284 
On the other hand, those who drafted CACs to address a holdout 
problem backed the more aggressive clause forms. Buchheit at Cleary 
Gottlieb stands out for having advocated clauses to battle holdouts since 
before the Rey Report.285 In a 2007 article, he attributed the CAC shift to 
investor frustration with losing money to holdouts and with Argentina’s 
protracted restructuring.286 (No investor was willing to make the link in 
our interviews.) Unlike most sovereign debt lawyers whose work includes 
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a mix of new issuance and restructuring, Buchheit’s sovereign practice is 
almost all restructuring. An elegant and prolific writer, he had published 
many articles on CACs before the Mexico shift. The first of these 
appeared in 1991, on the heels of some particularly contentious 
renegotiations of syndicated bank loans where individual banks had held 
the rest hostage.287 In 1998–1999, he published a series of columns in the 
leading trade publication proposing specific CACs for bonds,288 and more 
articles elsewhere discussing ways of addressing the holdout problem.289 
He became something of a public intellectual on sovereign debt matters, 
frequently called upon by the official sector (for the G-10 “eminent 
lawyers” group, among other efforts), but also a deeply polarizing figure 
among creditors for his aggressive representation of distressed countries.  
Despite his public association with CACs, Buchheit appears to have 
played a small role in Mexico’s decision and the execution of its first CAC 
issue. Cleary Gottlieb lawyers with principal responsibility for the Mexico 
relationship took the lead. But many point to Buchheit’s instrumental role 
in designing Uruguay’s CACs, which went beyond Mexico’s surgical 
response to official initiatives. 
Uruguay’s April 2003 documentation, including a trust structure and 
aggregated voting across different issues, became the model for Argentina 
and the Dominican Republic, represented by other lawyers at Cleary 
Gottlieb, as well as Iraq, a Buchheit client—all comprehensive debt 
restructurings. Argentina added a twist by introducing a trust indenture 
that covered both New York– and English-law bonds. Later Grenada 
(another Buchheit client) used the trust structure and eliminated a 
bondholder’s individual right to sue for missed payments.290 To the extent 
U.S. pressure for CACs played a role in these cases, it did not seek to go 
beyond the Mexican model. 
Uruguay and even more so Grenada were smaller and less sophisticated 
issuers than Mexico, Brazil, or Argentina. Smaller issuers were more 
likely to look to their lawyers for substantive strategic decisions, which in 
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turn may have given more of an opening to an entrepreneur like Buchheit. 
His history with CACs and the earlier initiatives may have prompted him 
to respond to official pressure in ways different from other lawyers. 
Taylor’s philosophical discomfort with endorsing specific clauses made 
minimalism the natural response for those who worried about government 
pressure more than they did about holdouts, it also offered two good 
reasons for Mexico’s preemption strategy.291 For those like Buchheit who 
worried about holdouts, official advocacy offered a window of opportunity 
to fix the problem; the others’ minimalist tendencies worked to narrow 
that window. 
In the Buchheit story, a market actor convinced of a market failure did 
play a key role in producing a set of clauses which address that failure. It 
was not the role reported in the published stories, which focused on 
Mexico’s CAC move. Instead, Buchheit’s role as innovator emerged in the 
window created by the Mexico shift. His clients’ contracts were greeted 
with only a fraction of the fanfare that accompanied the first issue. 
E. Great Men and Little Funds 
“Market resistance” is the standard explanation for the eight-year lag 
between the Rey Report and February 2003. In contractual boilerplate 
studies—assuming CACs were optimal for the parties—it evokes learning 
and network effects, and switching costs. We used our interviews to try to 
unpack the forces behind investor resistance to CACs. 
Interviews and official records suggest that large sell-side investment 
banks acknowledged the theoretical value of CACs in principle, but 
rebuffed official requests to intervene with their sovereign clients. A 
banker ultimately involved in an early CAC issue put it this way: 
“Treasury would call and we would say that we are not an arm of the U.S. 
government, we work for the issuers.”292 He could justify advocating 
CACs if using them would save an issuer even one basis point, but a cost 
savings seemed improbable.293 An official outreach log entry for this firm 
reads, “Will not raise CACs with issuers.”294 Once issuers made up their 
 
 
 291. Mexico could be as minimalist as it pleased, while preempting another country’s egregious 
minimalism. 
 292. Interview 013106, supra note 114.  
 293. Id. See also Interview 060706, supra note 259. This does not mean that the institution was 
renouncing its “network coordinating” responsibilities in general. Since CACs were expected to carry 
a penalty, and since there was no agreement among market participants on the grounds for such a 
penalty, the optimal standard was unclear and the need for standardization around CACs not obvious. 
 294. CACs: Country/Firm Outreach Overview As of January 28, 2002 [sic] (Jan. 28, 2003) (on 
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minds to move, the bankers—much like the lawyers—were instrumental 
in designing the early issues and setting the market standard. 
In contrast to the Klausner-Kahan study where end investors are diffuse 
and invisible, the buy-side was prominent throughout the CAC episode. 
But the buy-side came in several varieties. EMCA got the most attention 
and stirred up the greatest passions. It was staffed by investors with busy 
day jobs. Many of its leaders joined up in reaction to what they saw as 
sell-side fecklessness, official venality, and issuer treachery in Ecuador 
and Argentina.295 But they also expressed higher motives, such as 
improving the asset class or bridging the intractable information gaps that 
plagued emerging market sovereign debt: 
Market people thought the government people were morons. 
Government people said, “Why are you buying this stuff, you know 
what it is . . . .” Markets see [the IMF] as the transfer agent for their 
money to developing countries. Developing countries see it as the 
paymaster that makes sure that creditors get paid. Both cannot be 
right.296 
Publicly, EMCA styled itself as the voice of the bondholder grassroots, 
and had initially distanced itself from the older, more professionalized 
trade groups with significant sell-side membership and roots in the 1980s 
debt crisis. EMCA’s penchant for public purity positioned it as the enemy 
of both SDRM and CACs. Yet the group was the first on the investor side 
to propose a package of clauses that included majority amendment. 
EMCA’s “Model Covenants for New Sovereign Debt Issues” circulated 
informally as early as May 2002, four months before the G-10 clauses and 
eight months before the consensus clauses later endorsed by seven market 
associations, including EMCA itself.297 
Like the official initiatives to promote creditor collective action, 
EMCA clauses technically removed the unanimity constraint. In hindsight, 
market contacts point to these clauses as evidence that investors had 
always accepted CACs in principle. But EMCA’s effort addressed 
fundamentally different problems—issuer misbehavior (hidden action) and 
sovereign immunity. One member said that EMCA clauses came about 
after investors “saw Argentina acting the way it did” in late 2001 to early 
 
 
file with authors). 
 295. E.g., http://www.emcreditors.org; Interview 060706, supra note 259.   
 296. Interview 060706, supra note 259. 
 297. EMCA, MODEL COVENANTS FOR NEW SOVEREIGN DEBT ISSUES (May 3, 2002), available at 
http://www.emcreditors.com/pdf/model_convenants.pdf. 
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2002.298 Reportedly drafted by a lawyer who had successfully sued several 
emerging market governments, the clauses proposed to expand the 
universe of assets and protections available to creditors, including 
injunctive relief and waiver of central bank immunities.299 The amendment 
threshold was 95 percent for an expanded list of reserve matters including 
key financial terms, 75 percent for most other terms, and 100 percent for 
the amendment provisions themselves. 
EMCA said that it took the official sector at its word—if Treasury 
wanted a market fix for financial crises, and granted its decision to go 
about the fix by altering private contracts, we, the market, would organize 
to claim the terms we really want. In effect, these investors tried to use the 
official initiative, including Taylor’s reluctance to be prescriptive, as a 
vehicle to revisit some of the contractual battles that led to EMCA’s birth. 
Their clause package would help defeat exit consents and enshrine a broad 
interpretation of the pari passu (equal treatment) clause to facilitate debt 
enforcement.300 CAC advocates outside the bondholder community saw a 
Trojan horse, and the package went nowhere.  
EMCA’s effectiveness and power base were not clear. On the one 
hand, its leaders had access to high-level U.S. officials, and EMCA’s 
public reactions to events of concern to its membership (such as sovereign 
defaults and G-7 policy turns) were quick and forceful. On the other hand, 
EMCA’s ability to hold its own base together and speak for the emerging 
markets buy-side community were patently limited. Mexico’s CAC issue 
and Argentina’s restructuring both occasioned indignant EMCA press 
releases but drew participants from its membership.301 EMCA’s limited 
 
 
 298. Telephone Interview (December 9, 2005) [hereinafter Interview 120905]. 
 299. EMCA, supra note 297.  
 300. Id. EMCA was established in part to protest Buchheit’s aggressive use of exit consents on 
behalf of Ecuador. Interview 060706, supra note 259. Investors who later became part of EMCA’s 
leadership also protested Ecuador’s attempt to restructure its Brady bonds while sparing its Eurobonds; 
they claimed that the treatment of secured bondholders violated Ecuador’s pari passu undertaking 
(most considered this to be a misapprehension of the clause). Ecuador: A Case for Comparability?, 
EMERGING MKTS. DEBT REP., Mar. 29, 1999, at 13; Felix Salmon, The Buy Side Starts to Bite Back, 
EUROMONEY, Apr. 2001, at 46. See Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in 
Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869 (2004), and William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a 
Distressed Sovereign’s Rational Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823 (2004), for different perspectives on the 
pari passu controversy.  
 301. Some EMCA leaders said the bondholders participated in these deals because they were 
clueless, sleepy, docile sheep—“the only one less equipped than the public sector was the private 
sector.” Interview 070206, supra note 104. Some members offered another reason for the difficulty of 
coordinating even a small group of investors. At least when it comes to litigation and possibly other 
forms of aggressive enforcement, money managers must get permission to proceed from the account 
holders. Few are willing to undertake this additional level of coordination. Hedge funds and 
proprietary traders do not have this problem. Telephone Interview (Dec. 9, 2005). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1627 Gelpern Gulati book pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1688 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1627 
 
 
 
 
influence on contract drafting had a structural reason. We noted earlier that 
buy-side investors do not normally negotiate sovereign bond contracts; the 
sell-side does it for them. Issuer’s and underwriter’s counsel do the 
drafting. Investors can and do make their views known to issuers and the 
sell-side—hence, the expanded list of reserve matters in Mexico and the 
virtual disappearance of aggressive exit consents after Ecuador—but 
typically, to buy or not to buy is the only decision the buy-side makes, 
sometimes with the help of in-house lawyers, but often without. Some 
lawyers for major issuers told us they simply had no occasion to interact 
with the buy-side. EMCA leaders understood this predicament and saw the 
campaign for CACs as an opening for more direct input into contract 
terms. But Taylor’s refusal to be prescriptive cut both ways—he would not 
protest Brazil’s 85 percent threshold, nor would he carry the water for 
EMCA on pari passu. 
Several of our public and private sector contacts said that by the fall of 
2002, some large investors in emerging market debt were dissociating 
themselves from the EMCA leadership position, which they characterized 
as too vocal, inflexible, and “legalistic” (they attributed the latter to the 
presence of lawyers-turned-fund-managers on EMCA’s board). As one 
investor put it,  
We invest based on economic fundamentals. Legal minutiae [are] 
not what we do. . . . These legal provisions—we are money 
managers—do we read them? . . . [W]e are supposed to be smart 
enough, invest in a liquid market—if there is a debt crisis, you are 
not supposed to have the debt! . . . SDRM was ridiculous. . . . 
Everyone agreed that CACs are a decent step forward. Once they 
are introduced, [we’ll] see how the market reacts . . . if anyone 
cares.302 
A more complex explanation for the buy-side split has to do with the 
evolution of emerging market debt as an asset class. Ten years after the 
Brady Plan, crossover investors came to hold substantial stocks of 
emerging market debt, usually the better-rated credits. Contract and 
regulation often bar these investors from holding assets below a specified 
rating threshold. The fact that emerging market ratings were more volatile 
than their U.S. corporate counterparts created unexpected problems for 
crossover investors. One prominent emerging market specialist on the buy 
side recalled a downgrade of Peru in the wake of successful holdout 
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litigation.303 Crossover fund managers in his company had to sell Peruvian 
debt quickly, even though nothing had changed about the country’s 
fundamentals. After the incident, he had trouble convincing colleagues to 
invest in emerging market debt, even where it was cheap compared to 
similarly rated U.S. corporate securities. The experience in turn convinced 
him that if the emerging markets were to mature as an asset class, 
something had to be done to neutralize the holdouts and make recovery 
values more predictable.304 CACs looked like a reasonable something. 
Having thus come around, investors exposed to both dedicated and 
crossover perspectives found themselves at odds with longstanding EMCA 
positions and with dedicated investors intractably opposed to any 
weakening of creditor rights. 
Late in 2002, several executives responsible for large emerging market 
funds contacted the official sector and offered help with getting a country 
to adopt CACs. They proposed a meeting to reassure high-quality issuers 
of their willingness to buy CAC bonds. As noted earlier, the meeting was 
scheduled but Mexico backed out. 
When Mexico launched its first CAC bond, EMCA was furious. The 
following view, emailed the day after the deal closed, is indicative: 
First, the procedure made the whole deal feel like a jam-job. EMCA 
had draft covenants on the table for nearly two years. We were not 
even consulted before this deal was put on the table. Kind of 
pathetic. After years of Buchheit et al. complaining that the buy-
side cannot organize itself, when we finally do organize, the issuers 
and allied officials ignore us. This does not engender good will on 
the part of the market. (That, of course, is probably not on the 
officials’ agenda anyway.) . . . [M]ost dedicated EM investors 
believe that the UST and Cleary were behind much of this deal. As 
a technical matter it was not so much elegant as clever/sneaky to 
bring the first CACs . . . in Mexico. Crossover investors are a big 
part of the Mex investor base, so there was no need to force these 
bonds onto the dedicated EM investors who are the key buyers of 
the lower grade EM credits. . . . The 75% threshold is a joke. 
EMCA and EMTA said as much. The trigger level leaves the clause 
open to easy abuse by distressed sovereigns. It is unlikely to be an 
issue in Mex, since the probability of default is so low for this 
credit. . . . The trigger level is the key to making CACs effective vs 
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a joke. And what happened to all of the other covenants that the 
buy-side asked for? The negotiations over bond docs have been a 
joke—nothing has started.305  
Many contacts told us of a contentious conference call organized by the 
lead managers, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, shortly after the launch. 
Most of the sentiment was along the lines of the preceding quotation. One 
of the larger investors “piped up and lauded the Mexicans on taking an 
important step forward and asserted that if people were so skeptical of the 
issuers’ motives maybe they should be investing in another asset class . . . 
but he was a lone positive voice.”306 One sell-side banker said in retrospect 
that the conference call represented “95 percent of the noise [that] 
occurred” in response to CACs.307 Many said to us that EMCA activists 
represented a small fringe of the investor community. But even if that 
were true, at the time the deal managers could ill afford to dismiss them—
“We have five major institutional investors . . . saying ‘if you buy this, you 
destroy the asset class.’ . . . They are thought leaders.”308 
One thought leader who got credit for the CAC shift from the press and 
government officials was Pimco’s Mohamed El-Erian. El-Erian was 
among the largest investors in emerging market assets, a former IMF 
staffer, and one of EMCA’s founding board members (he resigned after 
2001).309 He spoke publicly on policy issues relevant to the asset class, 
and for many was taking on the role of a buy-side “senior statesman.”310 
Multiple contacts told us that he engaged with the official sector in the 
winter leading up to the CAC shift, and had offered to work with major 
issuers to help broker the shift. But just as many contacts said he was 
unhappy at not being consulted ahead of time about Mexico’s issue and 
did not buy it for reasons that had to do with some combination of money 
and principle.311 
EMCA was one of three market associations active in the CAC episode 
in the United States. The Washington-based Institute of International 
Finance and New York–based EMTA (formerly the Emerging Markets 
 
 
 305. Email to Anna Gelpern (Mar. 4, 2003) (on file with authors). 
 306. Email to Anna Gelpern (Feb. 24, 2003) (on file with authors). 
 307. Interview 013106, supra note 114. 
 308. Interview 060706B, supra note 244. 
 309. Compare EMCA, About EMCA: Directors 2001, http://www.emcreditors.com/list_directors_ 
2001.html, and EMCA, About EMCA: Directors 2002, http://www.emcreditors.com/list_directors_ 
2002.html. See also Salmon, infra note 350. 
 310. Salmon, supra note 91. 
 311. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 128–29. After Brazil, El-Erian wrongly predicted that 
lower credit issuers would stay with higher amendment thresholds. See Salmon, infra note 350. 
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Traders Association) both engaged regularly with officials throughout the 
private sector involvement campaign of the 1990s, and especially in the 
later CAC-SDRM debate. IIF was founded early in the 1980s debt crisis, 
with a membership comprising leading commercial banks that were also 
the dominant creditors to troubled sovereigns.312 It later expanded to 
include investment banks. In addition to serving as an industry forum for 
major financial institutions and a liaison with the official sector, IIF 
periodically publishes economic and market research. EMTA started in the 
early 1990s as LDC Debt Traders Association, with a mission to facilitate 
trading in the Brady bonds and later all emerging market debt.313 Its 
membership overlaps with IIF’s, but EMTA focuses more on improving 
trading practices and market and legal infrastructure, and serves as the 
authoritative clearing house for information in these areas. During the 
period we studied, a former Bush I Treasury official headed IIF; EMTA’s 
head was a former Shearman & Sterling partner who had been active in 
the Brady restructurings. The two organizations aspire to represent both 
sell-side and buy-side investors; they are often seen as closer to the sell-
side, an impression reinforced with EMCA’s appearance on the scene. 
IIF leadership was in frequent contact with Taylor and his colleagues 
from the earliest days of the CAC initiative. Charles Dallara, the head of 
IIF, took the lead as a liaison between the interested industry associations 
and the U.S. Treasury; the focus was on defeating SDRM. Senior Treasury 
officials valued IIF’s early support for the contractual approach, but 
worried that the group did not have a way to operationalize the support 
quickly: “Charles’s initial reaction was positive. But it wasn’t, ‘We’re 
doing it’—not operational.”314 Some at IIF saw Treasury’s campaign as 
too public and adversarial—the problem was not CACs themselves, but 
the public sector cramming them down on the market, in 2002 just as 
much as in 1996: 
[I] believe from the bottom of my heart, if G7, Treasury, IMF—
anyone—had serious discussions about CACs on a voluntary basis, 
[we] could have had CACs in bonds four years [earlier].315 
Treasury’s outreach to individual issuers and institutions, which Taylor 
considered key to the ultimate success of the CAC shift, was 
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Mar. 19, 2007).  
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counterproductive in this view. In an individual capacity, each market 
participant was bound to “talk their book”316—hence some of the more 
vituperative responses to early official overtures. The function of a trade 
association like IIF was to act in the collective interest of the market, to 
bring out the inner statesman in the financier.317 
But in 2002 Treasury was in a hurry. Whether IIF could have delivered 
CACs in the relevant time frame is subject to debate. Buy-side and sell-
side investors involved in early CAC issues dismiss IIF efforts as 
irrelevant. Then again, most of the deal participants were mid-level 
executives. IIF tended to work through “senior statesmen” at the higher 
rungs of major global institutions. Most of them knew one another from 
having worked together on the loan restructurings of the 1980s, a time 
when the informal norms of this small community of elite bankers, 
lawyers, and government officials ruled the roost. Skeptics dismissed the 
“great men” approach as a relic of the 1980s that could not deliver in the 
diffuse, diverse world of the capital markets.318 But surely support at the 
top could not hurt. 
While IIF appeared to lead negotiations with the official sector, EMTA 
played a central role in the last key design exercise leading up to Mexico’s 
issue. Following EMCA’s clause proposal and the formation of the G-10 
working group, the onus was on the industry mainstream to produce a set 
of terms that stood a realistic chance of being adopted. The goal was partly 
to preempt SDRM, but also to address the one problem around which there 
was consensus among market participants—the problem of “the rogue 
debtor.”319 EMTA, EMCA, IIF, the London-based IPMA, and three 
broader securities industry groups released the “marketable clauses” 
package on January 31, 2003, together with an early version of the code of 
conduct for sovereign restructurings.320 These clauses were a far cry from 
EMCA’s, but shared the same essential impetus—creditors would yield on 
majority amendment for key financial terms (this time at 85 percent of the 
outstanding principal provided 10 percent did not object), in exchange for 
more robust investor protections, disclosure and safeguards against the use 
of exit consents.321 The process of building consensus among the “Gang of 
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 318. See, e.g., Interview 052506D, supra note 284; Interview 013106, supra note 114; Interview 
030306, supra note 206. 
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 320. EMCA, EMTA, IIF, IPMA, ISMA, SIA AND TBMA, Model COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES 
FOR SOVEREIGN BONDS (Jan. 31, 2003), available at http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/Final_merged.pdf. 
 321. Id. at 13.  
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Seven” trade associations took time; their clauses were the last to arrive on 
the scene. But their release did signal a turning point; by early February 
2003, every market constituency as well as the government of every major 
financial center was on record supporting clauses in some form—the 
question was which form would prevail. 
Yet again, industry endorsement of CACs was hardly on the merits, as 
a robust solution to real collective action problems. Investors sought to 
stop SDRM and, to a lesser extent, to leverage official advocacy of 
contract change to secure more creditor-friendly terms. Inasmuch as 
SDRM may have withered away on its own, while Mexico’s contract 
model prevailed over the industry’s, some investors were disappointed 
with the outcome. Years later, one of the leaders of the “marketable” 
drafting effort called the entire CAC episode “make-work.” He speculated 
that successful holdout litigation against Peru in 1996 had galvanized 
official efforts to solve a holdout problem that was not really there: 
Suing a sovereign is so damn hard—being a holdout is hard, not 
smart. . . . [The] official sector was offended by what happened to 
Peru—someone bought low and shook down Peru. . . . It offended 
[their] sense of fairness in the financial system. I was pretty 
offended while the Brady deal was going on, but not when [the 
holdout] collected. Peru was flush. It paid when it did not hurt to 
pay.322 
A sell-side banker involved in an early CAC deal said he “suspected 
that Taylor was smart enough to realize that whether [issuers] include or 
exclude CACs meant not a hill of beans—which turned out to be the case. 
I thought it was entirely political.”323 And a buy-side money manager 
summarized the general sentiment this way: 
Conceptually it is hard to argue against CACs if they are written 
well. [CACs] removed the very small probability that holdouts 
would stop [a country from conducting a generalized restructuring]. 
The issue is nonsense, but CACs, if properly drawn, would [be] the 
appropriate theoretical response. If you think that holdouts are a 
small problem, [the amendment threshold] should be above 90 
percent. If you are of the other view, they should be as low as 
possible. This begs the question whether the public sector was 
concerned with a smooth and efficient workout, or with their capital 
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being trapped. . . . [CACs are a] potentially reasonable theoretical 
answer to a remote but plausible theoretical problem. Get into 
compound complex sentence that the average investor group does 
not worry about.324 
F. The Ultimate Market Story 
It is worthwhile at this point to pull together the different interview 
strands that address Mexico’s motives for moving first. SDRM was 
malingering at the IMF, the U.S. Treasury had lobbied Mexico for months, 
and drafting efforts were proliferating. These factors weighed against what 
seemed like unwavering resistance at the highest levels in the Mexican 
government. 
The core Mexican team responsible for making the decision consisted 
of three officials led by the Finance Minister. The Minister went so far as 
to write a scathing thirteen-page letter to O’Neill in November 2002, 
expressing his intractable opposition to both CACs and SDRM.325 What 
changed minds so drastically that (apparently, on a weekend) Mexican 
officials called their lawyers down to Mexico City to implement CACs? 
We heard two explanations. Market participants, both lawyers and 
bankers, told of a rumor that some small country was going to launch an 
offering using industry-sponsored clauses with a high amendment 
threshold. Such unfavorable CACs risked becoming market standard if 
Mexico did not preempt this unnamed country. Other contacts focused on 
Mexico’s leading role in opposing SDRM. A trade press account of the 
CAC shift suggested that taking SDRM off the table was the quid pro quo 
that Mexico extracted out of the United States.326 
Both stories are problematic, even though we heard them from multiple 
sources. Not one of our contacts had a clue as to the identity of the country 
in the “small country–bad clauses” rumor, raising the possibility that it 
was just a rumor. In public and in private, Mexican officials expressed 
only a general desire to preempt bad precedent, and only a general concern 
about proliferating public and private initiatives that threatened to 
destabilize the boilerplate. Bankers and lawyers involved in the deal 
echoed the sentiment. 
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 325. See Interview 100605, supra note 108; Interview 121405B, supra note 113.  
 326. Salmon, supra note 80. Like Salmon, we found no evidence of other tradeoffs, for example, 
on immigration or trade policy. The fact that the White House was uninterested in CACs makes these 
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As for fear of SDRM and the quid-pro-quo theory, it rings only partly 
true. It is unlikely that a U.S. Treasury under John Snow would have 
continued the two-track charade much beyond the spring of 2003. 
Hubbard’s keynote at the IMF conference on January 22 signaled to a 
spectrum of interested parties that White House support was not there. On 
the other hand, even after Mexico’s debut, a market-wide shift looked far 
from certain.327 Mexico’s issue was a hopeful sign and a new argument for 
the contract contingent, but not mission accomplished. And in any event, 
even wholesale adoption of CACs was never a substitute for statute in the 
SDRM camp. Almost two years and two dozen CAC issues since Mexico, 
one U.S. contact speculated that if a vote were held on the day of our 
interview, a majority of the IMF Board would have supported SDRM.328  
So what moved Mexico? Mexican officials tell the ultimate market 
story—an issuer with significant market power that perceived a threat to 
this power from a mix of official meddling and bondholder activism: “For 
us, the issue was our role as issuer. We were concerned about the state of 
discussion on the markets. . . . What generated the change? We didn’t like 
the fact of being pushed around by international initiative where our fate 
was not very clear.”329 
This is not so much a story of Mexico eager to get the best possible 
clauses into its debt, or of Mexico worried that SDRM would come to 
pass, but of Mexico worried that talk of SDRM—and clauses—would not 
stop. The talk got everyone thinking about default (the morgues), 
threatened to create uncertainty in the markets about G-7 and IMF 
behavior in crisis, and could increase the cost of capital for the very 
countries supposed to benefit from the initiatives. 
We have no way of knowing whether the story of market and political 
leadership that we read in the press and heard from Mexican officials in 
fact reflects their true motives for using CACs. Virtually all the lawyers, 
bankers, and investors involved in the first CAC deal, as well as the G-7 
officials who lobbied Mexico, stress reputational factors and U.S. pressure 
and de-emphasize the CACs’ substantive value. The narrow scope of 
Mexico’s CACs as a technical matter supports this view.  
 
 
 327. See infra Part IV.G for efforts to maintain momentum for the contract shift after Mexico’s 
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To the extent Mexico wanted to use the CAC incident to create a 
perception of autonomy and leadership, it was wildly successful. A 
European official put it this way: 
Mexico may have been ahead of the curve. . . . They not only 
earned the respect of the official sector (that didn’t mean anything 
to the Mexicans), they showed the markets that they were ahead of 
the markets. . . . They are too intelligent, too sophisticated to have 
believed SDRM was a realistic possibility.330 
Market participants and officials alike offered effusive comments about 
the Mexican debt managers’ intelligence, sophistication, financial acumen, 
and investor relations style. Mexico, they said, was not like any other 
emerging market issuer. Observers spoke of a “revolutionary experience,” 
a “transformation of mentality between 1994 and 2000,” of getting “out of 
the victim mentality” that plagues the emerging markets.331 Mexican 
officials “may have been the only example of adult behavior in the whole 
[crowd]”: 
[Mexico’s Deputy Secretary of Finance Agustín] Carstens had been 
Mexican ED [Board representative] at IMF. He was always very 
open minded and into modernizing the IMF. He was okay on 
transparency, etc., which put him in contrast with many of his EM 
colleagues on the Board. In FinMin, he worked a lot with markets. I 
actually think Agustín was being internationalist minded at the time 
and believed that he thought Mexico should be internationalist to 
show that it was playing a greater role as a responsible player on the 
global scene. He and Alonso Garcia should be mega-stars of [the] 
article.332 
While Mexico’s circumstances and leadership indeed stood out at the 
time, many of our contacts also noted that the shift conceived in the 
turmoil of the 1990s finally happened under unusually benevolent market 
conditions, when interest rates in mature market economies were at all-
time lows and investors flocked to emerging market debt.333 Mexican debt 
 
 
 330. Interview 021706, supra note 149. 
 331. Interview 060606, supra note 146. 
 332. Interview 121605, supra note 118. Carstens holds a Ph.D. in Economics from The University 
of Chicago, and is the Finance Minister of Mexico at the time of this writing. ED stands for Executive 
Director. 
 333. A biweekly sell-side research note a few weeks before Mexico’s launch described the market 
conditions: 
EM debt has soared in recent days in moderate volume, allowing the asset class to deliver a 
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was investment grade, and attracted growing numbers of cross-over 
investors. The government had pre-financed for the year, and did not need 
the money from the CAC issue (it used the proceeds to retire more costly 
Brady bonds). It was difficult to envisage a better time.334 But the 
experiment was not riskless. A Mexican official who played a key role in 
the move described the concerns: 
At the time, Mexico could issue $1 billion on a day’s notice; 
everyone knew our contracts. [Issuing with CACs] disturbed it a 
little bit without an immediate benefit for Mexico. . . . Push [to] 
strengthen international financial system. . . . Instead of opening the 
book in the morning and closing six hours later oversubscribed, 
three days working the phones. Some committed clients surprised, 
some sensed betrayal [because Mexico had] not consulted them.335  
The same official described CACs as beneficial, but suggested that 
their principal benefit in 2003 was to let business people return to 
business: 
Both debtors and creditors like having a set of contracts, and 
proceed to issue. Impractical to make the issue of contracts . . . . 
[Settling procedural terms] allows us to focus on the substantive 
issues of the transaction—issues, rights, options. This is what the 
market participants want.336 
In this framing, which we also heard from other emerging market 
contacts, government debt managers are first and foremost market 
participants whose goal is to minimize borrowing costs. We got the 
distinct sense that when these officials spoke of a disequilibrium that 
prompted the CAC shift, they referred to the flurry of public sector crisis 
resolution initiatives, not holdout problems. For them, public good and 
international prestige came by way of being market actors par 
excellence.337 
 
 
year-to-date return in excess of 2%. The rally in the US Treasury market, where 10-year 
yields have dropped from 4.20% two weeks ago to below 4.00% at present, is creating a 
hothouse effect for investors in EM bonds. Portfolio managers in the US and Europe continue 
to receive inflows of funds looking to be invested in EM bonds. 
ABN-AMRO, EMERGING MKTS. FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 9, 2005, at 1. See, e.g., Interview 070206, supra 
note 104; Email to G. Mitu Gulati (July 7, 2006). 
 334. See, e.g., Interview 030106, supra note 278. 
 335. Interview 121205, supra note 145. See supra notes 305–08 and accompanying text for more 
on the investor reactions. Note this official’s use of “clients” to denote investors in his country’s debt. 
 336. Interview 121205, supra note 145. 
 337. Here it is useful to contrast Mexican and U.S. accounts of the months leading up to the first 
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G. At the Tipping Point 
Mexico’s sound economy and sterling reputation made it the perfect 
first mover in February 2003. These same qualities gave skeptics the 
perfect excuse to dismiss it as precedent. Mexico was not like the rest of 
the emerging markets; maybe its CAC issue should be viewed much as the 
G-7 countries’ attempts to “lead by example,” putting clauses in their own 
foreign-currency debt—a face-saving, but irrelevant, gesture.338 
The next two countries to launch CAC issues were Brazil and Uruguay, 
both in April 2003. Unlike Mexico, neither Brazil nor Uruguay had been 
doing well. Brazil had been out of the international markets for over a 
year. It had just elected a leftist government, prompting questions about its 
economic policy course. Uruguay had suffered from Argentina’s financial 
crisis, including a massive bank run that only stopped with the help of an 
IMF package that amounted to $500 for each Uruguayan.339 If Brazil and 
Uruguay could use CACs, even hardened skeptics would have to concede 
that the shift was underway. 
We heard two kinds of explanations for Brazil’s and Uruguay’s moves. 
The first attributed them to competition among lawyers and law firms to 
set the market standard for CACs. As discussed earlier, we found no 
evidence of such competition. The second explanation brought back U.S. 
pressure as the dominant factor. As with Mexico, the pressure was there, 
but the way in which it worked, and the extent to which it was effective, 
were context-specific. 
 
 
CAC issue. Mexican officials and their advisers stress the fact that the decision was made 
independently and all but sprung on the U.S. Treasury, even as they expressed gratitude for U.S. and 
G-7 support. U.S. officials emphasize long-term, painstaking coordination. See supra note 229 and 
accompanying text.  
 338. Press Release, Can. Dep’t of Fin., supra note 7. The Honourable Paul Martin, Min. of Fin. 
for Can., Statement Prepared for the International Monetary and Financial Committee, Prague, Czech 
Republic (Sept. 24, 2000), available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/news00/00-072e.html; Mervyn King, 
Deputy Governor of the Bank of Eng., The International Financial System: A New Partnership, 20th 
Anniversary of the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (2001), available 
at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2001/speech138.htm (describing initiatives 
by Canada and the United Kingdom to lead by example by including CACs in their foreign-currency 
debt). Emerging market officials and investors uniformly dismissed such efforts as irrelevant. A 
European official described the principal value of leading by example as rhetorical: “It helped 
rhetorically in the debate—took away a cheap short argument. If I were an [EM] issuer, I would not be 
interested in what zero-risk countries are doing.” Interview 071006, supra note 208. But one lawyer 
involved in debt offerings for a G-7 issuer recalled Quarles appealing to the government to use 
CACs—which the lawyer apparently considered irrelevant in view of the country’s credit quality—“as 
some kind of post-9/11 unity thing”. Interview (Apr. 17, 2007). 
 339. Felix Salmon, Uruguay’s Elegant Transformation, EUROMONEY, Feb. 2004, at 86. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/3
p 1627 Gelpern Gulati book pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] PUBLIC SYMBOL IN PRIVATE CONTRACT 1699 
 
 
 
 
In early 2003, Brazil was the IMF’s largest debtor, and was about to 
draw more funds and extend its repayment period before the year’s end.340 
It could ill-afford a public spat with official creditors. But Brazil was also 
among the largest emerging market issuers in the world: it accounted for 
about one-fifth of the benchmark index, with Mexico and Russia as its 
nearest competitors.341 A Brazilian official involved in the CAC decision 
explained: 
In the short-term, Brazil faced incredibly hard times in the market. 
. . . Everything could be used against us. We had to preserve [a] 
relationship with bondholders at any cost.342 
The leading business daily in Brazil called CACs “default clauses” 
(cláusulas de calote) in reports that blamed the United States for foisting 
them onto issuers to put investors on guard and save IMF bailout money. 
Brazilian officials took great pains to show they were in the driver’s 
seat.343 This is in further contrast to Mexico, where tempers seemed to run 
lower. Mexican press reports were brief and favorable, citing government 
releases and the foreign media.344 To our knowledge, in neither country 
did the press debate the merits of collective action or majority amendment, 
notwithstanding robust coverage of the Argentine default and general 
sensitivity to debt issues. Both SDRM and CACs appeared as foreign 
political artifacts, with limited resonance for domestic audiences. 
With Mexico, Brazil led the opposition to SDRM in the IMF Board. 
Brazilian officials said that initially they did not see much light between 
CACs and SDRM—both gravely threatened the country’s fragile market 
access. But faced with a combination of SDRM’s resilience and a growing 
 
 
 340. INT’L MONETARY FUND, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 18 (Apr. 30, 2003), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/quart/2003fy/043003.pdf. 
 341. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 342. Interview 080406, supra note 154. 
 343. See, e.g., Cláusula de calote adotada pelo Brasil foi sugestão dos EUA, Folha de São Paulo, 
Apr. 29, 2003, available at http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u66455.shtml (last 
visited Jun. 22, 2007); Leonardo Souza, Brasil deverá adotar a “cláusula de calote” para fazer novas 
emissões, Folha de São Paulo, Apr. 12, 2003, available at http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/indices/ 
inde12042003.htm (citing Economy Minister Antonio Palocci’s insistence that he raised CACs of his 
own accord in a meeting with Treasury Secretary Snow and Fed Chairman Greenspan). We are 
grateful to Giselle Datz for these and other Brazilian press materials and for the translations from the 
Portuguese. 
 344. For example, Mexico’s CAC debut merited only a squib in a leading newspaper, which noted 
that issuing with CACs put Mexico in the company of mature markets issuers such as the United 
Kingdom and Italy. Nombres, Nombres y... Nombres/ Acelerará fuerte en México GE Capital Bank y 
va por dls. mil 400 millones de cartera para el 2005 in La Reforma, Feb. 27, 2003, available at 
http://www.reforma.com.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1627 Gelpern Gulati book pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1700 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1627 
 
 
 
 
sense of market tolerance for some form of CACs, they came to describe 
clauses as a “good compromise,”345 “reasonable, not disruptive,”346 and 
ultimately, a “Pareto improvement”.347 
Two factors affected the timing of Brazil’s first CAC issue. First, 
unlike Mexico, Brazil needed the money and so had to launch in favorable 
market conditions for its own sake, if not for the CAC cause. Second, 
Mexico had to go first. We believe that had Brazil returned to market in 
January instead of April, its CACs would have had to wait. Mexico’s first 
move established the presumption that CACs carried no penalty; Brazil 
tested that presumption. Mexican and Brazilian finance officials knew one 
another and had discussed CACs and SDRM; however, we have no 
evidence that they coordinated their respective CAC debuts. 
Our Brazilian contacts described their first CAC issue as “part of a very 
clear indication on many fronts of where we stood.”348 Brazil stood in a 
delicate spot. After the election, it needed to reassure investors of its free-
market credentials—”evolutionary, rather than revolutionary; that was our 
sound bite”349—which made any discussion of potential default anathema. 
According to trade press, Brazil “absolutely had to have a hugely 
successful deal to mark its reintroduction to the capital markets.”350 On the 
other hand, if Brazil saw itself ultimately as part of the Mexico cohort, 
issuing with CACs was not all bad: “We wanted to do it, it was time to do 
it.”351 Brazil needed G-7 support to continue drawing exceptional sums 
from the IMF at a difficult time for its economy and political system. In a 
more subtle sense, Brazil needed to signal to the markets that the United 
States and the G-7 would stand by it in the event things took a turn for the 
worse. 
The resulting compromise, a majority amendment clause with an 85 
percent threshold—in contrast to Mexico’s 75 percent—is easy to explain 
in this context, even as it drew criticism in the sovereign debt world.352 
Conspiracy theorists blamed Brazil’s lawyers and investment bankers; 
Brazilian officials insisted to us that the decision was their own. Critics 
said that the 85 percent threshold signaled both that Brazil was a weaker 
 
 
 345. Interview 080406, supra note 154.  
 346. Interview 061606, supra note 153. 
 347. Interview 080406, supra note 154.  
 348. Interview 061606, supra note 153. 
 349. Interview 080406, supra note 154. 
 350. Felix Salmon, Brazil Goes Off On a CACs Tangent, EUROMONEY, June 2003, at 156. 
 351. Interview 080406, supra note 154. 
 352. See Salmon, supra note 350. 
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credit, and that the threshold itself made a difference.353 This went against 
much of what Mexico had tried to accomplish in designing its first move. 
But Mexico’s offer was structured specifically to launch CACs; 
launching CACs was at best a third-tier objective for Brazil. And Brazil 
was spectacularly successful in meeting its first-tier objective—the issue 
was oversubscribed, with an order book total of over $7 billion for a $1 
billion offer, spread among 430 accounts.354 Brazil has since shifted its 
amendment threshold to 75 percent, in line with Mexico’s, validating it as 
the new market standard. In retrospect, its officials described the episode 
as “technical progress”;355 some went out of their way to praise Taylor’s 
reasonableness and sensitivity.356  
CACs were not foremost on the minds of Uruguayan officials facing 
default on a debt stock of over $5 billion. But legal provisions became 
entangled with the political, policy, and business aspects of the debt 
exchange: “We did not like to default on debt. Did not know about CACs, 
SDRM. But by chance immersed into a very sharp debate among lawyers, 
U.S. Treasury, IMF—something we realized months later—trying to solve 
fundamental problems.”357 
The debate in Uruguay’s case had to do with its IMF package and the 
terms of its debt restructuring. Uruguayan officials prized the country’s 
reputation as a reliable borrower; it did not have its neighbors’ history of 
defaults. Because much of its debt was held domestically, they also 
worried that a default or deep debt reduction would spur another bank 
run.358 But the official sector was ill-disposed to finance another bailout of 
private creditors. Some Uruguayans suspected that theirs was becoming a 
test case for a new regime that would lead into SDRM.359 More likely IMF 
was reeling from Argentina’s default and accusations that the Fund had 
financed unsustainable policies and last-ditch debt exchanges that 
increased Argentina’s unsustainable debt.360 IMF staff and some market 
participants grumbled that Uruguay’s proposed restructuring terms were 
 
 
 353. Interview 060706B, supra note 244. 
 354. Salmon, supra note 350. 
 355. Interview 080406, supra note 154.  
 356. Interview 061606, supra note 153. 
 357. Interview (Dec. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Interview 122005B]. 
 358. Salmon, supra note 339. 
 359. “Ex-post we realized that IMF was trying to force us to go to SDRM approach.” Interview 
122005B, supra note 357. 
 360. See generally MUSSA, supra note 111; Republic of Arg., Prospectus Supplement and 
Prospectus (filed pursuant to Rule 424(b)(5)), at 165–66 (Jan. 10, 2004) (describing a pre-default debt 
exchange that increased the net present value of Argentina’s debt by $9.5 billion), http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/914021/000095012305000302/y04567e424b5.htm#214. 
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too rich—a mere extension of maturities—and would leave its debt levels 
dangerously high, guaranteeing another restructuring shortly.361 
Against this background, Uruguay was probably the only one of the 
early movers that had approached CACs recognizing that they might be 
used in the foreseeable future—even granting the team’s conviction that its 
proposed financial path was sustainable. Uruguayan officials report that 
they had decided to use CACs in late January, a month before Mexico’s 
issue. Even though Cleary Gottlieb represented both Mexico and Uruguay, 
the bankers and their lawyers were all different, and we found no evidence 
that the documentation work on the two issues was coordinated in any 
meaningful way. Everyone involved in Uruguay’s issue said that Mexico’s 
success made it easier to sell Uruguay’s more radical clause package. But 
at least one lawyer speculated that Uruguay would have tried CACs even 
if Mexico had not gone first, piggybacking on the G-10 
recommendations.362 A G-7 official was more blunt: “Do you really think 
that Urugay would, in coming to us to support big IMF money and an 
Exchange Stab[ilization] Fund loan, have not had CACs in their 
exchange?”363  
Uruguay’s deal was intensively marketed, and made specific 
accommodations in response to investor requests, which generated good 
will. The team did not have to worry about a CAC price penalty, since in a 
restructuring the price is set in the offer. Creditor participation was the 
only open variable. Uruguay’s exchange closed with over 90 percent 
participation; the holdouts were later paid off. So far, Uruguay has not 
needed to restructure again. 
Uruguay is also the only case we know where the participants produced 
a pro forma calculation after the exchange to see how having CACs in the 
old bonds might have changed the results.364 The exercise suggests that 
CACs operating issue by issue (such as those included in new Mexican 
and Brazilian bonds) would have increased participation by a few 
percentage points. The big jump came with aggregation across issues, 
which added up to ten percentage points depending on the voting 
threshold. Of course such a calculation cannot reveal how investor 
 
 
 361. Salmon, supra note 339; Interview 121205B, supra note 145; Interview 013106, supra note 
114. 
 362. Interview 092205, supra note 250.  
 363. Interview 121605, supra note 118. 
 364. Buchheit & Pam, supra note 300. As part of its comprehensive restructuring, Uruguay 
amended several small Japanese bonds using CACs already in its Japanese-law contracts. 
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behavior would change, if at all, with the advance knowledge that their 
bonds could be amended. 
Countries such as Argentina and the Dominican Republic that have 
restructured since Uruguay have built on its model, including aggregation. 
An Argentine official said that by the time his government announced it 
would use CACs, they had become market standard—a non-issue. He 
even recalled proposing to lower the amendment threshold below 75 
percent; he was outvoted.365  
Once Mexico, Brazil, and Uruguay shifted, the floodgates opened. We 
spoke with some of the officials, lawyers, and bankers involved with the 
shifts for ten sovereigns that followed the first three movers: South Africa, 
South Korea, Turkey, Italy, Panama, Venezuela, Chile, Belize, Argentina, 
and the Dominican Republic. None of them reported any drama in these 
countries’ shift to CACs.  
This is not to say that issuers would have shifted to CACs simply 
because Mexico, Brazil, and Uruguay had done so. U.S. Treasury officials 
and staff kept working the phones for months after Mexico, and CACs 
remained a talking point at official meetings. Market contacts even 
reported that the effort escalated after Mexico. From the public sector, we 
did not get a sense of escalation, but rather of continued pressure and a 
desire to maintain momentum behind “the market solution.” Officials 
reported that later in 2003, South Africa went so far as to issue in London, 
in euros, under New York law as a favor to the United States—a change 
from earlier the same year when, according to outreach records, South 
Africa had declined to join the first movers’ group.366 Treasury advocacy 
gave the impetus, but the experiences of Mexico, Brazil, and Uruguay 
gave sovereigns and their advisers confidence that CACs would not raise 
borrowing costs.  
Again, almost none of the professionals involved in the post-Uruguay 
issues mentioned the need to solve the holdout problem as the motive for 
the shift. The impetus came from the U.S. Treasury, transmitted through 
government-to-government channels. Long-term considerations of what 
contract clauses would facilitate orderly debt restructuring did not merit 
discussion, either at the level of individual lawyers/bankers or at the level 
of their firms. 
 
 
 365. Interview (Dec. 13, 2005) [Interview 121305C]. One of the lawyers involved in Argentina’s 
exchange said that CACs were “a foregone conclusion.” Interview 052506D, supra note 284. 
 366. Interview 121405B, supra note 113; Interview 121605, supra note 118; Salmon, supra note 
350; CACs: Country/Firm Outreach Overview, supra note 294. 
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We remained puzzled at the speed with which the shift occurred 
following the move by the first handful of sovereigns. Our contacts 
pointed to market education. Even if all the official drumbeat and private 
commentary between 1996 and 2003 were enough to overcome the first-
mover problem, once that problem was solved education kicked in. 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the market learned the value of CACs; it was 
now ready to use them. In response, we suggested that it was improbable 
that the most sophisticated players in the international financial markets 
needed seven years to learn that supermajority provisions could neutralize 
holdouts. Moreover, market participants continued to disagree about the 
holdout problem long after shifting to CACs. If education was the answer, 
it begged more questions—what exactly did market participants think they 
needed to know before they could use CACs? And how did they come 
upon the missing information? The next set of explanations came in two 
versions: economist and lawyer. 
The economist version of the story from both bankers and officials 
boiled down to one factor—price. Economists in the public and private 
sector disagreed on the existence of a holdout problem in need of a 
solution, but they agreed that for the CAC shift to happen, participants 
needed a better sense of the cost to sovereigns of switching to CACs in 
their New York–law bonds. For debt managers and their bankers to be 
comfortable with a switch, they needed assurances that the penalty would 
be minimal. If academic pricing studies helped frame official advocacy,367 
then investor behavior and market research post-Mexico, Brazil, and 
Uruguay showed in the market’s own terms that price-penalty worries 
were misplaced—at least when market conditions were sweet. 
For the lawyers, the key issue was not pricing, but the cost of deleting a 
protection that had been in New York–law sovereign bonds as far back as 
anyone could remember. Every one of the clauses in a standard form 
document is there for some historical reason, leading lawyers explained. 
Some major event must have altered the balance between debtor and 
creditor or among creditors. New clauses arose as responses to such 
events.368 When someone proposes to alter a clause, lawyers want to know 
why it had been included in the first place, and what protection would be 
lost by removing it. That loss often cannot be discerned just by reading the 
text of the clause.  
 
 
 367. See, e.g., supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
 368. See LEE C. BUCHHEIT, HOW TO NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY LOAN AGREEMENTS, ch. 2 (2d 
ed. 2000) (describing loan contract terms as akin to the “scars on an aging prizefighter,” each scar 
telling an old battle story). 
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Quarles addressed this concern with his intervention at the IMF 
conference in January 2003.369 Quarles’s former firm, Davis Polk, had 
played a leading role in the era of railroad bankruptcies and equity 
receiverships (roughly between 1880 and 1930). Collusion among large 
creditors and large equity interests in the big workouts of that era 
threatened to squeeze out minority creditors. The response culminated in 
the creation of a corporate bankruptcy system where workouts would be 
supervised by a federal judge. So as to protect minority creditors outside 
bankruptcy, publicly issued corporate bonds in the United States had to 
mandate unanimous approval for any changes to key payment terms.370 
Quarles knew this history and was able to explain the origins of unanimity 
in the move to statutory corporate bankruptcy. The existence of a 
bankruptcy system where holdout problems would be settled meant that 
outside of bankruptcy, everyone could live with unanimity. The United 
Kingdom saw no similar statutory reform, which is why English-law 
corporate bonds kept majority amendment. Quarles’s speech reassured 
some U.S. lawyers that there was no hidden danger in switching to 
CACs.371 In addition, this history—which Quarles and Buchheit told in 
parallel—helped reassure officials that the unanimity requirement for 
corporate bonds did not reflect a broader public policy against CACs in 
the United States.372  
Even as he reendorsed the two-track approach, Quarles’s history lesson 
neatly reinforced the CACs-SDRM opposition. It implied that CACs made 
the most sense in the absence of a bankruptcy system. Statutory sovereign 
bankruptcy was just what the market wanted to avoid. 
H. The Meaning of Argentina 
No public or private account of the CAC shift passes without mention 
of Argentina and its 2001 sovereign bond default—the largest in history. 
None of the big crises until then had featured foreign sovereign bonds, 
which had been the overwhelming focus of reform efforts: Mexico’s and 
 
 
 369. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 370. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. 77aaa et seq. 
 371. Academics knew this history well. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY 
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001); David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Majority Action Provisions Do It 
All?, 51 EMORY L.J. 417 (2003); Tarullo, supra note 125, at 670–71. Buchheit had also published an 
article on the topic. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 289. 
 372. At roughly the same time, similar public policy concerns were raised in both Japan and 
Germany with regards to CACs in sovereign bonds governed by their laws. See Takehiro Nobumori, 
Aspects of Collective Will of Bondholders Under Japanese Law, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 755, 773–75 & 
n.22 (2004). 
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Russia’s were about domestic debt, Thailand’s, Korea’s, and Indonesia’s 
about bank and corporate debt.373 Ecuador, Pakistan, and Ukraine had 
foreign bond crises, but were just too small to occasion the cataclysm. 
Their bond restructurings went quickly; Ukraine even used the CACs 
already in its English-law bonds, but Pakistan did not, and Ecuador could 
not because it had none, with no apparent difference in outcome among 
the three.374 Argentina was just the sort of crisis experts had prophesied—
hundreds of thousands of creditors spread across 150 different bond issues 
in six different currencies and eight different jurisdictions. It took 
Argentina three years to launch a foreign bond exchange, which left over 
$20 billion in holdouts and has been plagued by dozens of lawsuits.375 The 
crisis shocked and shamed the system and got everyone, notably Paul 
O’Neill,376 energized to do something about it. 
Would Argentina’s crisis have panned out differently if its New York–
law bonds had CACs? No one told us that it would have. Argentina’s 
reluctance to restructure before default had little to do with its debt 
contracts and everything to do with its domestic politics and its currency 
regime.377 The delay in launching a restructuring after default and the 
hostile tone of the operation, again, were a function of politics at the 
highest levels and appear to have been perceived as such by investors.  
What of the litigation? Argentina’s debt swap was held up for over two 
months thanks to a lawsuit attempting to attach defaulted bonds tendered 
by participating holders. The delay cut deeply into some traders’ profits. 
But it had precisely the opposite impact on participating holders from what 
theory predicted: instead of demanding their bonds back and holding out 
for more, the creditors who had already tendered wanted the restructuring 
to go on as soon as possible, even if—especially if—the litigants got paid 
in full. One of EMCA’s last public acts was filing an amicus brief in the 
holdout lawsuit, asking the Second Circuit to make sure that Argentina 
consummated the restructuring regardless of the holdout settlement.378 The 
 
 
 373. E.g., Truman, supra note 54. 
 374. Dixon & Wall, supra note 55, at 142, 150–51.  
 375. For an original analysis of Argentina litigation, see Marcus Miller & Dania Thomas, 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Judge, the Vultures, and Creditor Rights (May 2006) (on file with 
authors). 
 376. Supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text. 
 377. See, e.g., BLUSTEIN, supra note 33; Brad Setser & Anna Gelpern, Pathways Through 
Financial Crisis: Argentina, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 465 (2006). 
 378. Brief of the Emerging Markets Creditors Ass’n as Amicus Curiae, NML Capital, Ltd., v. 
Rep. of Arg., No. 05-1543-CV(L) (2d Cir. Apr. 20, 2005). 
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holdouts lost and Argentina went forward with one of the most aggressive 
debt reduction deals in memory. 
Would CACs have made no difference? Pro forma calculations in the 
aftermath of Uruguay’s exchange suggest that if Argentina had used 
aggregated majority amendment provisions, at least the passive holdout 
number might have been much smaller than $20 billion. Defaulted debt 
still outstanding is a contingent liability for the government that one day 
could constrain its external financial activities. On the other hand, even if 
most of the $20 billion in holdouts had gone away under a hypothetical 
aggregation scenario, those determined to litigate would have had little 
trouble buying up a small debt issue at pennies on the dollar and forcing it 
out of the exchange. With CACs having cleared the coast of other 
claimants, litigation might seem more rewarding than ever. 
In sum, Argentina’s crisis motivated everyone in the sovereign debt 
world to redouble efforts to improve crisis resolution. But remedies 
differed depending on the proponents’ diagnoses of the problem that 
Argentina revealed. The prospect of another IMF bailout prompted the 
U.S. Treasury Secretary to commission a fix to overcome inflexible debt 
contracts and the ensuing competition between SDRM and CACs. Default 
drove industry groups to put proposals on the table designed to address 
hidden action, or bad faith on the part of the sovereign debtor. But no one 
suggested to us that the prevailing fix—CACs—would have produced a 
substantially quicker and smoother restructuring, with less suffering or 
smaller losses for anyone involved. 
I. Form Copying in London: Inadvertence or Market Response?  
Mexico’s offering in February 2003 is often described as the first 
sovereign CAC issue under New York law. Two researchers from the 
Reserve Bank of Australia, Mark Gugiatti and Anthony Richards, showed 
that this was inaccurate. Mexico was the first of the large sovereign issuers 
to use CACs in a public offering registered with the SEC. But between 
1997 and 2001, at least five smaller sovereign issuers—Lebanon, Egypt, 
Qatar, Bulgaria, and Kazakhstan—used CACs in New York–law bonds 
issued privately in the UK.379 
What caused their departure from convention? Gugiatti and Richards 
suggested that New York lawyers in London had mechanically copied 
English-law forms, changing only the governing law clause.380 This view 
 
 
 379. Gugiatti & Richards, supra note 55.  
 380. Id.   
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was based on Bank of England inquiries with several of the law firms 
involved, which reported form copying combined with an apparent lack of 
awareness on the part of the lawyers of the novelty in their approach.381 
Form copying is standard contract drafting practice; it can be 
mechanical or deliberate.382 We spoke to half a dozen of the lawyers and 
bankers involved with these early CAC deals. Not surprisingly, the 
lawyers maintained that they were fully aware of the difference between 
New York– and English-style amendment language, and used the UK 
form deliberately. But some went further, describing negotiations to keep 
the language from their clients’ English-law bonds because it was 
advantageous, even though they were concerned about penalties for 
departing from the New York unanimity standard. Lawyers told us that the 
investment bankers for Kazakhstan investigated whether majority 
amendment provisions would carry a price penalty, decided that they 
would not, and the deal went ahead.  
Ten years later, the banker who reportedly led the effort had no 
recollection of the clause, but speculated that deal managers in London 
may have used New York law to appeal to U.S. investors, and may have 
acted under a mandate from the U.S. headquarters to use a specific New 
York law firm to document the deal.383 A different banker at the same 
institution, who was later involved in Mexico’s CAC debut, remembered 
learning about the early clauses shortly before February 2003; he even 
recounted a rumor that Mohamed El Erian had helped convince Egypt to 
use CACs shortly after Kazakhstan.384 
As it turned out, the broader market did not pay the slightest attention 
to Kazakhstan’s or Egypt’s innovations, or to those of Bulgaria, Lebanon, 
and Qatar that followed. Neither Clinton nor Bush II Treasury officials 
recalled hearing about these early CACs before 2003. 
Some of the lawyers who worked on these deals tell a version of the 
story more directly related to solving the holdout problem. Several had 
worked on the Brady restructurings in the 1980s and 1990s and had 
witnessed the holdout problem firsthand in cases such as Poland, which 
involved bank loans. Others had worked on the more recent Ukrainian 
restructuring, which used English-style CACs in a successful exchange. 
Both groups had a strong substantive preference for the English-law form. 
 
 
 381. Interview (Dec. 13, 2006). 
 382. See Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese,” 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 60–
62 (2001) (discussing contract production in large law U.S. law firms). 
 383. Email to Anna Gelpern (May 3, 2007). 
 384. Interview 013106, supra note 114. 
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In sum, the inadvertent form-copying story does not hold up—at least 
some lawyers had debated the amendment provisions and knew full well 
they were deviating from convention, even if they might have been 
unaware of the official sector’s support for CACs. 
Richards and Gugiatti found the five pre-Mexico CAC issues in a 
limited data search. Our interviews raise the possibility that there may be 
others. One lawyer told us that Argentina tried to include English-style 
majority amendment provisions in its first SEC-registered offering in 
1993, much like Kazakhstan, based simply on the fact that it had the 
language in its English-law debt.385 Lead managers from Merrill Lynch 
reportedly refused.386 But there may have been other, lower-profile issuers 
that asked and faced little resistance. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Public explanations of the rapid market-wide shift in sovereign bond 
amendment provisions reflect a traditional understanding of contracts. In 
the official accounts of the CAC episode, contract terms matter because 
they regulate the actions of contract parties: they facilitate or impede debt 
workouts; motivate decisions to pay, default, hold out, or restructure; and 
serve as vehicles for contingency planning and risk allocation between the 
sovereign and its bondholders. Absent statutory bankruptcy, a sovereign 
constrained by unanimity might refrain from launching a debt 
restructuring, while bondholders might leverage unanimity to extract side 
payments. When negotiating new contracts, a sovereign that expects to 
restructure (arguably a defining feature of the emerging market asset 
class387) might seek lower amendment thresholds. Bondholders would 
seek amendment thresholds high enough to control “rogue” borrowers, but 
not so high as to invite holdouts and deadweight losses. A reasonably high 
majority amendment clause in emerging market bonds seems desirable and 
attainable from this perspective.  
Why did it take so long to break the unanimity habit in New York? 
Literature on boilerplate would point to learning and network externalities. 
These in turn underlie many of the public explanations for the shift: 
governments, investors, lawyers, and official and private groups variously 
 
 
 385. Interview 052506D, supra note 284. 
 386. Id. 
 387. See Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff & Miguel A. Savastano, Debt Intolerance, 2003 
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get credit for helping market participants overcome switching costs 
associated with learning and network effects.388 
Collective action problems and switching costs also help justify 
government involvement in private contracts. SDRM makes sense both as 
an alternative means of promoting collective action, and as a stick to push 
the markets to switch to CACs—a way of altering the calculus for 
switching costs. 
But the view of contracts we got in most of our interviews differed 
from the one that underpins all of these explanations. Despite the apparent 
risks of holdouts under unanimity, and the equally apparent merits of 
majority amendment as a fix, participants in the CAC shift consistently 
refused to cite these as motivating factors for their efforts. Early movers 
asserted that amendment terms had no bearing on a sovereign’s decision to 
default or restructure, were routinely ignored by investors buying 
sovereign bonds, and while potentially helpful at the margins, may not 
function as expected in crisis. Whether or not this is the case, the 
interviews give us no basis to conclude that parties adopted CACs to 
improve their contracts, and therefore provide no basis to assess the 
learning and network explanations.  
Instead, the participants’ attitude to contracts evokes Stewart 
Macaulay’s classic 1963 study of Wisconsin manufacturers.389 Macaulay 
found that contracts often played a bit part in the business relationships 
they purported to govern.390 This conclusion was at odds with the 
prevailing contracts literature, which was built on the presumption that 
contracts mattered in a very literal sense for their stated technical function. 
Macaulay’s findings raised three kinds of questions for contracts 
scholarship. First, how should courts interpret terms left vague or 
apparently ignored by the parties? Second, if contracts (or, for that matter, 
the law) did not govern business relationships, what did? Third, why 
would anyone spend time and money on contract terms that were, in the 
parties’ own words, beside the point? 
Answers to the first two questions are the subject of a distinguished 
literature.391 The third question has drawn increasing attention from 
 
 
 388. Taylor was among those who suggested paying countries to switch. Taylor, supra note 130.  
 389. Macaulay, supra note 16.  
 390. Id. at 57–67. 
 391. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. 
REV. 1089 (1981) for a classic treatment of the first question. Macaulay’s own study focused on 
answering the second question. Although it addresses statutes and ordinances more than contracts, 
Ellickson’s research on economic relations among cattle ranchers offers critical insights into the 
second question. ELLICKSON, supra note 18. Lisa Bernstein’s work is an example of the first two 
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scholars.392 While our project did not start out trying to answer the third 
question, our findings point in its direction. We studied sophisticated 
market actors who deliberately changed their contracts in an apparent 
attempt at contingency planning. But most of them told us that they were 
not worried about the contingency the new terms addressed, and insisted 
that these terms were at best marginally useful in managing risks 
associated with default. They said they adopted the terms in their private 
contracts primarily to send a public message—to governments, 
international institutions, and the broader markets—in the hope of getting 
political, reputational, and economic benefits. 
Law scholars and economists have written about the use of contracts to 
send messages. In 1941, Lon Fuller described what he called a 
“channeling function” of the contract form.393 According to Fuller, parties 
write their contracts not only to serve as evidence in court or to constrain 
one another’s commercial behavior, but also to communicate something 
about their relationship to the outside world.394 Contract theorists in 
economics have described instances where the contract form itself serves 
as a signal, conveying information to would-be parties.395 More recently, 
Mark Suchman proposed the notion of “contract as artifact,” where a 
contractual device serves not only as a technical solution but also as a 
symbol and gesture.396  
 
 
questions joined: she identifies private commercial norm systems, but argues against judicial reliance 
on commercial custom in contract interpretation. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the 
Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: 
A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999). See also Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs 
Exist? in Jody S. Kraut & Steven D. Walt, eds., THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE 
AND COMMERCIAL LAW 118–48 (2000) (arguing that judges bring their experience and biases to bear 
in identifying custom). 
 392. Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 91 (2003), offers the 
broadest theoretical framework for answering the third question. The literature on the “boilerplate” 
phenomenon (see Goetz & Scott and Kahan & Klausner, supra note 4; Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra 
note 259) addresses one aspect of the question: why parties fail to reform suboptimal terms. Few legal 
studies offer an affirmative case for including contract terms for reasons other than their mechanical 
function. But see, e.g., Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language and Norms in Complex Business 
Contracting, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 29, 56 (2001) (suggesting that the signaling value of contract 
terms may be distinct from their mechanical function). 
 393. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801–03 (1941). 
 394. Id.  
 395. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. 
REV. 388 (1987), for a domestic commercial example; Joseph Stiglitz, unpublished manuscript on file 
with authors (2007), for a related argument in the sovereign context; see generally PATRICK BOLTON 
& MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 100–27 (2005).  
 396. Suchman, supra note 392, at 108–15. See also Hill, supra note 392, at 56. 
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The function of CACs and of the contract form more broadly that 
emerges from our interviews resonates with these strands of the literature. 
But it is not an easy fit. For example, our interviewees frequently 
described their use, non-use, support of, or opposition to CACs as 
“signaling”.397 Yet CACs look ineffective as an economic signaling 
device—a way to tell good borrowers or instruments apart from bad ones 
in the face of information asymmetries.398 Before 2003, all emerging 
market sovereigns issuing bonds in New York, regardless of credit quality, 
used contracts with unanimity. To the extent unanimity was meant to 
signal that bonds would not be restructured, exchange offers (especially 
Ecuador’s) made it meaningless.399 After Mexico, Brazil, and Uruguay 
changed their bond contracts in 2003, adopting CACs in New York 
became effectively costless for sovereigns, again, regardless of their credit 
rating. The precise formulation of an issuer’s CACs, including the voting 
threshold, also seemed to lose significance almost immediately as a means 
of conveying the likelihood of default or restructuring.400 
In our contacts’ accounts of the CAC shift, “signaling” (in the broader 
sense of using contract terms to communicate) was often done by and 
directed at non-parties—people and institutions outside the contract. The 
same contract form conveyed different messages depending on who was 
communicating, with whom, and when; it became a medium of 
communication. For example, CACs may have communicated both 
Mexico’s status as a market leader and the Bush administration’s desire to 
stop bailouts, Brazil’s claim to be part of the Mexico cohort, and its desire 
to please both the official sector and private investors in hard times. At 
some point between 1996 and 2005, CACs in New York–law bonds went 
from standing for economic weakness, reduced willingness to pay, and 
 
 
 397. Participants used similar language in public statements. For example, Taylor observed, “I did 
look for opportunities to take some immediate actions that would signal change, in particular, that we 
wanted to move in the direction of ‘rules’ or ‘limits’ [on official lending] . . . .” TAYLOR, supra note 
79, at 108. Mexican officials said the CAC move was meant “‘to send a signal’ to the markets, and that 
. . . there was almost no chance of a debt restructuring within the next 12 years.” Authers, supra note 
80. 
 398. A. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 355 (1973) 
(describing a mechanism by which good employees can distinguish themselves from bad ones by 
acquiring costly but otherwise useless education). 
 399. Cf. Choi & Gulati, supra note 17 (describing Ecuador’s restructuring as a shock that reduced 
the value of unanimity as a device to discipline debtors). Regardless of its technical efficacy, 
unanimity’s value as a signal that bonds could not be restructured would have been lost. Cf. discussion 
of “moral commitment” in Brady bonds, supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 400. For example, lawyers for a leading trade association observed that their contract analysis 
product was most interesting to academics; members paid little attention. Interview (Jun. 4, 2007). 
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official coercion of private creditors, to standing for strength, for market 
and political leadership, and market-friendly policies.401 
Our interviews also raise new questions about the role of governments 
in the incident. Much of the credit for the CAC shift goes to newly 
appointed U.S. officials anxious to distance themselves (at least 
symbolically) from their predecessors’ crisis management strategy. They 
invested unprecedented time, prestige, and intellectual resources in 
promoting an increasingly familiar and inoffensive contract term under 
historically favorable market conditions. The campaign proceeded in 
tandem with a statutory alternative, which came to look viable almost 
accidentally, thanks to the intervention of a maverick U.S. Treasury 
Secretary. The official sector encouraged drafting efforts and pricing 
studies whose principal value appears to have been rhetorical and political. 
The G-10-sponsored drafting group in particular implicated leading 
private sector lawyers in the official effort, spurred competition with trade 
associations seeking a different market standard,402 and ultimately created 
an implicit benchmark for countries’ clauses. 
For issuers and bondholders alike, all this activity did not reduce, but 
exacerbated uncertainty about future crisis management. It also 
destabilized sovereign bond boilerplate, dislodged settled meanings, and 
opened a range of contract terms to variation. Mexican debt managers 
described this as a threat; Buchheit saw an opportunity. 
This pattern of official activity does not look like regulation, even of 
the soft “cueing” variety. Despite persistent misperceptions to the 
contrary,403 the U.S. government did not preempt private contracting in the 
CAC episode, as it had in the Trust Indenture Act’s unanimity requirement 
for U.S. corporate bonds. Officials’ adoption of private contract terms as a 
symbol of their free-market agenda, and especially their deep involvement 
in drafting and negotiating substantive content, resemble the behavior of a 
party.  
This observation is consistent with Bulow and Rogoff’s view of 
sovereign debt as a three-party relationship. Creditor-country taxpayers 
have a vested interest in the resolution of sovereign debt crises (for 
 
 
 401. This fits well with Suchman’s “symbolic” accounts of contract formation and contract 
regimes. He borrows from anthropologists, describing contract terms deployed as “signs” and 
“gestures” that change meaning over time and depending on who is using them, and perform 
legitimating functions for specific actors and actions. Suchman, supra note 392, at 110–14, 126–28. 
 402. Creditors sought to control debtor moral hazard, pointing to Argentina as the “rogue debtor”. 
Porzecanski, supra note 96. For the role of associations in producing boilerplate, see Kevin E. Davis, 
The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate 104 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2006). 
 403. See, e.g., Beattie, supra note 78. 
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example, to maintain mutually beneficial trade), and are willing to make 
side payments to debtors and creditors to make the deal happen.404 The 
long history of official involvement in sovereign debt matters may have 
led debtors and creditors to believe they had a contingent claim on the 
official sector Taking Bush II Treasury officials at their word, they saw 
themselves as unwitting third parties to sovereign bond contracts, 
committed to provide financing in the event the parties failed to restructure 
in crisis. The CAC initiative was presented as a way to prod the private 
sector to write the official sector out of the boilerplate, eliminating or 
reducing the scope for a bailout. According to Taylor, “a rules-based 
reform of the IMF was inseparably linked to a reform of the process for 
sovereign debt restructuring.”405 The strategy would work only if CACs in 
fact facilitated restructuring without official intervention. 
Here the communicative and instrumental functions of contract terms 
blend: a quasi-party, such as the U.S. government, seeks to use 
amendment provisions to remove itself from the contract. U.S. advocacy 
of CACs both told the world about the policy shift and tried to accomplish 
the policy shift via contract change. In another example of blending, the 
investment community and Mexico deployed CACs to preempt official 
initiatives, notably SDRM. Preemption was an instrumental use of clauses, 
albeit not one readily discernible from reading their language. Adopting 
CACs sent the message that the market solved the collective action 
problem on its own; the contractual solution obviated the need for SDRM. 
These examples raise the question of how the technical, instrumental, 
and communicative functions of contract relate to one another. For 
example, if CACs did not, as a technical matter, make a material 
difference in a debt workout, were they less credible as a gesture on the 
part of the Bush II Administration? On the other hand, did CACs’ success 
at preempting official initiatives reflect their efficacy at solving collective 
action problems? 
Answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this article. No one 
knows for sure how CACs will work in the next crisis.406 Our study does 
 
 
 404. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Multilateral Negotiations for Rescheduling Developing 
Country Debt: A Bargaining-Theoretic Framework, 35 IMF STAFF PAPERS 644 (1988). For an 
alternative view of three-party sovereign debt negotiations, see Sachs, supra note 12. Similarly, a U.S. 
cabinet official we interviewed referred to the public sector’s predicament as “the realtor squeeze”—an 
analogy to real estate brokers who sacrifice part of their commission to close a home sale. Interview 
(Dec. 19, 2006).  
 405. TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 110. 
 406. This does not mean, of course, that sophisticated market participants could not calculate 
amendment thresholds, but rather that none was willing to predict how the presence of CACs might 
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not stand for the proposition that they in fact do not or could not matter, or 
should be ignored. Our interviews reveal only that CACs had a 
communicative function apart from and in addition to any actual or 
potential technical function, that this communicative function had both 
public policy and private market dimensions, and that in 2003, CACs’ 
value as a communication device, more than their technical merits, was 
instrumental in the market-wide boilerplate shift. At this writing, one 
small issuer, Belize (a Buchheit client), has used New York–law CACs to 
restructure a bond. The transaction concluded without incident—as did 
most of the CAC-less restructurings before it.407 Just about everyone we 
interviewed agreed that in the next big crisis, CACs might help on the 
margins, but will not change the policy response or the economic outcome. 
Perhaps the next crisis will have nothing to do with New York–law bonds. 
Do Ghanaian-law bonds have CACs?408 
 
 
affect issuer and investor behavior in a restructuring, or bet against a maverick litigator forcing a small 
debt issue out of a restructuring notwithstanding the presence of CACs. 
 407. Participation rates were in the high 90s, about on par with Ecuador and Uruguay. Interview 
092205, supra note 250. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text; see generally 
STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 44, for other restructuring outcomes. 
 408. Kathryn Wells, Sovereigns Look Abroad: G8 Debt Relief Package Will Not Constrain 
Issuance Plans, EUROMONEY, Aug. 9, 2006, at 54. 
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